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Enflasyonist Güdüler ve Güvenilirlik Problemi

Inflationary Incentives and Credibility Problem

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The subject of this study is the new analysis method which is widely adopted by modern studies in the field of monetary policy. According to the traditional studies, inflation is everywhere and every time a monetary phenomenon and revealed only by more rapid increase in the monetary quantity than increase in output. However, most country experiences have showed that the monetary authorities have putted forth a tendency towards allowing excessive expansion in money supply. Appreciating the incentives giving a direction to this tendency that was showed by monetary authorities and the efforts of building up policy proposals in this framework is a differing characteristic of modern monetary policy studies from the traditional one. Such that, in modern studies, changes in money supply and inflation are considered in a framework of strategic and informational interactions between monetary authorities and private sector agents. The studies can be classified into two main groups according to which kind of incentive they focus on: The studies focus on sequential nature of policy making process, i.e. time inconsistency problem and on political nature of policy making process, i.e. political business cycle. The shared points of view of the studies are to emphasize the credibility problem and to argue that the credibility is an indispensible provision of effective monetary policy. In this context, the aim of our study is to achieve the widening of this point of view which is not discussed sufficiently, in the academic circles. In this way, the policy recommendations extracted from this literature will become acceptable among the public opinion and the politicians. Consequently, the problem of lack of political feasibility which is one of the most important barriers for implementing policy proposals will be overcomed.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu çalışmanın konusu, para politikası alanındaki modern çalışmalarda yaygın bir şekilde benimsenen yeni analiz yöntemidir. Geleneksel çalışmalara göre, enf¬lasyon her zaman ve her yerde parasal bir olgudur ve sadece para miktarı artışı¬nın hasıladaki artıştan daha hızlı olmasıyla ortaya çıkabilir. Bununla birlikte, çoğu ülke deneyimi, para otoritelerinin para arzında aşırı genişlemeye izin verme yö¬nünde bir eğilim sergilediklerini göstermiştir. Para otoritelerinin sergiledikleri bu eğilime yön veren güdülerin anlaşılması ve politika önerilerinin bu çerçevede geliş¬tirilmesi çabası ise, modern para politikası çalışmalarını geleneksel olanlardan farklılaştıran bir niteliktir. Şöyle ki, modern çalışmalarda, para arzı ile enflasyon¬daki değişimler, para otoriteleri ile özel sektör ajanları arasındaki, stratejik ve enformasyonel etkileşimler çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Bu çalışmalar, hangi tür güdüler üzerinde yoğunlaştıkları itibariyle iki ana grupta sınıflandırılabilir: Po¬litika yapma sürecinin ardışık doğasına yoğunlaşan çalışmalar, yani zaman tutarsız¬lığı problemi, ve politika yapma sürecinin siyasal doğasına yoğunlaşan çalışmalar, yani politik iş çevrimleri. Çalışmaların ortak noktası ise güvenilirlik probleminin vurgulanması ve güvenilirliğin etkili bir para politikası stratejisinin vazgeçilmez bir koşulu olduğunun ileri sürülmesidir. Bu bağlamda çalışmamızın amacı, ülkemizde henüz yeterince tartışılmayan bu bakış açısının akademik çevrelerde yaygınlaştı¬rılmasını sağlamaktır. Böylece, bu literatürden çıkan politika önerileri, kamuoyun¬da ve politikacılar arasında kabul edilebilir hale gelecektir. Dolayısıyla, politika önerilerinin uygulanmasında karşılaşılan en önemli engellerden biri olan siyasal ola¬rak uygulanabilir olmama sorunu aşılabilecektir.
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