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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER VE RASYONELLİK: BÜROKRATİK POLİTİKANIN ALANA KATKISI VE GELECEĞİN ÖNGÖRÜLMESİNDE RASYONELLİK VARSAYIMININ ÖNEMİ

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND RATIONALITY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS TO THE FIELD AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION IN PREDICTING THE FUTURE

Journal Name:

  • Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2012

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

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Abstract (2. Language): 
Having embraced the assumption of the individual’s rationality, most studies in International Relations conclude that groups, institutions, and states are also rational actors and can take rational decisions. To these assumptions the strongest criticism so far has come from bureaucratic-politics studies. This article, through reviewing the seminal works in bureaucratic politics, reflects on the criticisms leveled against the rationality assumption at three basic levels, namely individual, group, and bureaucracy. Although bureaucratic politics has made invaluable contribution to the field by demonstrating that actors sometimes did not and cannot take rational decisions, if social scientists’ objective is not only explanation and understanding but also prediction, then, the rationality assumption is somewhat necessary. Those social scientists, who have been trying to contribute to the development of social science and to provide policy suggestions with leaders and policy makers, will need to adopt the assumption of rationality and simplify complex social issues and the data in hand. This conclusion does not mean that we can underestimate the frequency or the importance of irrational behavior in international politics, but that social scientists working under the assumption of rationality can better hope that we can predict future events
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe genel olarak bireylerin “rasyonel” olduğundan hareket edilerek, tümevarımsal yöntemle kurumların ve devletlerin de rasyonel aktörler olduğu ve rasyonel kararlar aldığı varsayılır. Bu varsayıma en kapsamlı eleştiri “bürokratik politika” çalışmalarından gelmiştir. Makale, bürokrasi, grup ve birey düzeylerinde bürokratik politikanın rasyonellik varsayımına getirdiği eleştirileri alanın en önemli eserlerine değinerek ele almaktadır. Her ne kadar bürokratik politika aktörlerin bazen rasyonel kararlar almadığını ve alamayacağını ortaya koysa da, eğer bilim ve teoriden amacımız açıklama ve anlamaya ek olarak geleceği de öngörmekse, rasyonellik varsayımına ihtiyacımız vardır. Sosyal bilimlerin gelişimine katkıda bulunma ve karar alıcılara tavsiyeler verme amacındaki bilim insanları, karmaşık veriler ile olayları basitleştirmeye ve aktörlerin rasyonel olduğunu varsaymaya ihtiyaç duyacaklardır. Bu sonuç, uluslararası politikada irrasyonel davranış ve kararların azımsanacak oranda olduğunu değil, rasyonellik varsayımını benimseyen bilim insanının geleceği öngörmede daha umutlu olacağını vurgulamaktadır
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PDF icon arastirmax-uluslararasi-iliskiler-rasyonellik-burokratik-politikanin-alana-katkisi-gelecegin-ongorulmesinde-rasyonellik-varsayiminin-onemi.pdf
  • 3
85-103
  • Turkish

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