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Bankacılık Sektöründe Asimetrik Bilgi: Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri

Asymmetric Information In Banking Sector: Problems And Suggestions

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a vital and lively field of economic research for a long time. The models with imperfect information are the subjects that researchers have been focused on. In this market, banks are the lenders; individuals and firms are the borrowers. Lenders are believed to be not always in a position to know the true state of their borrowers and/or borrowers´ quality of investment projects although lenders would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers. Asymmetric information in credit markets may lead to market failure and has macro economic effects as a whole. In this study, we explore how asymmetric information and uncertainty can lead to failure in markets and how to overcome these problems.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Asimetrik bilgiye dayanan piyasa teorileri literatürde uzun bir zamandır incelenmektedir. Tam olmayan bilgiye dayalı modeller arastırmacıların yoğunlastığı alanlardır. Bir çok piyasa gibi kredi piyasalarında da asimetrik bilgi sorununa rastlanmaktadır. Bu piyasada genellikle bankalar kredi arz eden, kisi veya kurumlar ise kredi talep eden konumundadır. Bankaların kredi talebinde bulunan müsterileri veya müsterilerinin yatırım projeleri hakkında her zaman doğru bilgiye sahip olması mümkün değildir. Ancak sahip olmaları durumunda bankaların bu durumdan çok büyük avantaj sağlayacakları da kesindir. Kredi piyasalarında asimetrik bilgi sorunu sonucunda ters seçim ve ahlaki tehlike olmak üzere iki önemli sorun ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu tür sorunların piyasa aksaklıklarına neden olduğu ve ekonominin isleyisini bozduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalısmada, kredi piyasalarında özellikle bankacılık sektöründe asimetrik bilginin yarattığı ters seçim ve ahlaki tehlike problemleri ve çözüm önerileri detaylı bir literatür taraması yoluyla tartısılmaya çalısılmıstır.

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