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Ülkelerarası Büyüme Farklılıklarının Açıklanmasında Kurumsal Yapının Rolü: Panel Veri Analizi

The Role of Institutional Structure Explaining the Growth Differences across Countries: Panel Data Analysis

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The question of why some countries grow faster than other countries is one of the main issues discussed by economists for many years. In recent years, institutional structure has been gaining increasing relevance in economic growth literature to explain growth differences across countries. In this study, the effects of institutional structure on economic growth analyzed for 110 countries using the panel data during the period 2000-2009 by using different indicators to represent the institutional structure. The results revealed that the effect of institutional structure on the economic growth differs by the development level. Moreover, institutional structure is one of the important determinants of economic growth especially in the developed countries.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Neden bazı ülkeler diğer ülkelerden daha hızlı büyümektedir sorusu uzun yıllardır iktisatçıların tartıştığı temel konuların başında gelmektedir. Bu doğrultuda son yıllarda büyüme literatüründe öne çıkan görüş, ülkeler arası iktisadi büyüme farklılıklarının kurumsal yapı farklılıkları ile açıklanmasıdır. Bu çalışmada kurumsal yapının iktisadi büyüme üzerindeki etkisi 110 ülke için 2000-2009 yılları arasını kapsayan dönemde panel veri yöntemi kullanılarak araştırılmıştır. Kurumsal yapıyı temsil etmek üzere farklı göstergeler kullanılmıştır. Elde edilen sonuçlar, kurumsal yapının iktisadi büyüme üzerindeki etkisinin ülkelerin gelir düzeylerine göre değişme gösterdiğini ve özellikle gelişmiş olan ülkelerde iktisadi büyümenin önemli belirleyicilerinden biri olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.
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