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Sağlık Hizmetleri Piyasasında Asimetrik Bilgiye Bağlı Problemler ve Çözüm Önerileri

Problems Based on Asymmetric Information i n Healthcare Market and Resolutıons

Journal Name:

  • Hacettepe Sağlık İdaresi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2008

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

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Abstract (2. Language): 
According to the theoretical and empirical studies in health care markets in the last years, health expenditures have been rising relatively. The basic reasons of increased health expenditures are an average increase in life time, development of health acknowledgement among people, use of advanced technology and especially the problems due to asymmetric information. The problems related to asymmetric information are adverse selection, moral hazard and induced supplier demand. Health economists and healthcare policymakers propose the supply side cost sharing, demand side cost sharing and mixed payment system for the problems dealt with asymmetric information. Some researchers suggest that health expenditures would decrease if the patients met their healthcare expenditure by themselves. On the other hand, some other researcher’s claim that the above suggestion wouldn’t be reasonable since healthcare market has some special rules and different market structure from other markets. Health services are over consumed and hence costs tend to increase when uncertainty, asymmetric information and health insurance of health service market are given in health care market. The success of cost sharing approach depends on standardization of the possibility of health care services measured and assessed.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Son yıllarda sağlık hizmetleri piyasası alanında yapılan teorik ve ampirik çalışmalara göre, sağlık harcamaları nispeten hızlı artış göstermektedir. Sağlık harcamalarındaki artışın temel nedenleri olarak; nüfusun yaşlanması, sağlık bilincinin artması, ileri teknoloji kullanımının yaygınlaşması gibi faktörler yanında özellikle asimetrik bilgiye bağlı problemlere dikkat çekilmektedir. Asimetrik bilgiye bağlı problemler; ters seçim, ahlaki tehlike ve arzın talep yaratmasıdır. Sağlık iktisatçıları ve politika yapıcılar asimetrik bilginin neden olduğu problemlere çözüm olarak; arz yanlı maliyet paylaşımı, talep yanlı maliyet paylaşımı ve karma ödeme sistemini önermektedirler. Araştırmacıların bir kısmı, sağlık piyasasındaki aktörlerin maliyete katlanmaları durumunda sağlık harcamalarında düşüş olacağını savunmaktadır. Diğer bir kısmı ise sağlık hizmetleri piyasasının kendine özgü kuralları ve piyasa yapısı nedeniyle uygulamanın başarılı olamayacağını ifade etmektedir. Sağlık hizmetleri piyasasında belirsizlik, asimetrik bilgi ve sağlık sigortası veri iken sağlık hizmetleri aşırı tüketilmekte ve maliyetler artmaktadır. Maliyet paylaşımı yaklaşımının başarılı olabilmesi, sağlık hizmetlerinin ölçülebilir ve değerlendirilebilir standart bir yapıya kavuşturulmasına bağlıdır.
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201-228
  • Turkish

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