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ULUSLARARASI DÖVİZ KURU SİSTEMLERİNİN GELECEĞİ: BRETTON WOODS’A GERİ DÖNÜLEBİLİR Mİ?

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The dramatic changes that has gone trough under the international monetary order; especially the global financial crisis have affected the IMF member countries exchange rate regime choices. The revival of a multilateral exchange rate system with one anchor currency is not a viable or realistic option. The “de jure” classification systems announced by countries and “de facto” exchange rate regimes have differed from each other. A more realistic case is a tripolar in the short run. In medium and long run it can be multipolar when China is taking account. In the global exchange rate system there are few anchor currencies competing with each other, globalization contradicts with international monopolies. Monopolies of currencies are included in this context. In this paper I will try to explain why there is no way back to Bretton Woods or any system based on single world anchor currency.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Parasal düzendeki son 10 yıl içerisinde gerçeklesen global finansal kriz gibi değisimler IMF üyesi ülkelerin döviz kuru rejim tercihlerini de etkilemistir. Tek bir çıpa para birimine bağlı çok yanlı döviz kuru sisteminin gerçekçi bir seçenek olmadığı, ülkelerin resmi olarak ilan ettikleri kur rejimi ile fiili kur rejimi arasında farklılıklar olduğu ortaya çıkmıstır. Daha gerçekçi olan durum üç kutuplu döviz kuru sistemi olup orta ve uzun dönemde Çin dikkate alındığında kutup sayısının arttığı gözlemlenebilir. Küresel döviz kuru sisteminde (ERS) az sayıda birbirleriyle rekabet eden çıpa para birimleri vardır. Küresellesme uluslar arası tekellesme ile ters düsmektedir. Buna para birimlerinin tekellesmesi de dahildir. Bu çalısmada neden tek bir çıpaya bağlı tekil dünyaya dayalı Bretton Woods sistemine dönüs olamayacağı açıklanacaktır.
108-115

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