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ULUSLARARASI SERMAYE HAREKETLİLİĞİ ALTINDA POLİTİKA KARIŞIMLARI VE PARTİZAN IRAKSAMALAR

POLICY MIXES AND PARTISAN DIVERGENCES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY

Journal Name:

  • İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2011

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and liberalization of capital movements have led to begin a new era for international economic system. In this respect, the role of international capital mobility on the determination of economic policies has increasingly gained importance. It is expected that liberalization in financial markets leads to convergence in economic policies by removing intercountry differences and limits domestic policy autonomy. However, the theoretical and empirical studies on external policy convergence indicate that the evidence on external policy divergence or domestic policy autonomy is much stronger. In this study, we concentrate on how the policy mixes are determined under international capital mobility and try to explain within David H. Bearce’s theoretical approach how the monetary and fiscal policy choices of governments result in policy divergences. In this context, we aim to make a theoretical review by clarifying the role of partisan-ideological factors on policy divergences.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Bretton Woods sisteminin çöküşü ile birlikte sermaye hareketlerinin serbestleşmesi uluslararası ekonomik sistem açısından yeni bir dönemin başlamasına sebep olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, uluslararası sermaye hareketliliğinin iktisat politikalarının belirlenmesinde oynadığı rol de giderek önem kazanmıştır. Finansal piyasalarda görülen liberalleşmenin ülkeler arası farklılıkları ortadan kaldırarak iktisat politikalarında yakınsamaya yol açması ve iç politika otonomisini sınırlaması beklenen bir durumdur. Ancak dış politika yakınsaması üzerine yapılan teorik ve ampirik çalışmalar, dış politika ıraksaması ya da iç politika otonomisini destekler nitelikteki bulguların daha güçlü olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası sermaye hareketliliği altında politika karışımlarının nasıl belirlendiği üzerinde durularak hükümetlerin para ve maliye politikası tercihlerinin, politika ıraksamalarına yol açabildiği hususu, David H. Bearce’ın teorik yaklaşımı çerçevesinde açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, politika ıraksamalarında partizan-ideolojik faktörlerin rolü üzerinde durularak konuya ilişkin teorik bir inceleme yapılması amaçlanmaktadır.
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  • 2
148-155
  • Turkish

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