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Alternatif Olanaklar Prensibinin İki Türü

Two Kinds of Principle of Alternative Possibilities

Journal Name:

  • Kaygı: Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2012

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Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
It is taken to be self-evident that freedom requires being able to do otherwise, by most incompatibilists, and some compatibilists; however, there are more than one way to interpret the meaning of “being able to do otherwise.” In this paper, two different versions of principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) are discussed: One of these PAPs is related to determinacy, and the other is related to supervenience. I defend that PAP which is about determinacy and, which is widely being used by incompatibilist has nothing to do with freedom, and the other PAP cannot be satisfied in a physicalistic world.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Başka türlü yapabilme olanağı özgür iradenin gereklilikleri arasında olduğu, çoğu uyuşurcular (compatibilist) ve bazı uyuşmazcılar (incompatibilist) tarafından tartışılmasına gerek olmayan bir gerçek olarak görülmektedir; ancak “başka türlü yapabilme olanağı”nın anlamı farklı biçimlerde yorumlanabilir. Bu yazıda iki farklı alternatif olanaklar prensibi (AOP) (principle of alternative possibilities) tartışılıyor: Bu AOP’lerden birisi belirlilikle (determinacy) ilgili, diğeri ise metafizik bağımlılıkla (supervenience) ilgilidir. Belirlilikle ilgili olan ve uyuşmazcılar tarafından yoğun olarak kullanılan AOP’nin özgür iradeyle ilgisi olmadığını ve diğer AOP’nin de fizikalist bir dünyada karşılanamayacağını savunuyorum.
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  • 19
133-137
  • Turkish

REFERENCES

References: 

INWAGEN, Peter van (1978) “Ability and Responsibility,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 87, iss. 2 (April, 1978), pp. 201-24.
GINET, Carl (1996) “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 30 (1996), pp. 403-17.
KANE, Robert (1989) “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, iss. 2, (December 1989) , pp. 219-54.
KANE, Robert (1996) The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
KANE, Robert (1999) “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, iss. 5, (May, 1999), pp. 217-40.
HUME, David (1975) An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, third edition revised by P. H. Nidditch, New York: Oxford.
MOORE, G. E. (1912) Ethics, chap. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MCINTYRE, Alison (1994) “Compatibilists Could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility and Negative Agency,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 103, iss. 3 (July, 1994), pp. 453-88.

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