You are here

RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD THE CASPIAN REGION: FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN

Journal Name:

Publication Year:

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The dramatic passing of the reins of presidential power in Russia from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin at the end of 1999 raised the intriguing question of whether a change in the chief executive at the top makes a discernible difference in a state’s foreign policy. Keeping this in mind, the present study asks whether Yeltsin’s replacement by Putin resulted in significant changes in Russia’s policy toward the Caspian region. In so doing, three narrower questions need to be addressed: (1) Did Russia’s policy toward the Caspian region change significantly during this period; (2) Was any such change in policy substantially attributable to the change in the individual occupying the presidency; and (3) What was the role of other factors in accounting for any policy change. For the sake of analysis, the major factors considered as relevant for determining Russian policy toward the Caspian region will be grouped under three headings: external, bureaucratic/organizational, and individual. It should be added that at its outset this study hypothesized that the apparent great individual differences between Yeltsin and Putin would result in significant differences in Russian policy toward the Caspian region. After briefly considering definitional, theoretical, and methodological issues, the study compares the Yeltsin and Putin periods with respect to three parameters for Russian policy: external factors, bureaucratic/organizational factors, and individual factors. Next, the study compares the policies Russia actually pursued toward the Caspian region under Yeltsin and Putin on two dimensions: (1) security and political policies, and (2) energy and pipeline policies. Finally, the study concludes by summarizing its findings, attempting to explain them, and discussing their implications.
35-48

REFERENCES

References: 

1. E.g., see John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (7th ed.; Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 1997): chaps 3-5.
2. Although Andrew Bennett makes a useful distinction between bureaucratic politics and organizational politics as types of explanations of political processes and decision-making, this distinction is developed in the present study(Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet Russian Interventionism, 1973-1996 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
3. See Bennett, chap. 8; Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
4. For a list of the members of the Security Council, see “Executive Branch,” NIS Observed: An Analytical Review 5, no. 9 (21 June 2000) , 5 Nov. 2000. Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin was added to the Security Council in June 2000. “Putin Brings Kvashnin Closer,” Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 12 July 2000: 18.
46 Philip S. GILLETTE
5. “Putin Brings Kvashnin Closer.”
6. Marina Dracheva, “Russia Reasserts Leading Role in Caspian,” Oil Daily, 25 April 2000, Infotrac, Expanded Academic ASAP.
7. Amy Knight, “The Enduring Legacy of the KGB in Russian Politics,” Problems of Post-Communism 47:4 (July/August 1999): 4.
8. Vladmir Putin. Address to the Nation.
9. See statements by Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council, lecture at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, reported 15 March 2000, Sevodyna, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 12 April 2000: 7; and Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister, ITAR/TASS News Agency, 24 May 2000, Infotrac, Expanded Academic ASAP.
10. Stanislav Cherniavskiy, “The Caucasus Vector of Russian Diplomacy.” Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of Social and Political Studies, 2000, no. 5: 94.
11. For details, see U.S.Energy Information Administration,“Caspian Sea Oil and Natural Gas Export Routes,” , 8 Nov. 2000.
12. Richard Giragosian, “Massive Kashagan Oil Strike Renews Geopolitical Offensive in Caspian,” Central Asian and Caucasus Analyst, 7 June 2000. .
13. “PUTIN, NAZARBAYEV URGE PROGRESS IN CASPIAN TALKS,” Interfax Diplomatic Panorama for 20 June 2000. World News Connection.
14. “PUTIN AND NAZARBAYEV REAFFIRM WARM RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KAZAKSTAN,” 20 June 2000, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 19 July 2000: 16.
15. “MOSCOW AND ASTANA’S THREE PRIORITIES,” 21 June 2000, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 19 July 2000: 17.
16. “RUSSIA DEFINES ITS PRIORITIES ON THE CASPIAN,” 18 July 2000, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 16 Aug. 2000: 17; “MAKING THE CASPIAN A SEA OF PEACE AND STABILITY,” 28 July 2000, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 23 Aug. 2000: 16.

Thank you for copying data from http://www.arastirmax.com