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Güvenilir Bir Para Politikası Stratejisinin Kurumsal Çerçevesi

Institutional Framework of a Credible Monetary Policy Strategy

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Abstract (2. Language): 
Modern studies in the field of monetary policy focus on the analysis of sequential or political nature of policy-making process. According to the findings of these studies, credibility is an indispensible component of effective monetary policy strategy. The policy proposal set forth in this framework is to make the institutional designs that will solve the credibility problem resulting from inflationary incentives of politicians and/or policy-makers. The designs under consideration can be gathered un¬der four main categories: Central bank independence, rules vs. Discretion, transpar¬ency and accountability and fiscal discipline. The evaluations related to these designs which are determining the credibility and/or effectiveness of monetary policy consti¬tute the subject of our study. In this manner, we can attain a criterion that can be use for comparing the alternative monetary policy strategies. In this context, our study aims at determining the criterion mentioned.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Para politikası alanındaki modern çalışmalar, politika yapma sürecinin ardışık veya siyasal doğasının analizi üzerinde odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmaların bulgu¬larına göre, güvenilirlik etkili bir para politikası stratejisinin vazgeçilmez bir bile¬şenidir. Bu çerçevede geliştirilen politika önerisi ise, politikacılar ve/veya politika yapıcıların enflasyonist güdülerinden kaynaklanan güvenilirlik problemini çözümle¬yecek olan kurumsal düzenlemelerin yapılmasıdır. Söz konusu düzenlemeler dört ana başlık altında toplanabilir: Merkez bankasının bağısızlığı, takdir yetkisine kar¬şı kurallar, şeffaflık ve hesap verme ve mali disiplin. Çalışmamızın konusunu, para politikasının güvenilirliğini ve/veya etkililiğini belirleyen bu düzenlemelere ilişkin değerlendirmeler oluşturmaktadır. Böylece, alternatif para politikası stratejileri¬ni karşılaştırmada kullanılabilecek olan bir ölçüte ulaşabiliriz. Bu bağlamda, çalış¬mamız söz konusu ölçütün belirlenmesini amaçlamaktadır.

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