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Açık Artırma Teorisi Üzerine Bir Çalışma

Journal Name:

  • Kocaeli Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2007

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
In this paper I will analyze theoretical work on auctions. After giving some assumptions and the model I will analyze the types of auctions in theory. There two oral auctions and two sealed-bid auctions. Both type of oral auctions, English and Dutch, and first-price sealed-bid auctions are used in practice but the second-price sealed-bid auctions are used in theory. In this study, I will examine the equilibrium of all these types of auctions and give some examples where these auctions are used.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu çalışmada ihaleler üzerine teorik bir araştırma yapılacaktır. Belirli varsayımlar altında model kurulduktan sonra açık artırma çeşitleri incelenecektir. İkisi sözlü ikisi kapalı zarf ihalesi olmak üzere dört standart ihale bilinmektedir. Bunlardan sözlü olan İngiliz ve Flemenk ihaleleri ve kapalı zarf ihalesi olan birinci fiyat kapalı zarf ihalesi pratikte kullanılan, ikinci fiyat kapalı zarf ihalesi ise teorik anlamı olan açık artırmalardır. Bu çalışmada her bir ihale için denge araştırılacak, ve örnek¬ler verilecektir.
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  • Turkish

REFERENCES

References: 

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Grahıam, D. ve
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Hendricks, K. ve R. H. Porter (1989), "Collusion in Auctions," Annales d'Economic et de Sta-tisque, 15/16, 217-230.
Açık Artırma Teorisi Üzerine Bir Çalışma 77
Ingrahıam, A.
(2000), "Testing for Cheating Between Bidders and Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working paper, University of Maryland, College Park.
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Rothkopf M., Teisberg, T. ve E. Kahn (1990), "Why are Vickrey Auctions rare?" Journal of
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