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PARASAL İSTİKRARI SAĞLAMADA MERKEZ BANKASININ BAĞIMSIZLIĞI

Journal Name:

  • Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2000
Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
Central banks are the main institutions which administer a country's monetary policy. Though the structure, duty and authority of central banks differ amoung countries, they play an efficient role in providing economic stability through monetary policy. Empirical research is essential in investigating relations between the independence of cetral banks and economic stability. The common ground of these studies is the observation of a fall in inflation rate as the independence of a central bank grow.This conclusion is especially valid in the economy of developed countries.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Merkez bankaları ülkelerin para politikasını uygulayan en önemli kurumlardır. Merkez bankalarının yapısı,görev ve yetkileri ülkeden ülkeye değişmekle beraber, para politikası ile ekonomik istikrarı sağlamada etkin rol oynarlar. Merkez bankasının bağımsızlığı ile ekonomik istikrar arasındaki ilişkilerin araştırılmasında ampirik çalışmalar önemli yer tutar. Çalışmalarda elde edilen ortak nokta, merkez bankasının bağımsızlığı arttıkça ekonomide enflasyon oranının düşmesidir. Özellikle gelişmiş ülke ekonomilerinde bu sonuç geçerli olmaktadır.
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  • 1
75-86
  • Turkish

REFERENCES

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