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1991 Körfez Savaşında İsrail’in Pozisyonunun Bir Değerlendirmesi

An Assessment of Israel’s Position in the 1991 Gulf War

Journal Name:

  • Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies

Publication Year:

  • 2016

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The Persian Gulf War was one of the defining incidents that shaped the current situation of the Middle East. There has been a vast amount of studies about this conflict but on a specific case why Israel stayed out of the conflict even though she was attacked continues to be an intriguing question for researchers. Saddam’s decision on invading Kuwait and the war following this is going to be summarized in order to present the structure when this incident took place and also to build an environment in which Israel’s decision on refraining itself from the war is going to be analyzed. Israel is perceived as one of the most aggressive countries in the Middle East mostly because of the wars that it included so far and the grand projects that it wants to put in practice in the future. With these assumptions it is rather hard to understand Israel’s passive behaviour during the Persian Gulf War and possible reasons of this is going to be main focus of this study to understand the motivations behind such policy. Israel’s state in that period and its capacity will be analyzed in order to understand whether this decision was taken directly and solely by Israel or it was a result of long-going dependency to another country or any other possible situation. Possible reasons that resulted with Israel’s passive attitude will be under the scope to explain whether what Israel did was rather rational or not. In addition to that, the advantages that Israel enjoyed and disadvantages that it faced will be shown at the last part of the study.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
1991 Körfez Krizi Orta Doğu’nun şu anki vaziyetinin şekillenmesinde en etkili faktörlerden birisi olmuştur. Bu kriz hakkında birçok çalışma yapılmış ve İsrail’in saldırıya uğramasına ragmen pasif tutumunu devam ettirmesi araştırmacılar için ilgi çekici bir husus olarak öne çıkmıştır. Saddam Hüseyin’in Kuveyt’i işgal etme kararını takip eden bu savaş hülasa olarak anlatılacak ve İsrail’in aldığı bu kararın oluştuğu dış yapı aktarılmaya çalışılacaktır. İsrail bu savaş dışında Ortadoğu’nun en aktif ve agresif devleti olarak nitelendirilebilecek ve günümüz topraklarını revizyonist bir yaklaşımla genişletme amacında olan bir devlet olarak kabul edilecektir. Bu yaklaşım İsrail’İn 1991 Savaşı’ndaki pasif tutumunu daha ön plana çıkaracağı ve problematize edeceği için tercih edilmiştir. Bu davranış, İsrail’in o dönemdeki sosyal, askeri ve diplomatik gücü dikkate alınarak analiz edilecektir. Bu analiz sonrasında İsrail’in bu kararı kendi fayda-zarar analizleri sonucunda alıp almadığı sorusu üzerinde durulacak ve buna cevap aranacaktır. İsrail’in bu tavrının bu şekilde analizi ile bu hareketin rasyonel bir hareket olup olmadığı ve süpriz devlet davranışı olarak sayılıp sayılmayacağına bakılacaktır. Ve bu seçimin sonucu olarak İsrail’in elde ettiği çıktılar sonuç bölümünde analiz edilecektir.
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REFERENCES

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