You are here

Home » Content

BAĞIMLI VE BAĞIMSIZ YÖNETİM KURULU ÜYE SAYISININ İŞLETMENİN FİNANSAL PERFORMANSINA ETKİSİ

THE EFFECT OF NUMBERS OF EXECUTIVE AND NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON FIRM'S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Journal Name:

  • Uluslararası Hakemli Akademik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2015

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
On 30th December 2011 a declaration was published in the official gazete by CMB in regard to Determinig and Practicing Corporate Governance Principles (Serial : IV , No: 56) for Publicly-Traded Companies affiliated to Capital Markets Board (CMB). CMB imposed an obligation for the companies' management boards to participate executive and non-executive members. It is possible to say that this obligation is highly important development for publicly-traded companies in terms of accountability , determination of policy and strategy, protecting the rights of stakeholders , providing transparency and objectivity in managements. The non¬executive member mentioned here is the person appointed externally , handing the authority of executing the task fully independent under no pressure and has no organic bond and execution authorisation. In reference to this obligation for the publicly-traded companies, using three-year data of 140 manufacturing industry managements publicly-traded in İstanbul stock market which have continuous data between 2012-2014 years , we wanted to analyse the effect of the number of executive and non-executive members on financial performance of the management using modern based performance criterion.
Bookmark/Search this post with
Abstract (Original Language): 
Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu (SPK), SPK'ya bağlı Anonim şirketler için "Kurumsal Yönetim İlkelerinin Belirlenmesine ve Uygulanmasına İlişkin" (Seri:IV, No:56) 30 Aralık 2011 tarihinde resmi gazetede bir tebliğ yayımlanmıştır. Bu tebliğ ile SPK, borsada faaliyet gösteren tüm şirketlerin yönetim kurulunda bağımlı (icracı) üyelerin yanında, bağımsız (icracı olmayan) üyelerinde bulunması zorunluluğunu getirmiştir. Bu zorunluluk aslında işletmelerde hesap verilebilirlik, politika ve strateji belirleme, menfaat sahiplerinin haklarının korunması, şeffaflık ve objektifliği sağlamak açısından borsa şirketleri için oldukça önemli bir gelişme olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Burada bahsedilen bağımsız üye, şirketle organik bir bağı ve icra yetkisi olmayan, dışarıdan atanan ve hiçbir baskı altında kalmadan görevini tam bağımsız bir şekilde yapabilme yetkisine sahip kişidir. Borsa şirketlerine gelen bu zorunluluk ile birlikte bizde bu çalışmada, 2012-2014 yılları arasında Borsa İstanbul'da (BIST) işlem gören ve verileri süreklilik arz eden 140 imalat sanayi işletmesinin üç yıllık verilerini kullanarak, bağımlı ve bağımsız üye sayısının işletmenin finansal performansına olan etkisini geleneksel ve modern tabanlı çeşitli performans ölçütleri kullanarak analiz etmek istedik.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
PDF icon arastirmax-bagimli-bagimsiz-yonetim-kurulu-uye-sayisinin-isletmenin-finansal-performansina-etkisi.pdf
  • 58
455
471
  • Turkish

JEL Codes:

REFERENCES

References: 

Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 31(03), 377-397.
Ahmed, K., Hossain, M., & Adams, M. B. (2006). The effects of board composition and board size on the informativeness of annual accounting earnings. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(5), 418-431.
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate boards in OECD countries: size, composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 197-210.
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2000). Board independence and long-term firm performance. Unpublished paper, University of Colorado.
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. The Business Lawyer, 921-963.
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition. JL Econ. & Org., 1, 101.
469
AKADEMİK BAKIŞ DERGİSİ
Sayı: 58 Kasım - Aralık 2016
Uluslararası Hakemli Sosyal Bilimler E-Dergisi
ISSN:1694-528X İktisat ve Girişimcilik Üniversitesi, Türk Dünyası
Kırgız - Türk Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Celalabat - KIRGIZİSTAN
http://www.akademikbakis.org
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195-221.
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 51(3), 371-406.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic management journal, 19(3), 269-290.
Fama, E.
F.
, & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of law and economics, 301-325.
Fich, E. M. (2005). Are Some Outside Directors Better than Others? Evidence from Director Appointments by Fortune 1000 Firms*. The Journal of Business, 78(5), 1943-1972.
Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (pp. 1-120). London: DtI.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The determinants of board composition. Rand Journal of Economics, 19(4), 589-606.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial management, 101-112.
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2001). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature (No. w8161). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kalaycı, Ş. (Editör) ve diğerleri, (2010), SPSS Uygulamalı Çok Değişkenli İstatistik Teknikleri, Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 5. Baskı, Ankara.
Kaymak, T., & Bektas, E. (2008). East meets west? Board characteristics in an emerging market: Evidence from Turkish banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(6), 550-561.
Klein, A.
(1998)
. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between Board of Directors' Composition, Firm Performance, and the Degree of CEO Domination over the Board of Directors, Working Paper.
Millstein, I. M., & MacAvoy, P. W. (1998). The active board of directors and performance of the large publicly traded corporation. Columbia Law Review, 1283-1322.
Müller,
V
. O. (2014). The Impact of Board Composition on the Financial Performance of FTSE100 Constituents. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 109, 969-975.
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 218-228.
Peng, M. W. (2004). Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions. Strategic Management Journal, 25(5), 453-471.
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of financial economics, 26(2), 175-191.

Thank you for copying data from http://www.arastirmax.com