1853-1856 OTTOMAN-RUSSIAN WAR AND EGYPT STATE

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Abstract

Besides its importance for the Ottoman Empire, the 1853-1856 War was very important for England, France and Russia. England and France attended the war with the Ottoman Empire in order to stop Russia’s progress and ensure the continuity of their benefits in the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was in a bad situation in terms of its military and financial situation. Firstly a general aid campaign was organized and when it was understood that this campaign wasn’t enough, states were required to pay more to supply all the needs. Different from the other states, as Egypt had army and navy forces, helped the Ottoman Empire significantly before and during the war. Egyptian soldiers who were seriously wounded and martyrs were paid equal amounts of salaries and given help. It was especially important for the Empire to treat equally and satisfy all the needs of Egyptian soldiers and families of the martyrs.

Keywords: the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Russia, help, army, navy.

1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus Harbi ve Mısır Eyaleti

Özet


Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Devleti, Mısır, Rusya, yardım, ordu, donanma.

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Introduction

Egypt was an important centre of population since ancient ages and with its unique Nile River, attracted many societies’ attention living in different geographies (Görgün, 2004: XXIX, 555). The state was a field of struggle between many countries and nations until Ottoman authority in 1516 when Sultan Selim the Stern became the only ruler (Avcı, 2004: XXIX, 559-562). He defeated the Mamluks and conquered Syria in Marc Dabik War; besides, with Ridaniyye triumph the Ottoman Empire became the only ruler in Egypt continent through which it became influential in North Africa. While Ottoman had the authority in the XVIth Century, Mamluk origin people had the most administrative functions in Egypt except the positions of governorship and Kadiship and the Ottoman Empire’s authority in Egypt started to decrease in XVII and XVIII centuries (Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid, 2004: XXIX, 556-557).

Egypt, negatively affected from colonization competition between European countries, was occupied by Napoleon in 1798 who wanted to build French authority in the Mediterranean and take advantage of the economic conditions. The Ottoman Empire ended this invasion in 1801 after making some agreements with Russia and England (Karal, 1999: V, 27 et al.).

In 1805 Mehmet Ali Pasha of Kavala was appointed as governor to Egypt which was still struggling with domestic disturbance. Pasha, trying to strengthen the authority with various reforms, fought and killed most Mamluk Emirs (a high title of nobility or office), built the sole power and authority in the region (Kutluoğlu, 2002: XXV, 63). After this, Pasha (a high ranking Turkish officer or governor) who wanted to conquer more lands started a rebellion against the central government in 1831 and continued his struggle for many years. Although it was a domestic affair at the beginning, the rebellion became an international issue when European countries got involved. At the end, although the Ottoman Empire tried to make an agreement in London on 15 July 1840 under the guidance of England, Pasha didn’t accept the articles of the agreement. Upon this, the navies of the Ottoman Empire, England and Austria defeated Pasha and made him accept the agreement. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire published an Egyptian Governorship Edict of Concession on 13 February 1841 (Uçarol: 1985: 134-135; Karal, 1999: V, 201-202). The government of Egypt was made hereditary in the family of M. Ali Pasha, and Egypt became a state under direct rule of the Ottoman Empire but with a special statute. M. Ali Pasha ruled the state until 1848 as the governor, his son İbrahim Pasha became the governor upon his illness (Kutluoğlu, 2002: XXV, 64).

Asking for Military Assistance from Egypt State upon the Start of War

Ottoman-Russian war –known as Crimean War- is one of the most significant war in the XIXth century. Although on the surface this war seems to result from disagreements between sects on the issue of possession of sacred maqams in Jerusalem, the real cause

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of the war was the politic and economic superiority struggle of England-Russia in the Middle East (Tukin, 1949: 236 et al). They couldn’t come to an agreement as Russia’s ambassador Prince A. Sergeyevič Mencikov acted against the rules and made requests that are contrary to the state’s freedom. Upon Mencikov’s return to the country, the states’ diplomatic connections were broken which created the possibility of a new war. Besides attending official meetings, the government, started preparations for war and planned to strengthen its army and navy military powers (Özcan, 1999: II, pp. 97-101).

The state decided to ask for military help from Egypt State in order to increase its military power. Besides being a state of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had an army and navy in order to defend itself against any possible attacks from land or sea. Upon governor İbrahim Pasha’s death on 10 November 1848, Abbas Hilmi Pasha (BOA, Mısır-Mektûmî: Register Nr: 15, p. 17). was appointed to the position. An official message was written from the Vizierate Office in 1853. In this message, after Ottoman and Russian meetings were explained, battleships and army forces were required from the State with these words: “requested soldiers with their equipments shall be sent here with the ships of navy without a moment’s delay” (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 543). Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha wrote an official answer to the Vizierate Office on 10 June 1853, and stated that in case of a war with Russia, he would do anything possible for his religion, state and nation, and would send army and navy forces as much as possible. He promised that 12 ships will be prepared in 30-40 days, soldiers and equipments will get on these ships and will be sent in the first place. On the other hand, he mentioned that coasts under his administration should be protected from any possible attacks, so necessary precautions started to be taken and soldiers will be prepared (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 543, Appendix 2).

Admiral Mahmud Pasha wrote an official message to the Vizierate Office on 21 July 1853; he stated that Abbas Hilmi Pasha prepared 6 regiments of foot soldiers four of which will be sent from Alexandria with two kapak (a kind of galleon) four frigates, two corvettes and one gölet (a kind of small ship) on the 10th or 12th of the month; the rest two regiments will be sent 15 or 20 days later with one kapak and two steamships (BOA, İrâde- Mısır: Nr. 546).

Egyptian fleet under the control of Vice Admiral Hasan Pasha had nine battleships (BOA, İrâde- Mısır, Nr. 547). The ships departed from Egypt; the first group reached İstanbul on the 14th of August and reached Büyükdere where Turkish fleet was situated on 26 August (Ceride-i Havadis, 1269: Nr. 637).

Egypt Fleet had 9 battleships: Crimea and Miftah-i Cihad galleons, Reşid, Dimyad and Bahire frigates, Cihadpeyker corvette, Saika gölet, Cây-i Ferâh brig, Nile and Pervâz-i Bahrî steamships (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 23).

1 rear admiral, 5 district governors, 3 lieutenant commander, 22 Kol Aghasis (senior commanders), 60 lieutenants, 150 mülazims (assistant lieutenants), 122 voluntary soldiers, 4,885 soldiers and other crew members; namely 5,335 people in total existed on the Fleet from Egypt (Tezel, 1973: 632).
In the work named *Kırım Zafernamesi – Hayrâbât*, it is stated that the Governor of Egypt sent 17 battalions of soldiers under the command of Selim Pasha besides many ammunitions and ten thousand bags of silver coins (Hayri, 1988: 32). The Ottoman war power increased and strengthened with the navy and armies sent by Egyptian Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha.

**Egyptian and Ottoman Power Cooperation and Developments**

Totally 30,000 Egyptian soldiers sent from Egypt step by step under the command of Selim Pasha and they were placed into the tents in Beykoz. Commander-in-chief Mehmed Ali Pasha, Admiral Mahmud Pasha and Imperial marshal Mehmed Pasha inspected these forces and a part of them was sent to Şumnu overland. Afterwards, all forces moved to Rumelia (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 9).

Arrival of Egyptian soldiers to İstanbul and sending them to the Rumelian side was told in a poem (Ahmed Rıza Trabzonî, 2000: 91-92).

> There came thirty thousands of brave man from Egypt  
> With Selim Pasha as the commander,  
> Moved from Arabia the army of braves  
> Arrived at Rumelia crossing the middle of the sea”.

Various meetings were made on October in order to decide organizations of army, distribution of duties, how and where will the navy be used. At the end of these meetings, it was decided that the navy will be divided into two. According to this decision; the fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha of Kayseri was going to serve as carriages for the fleets that will be used as security stations (Büyükçuğrul, 1982: II, 416). The fleet under the command of Brigadier Hasan Pasha of Egypt was going to carry soldiers coming from Egypt to Varna and was going to serve as security station in Rumelia part of the Black Sea (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 24; DMA, MKT: Register Nr: 24, Certificate Nr: 9).

Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha undertook the duty of carrying war munitions to Batum and the harbors of the Eastern Black Sea (DMA, MKT: 25/35-A; DMA, MKT: 24/32; Nutkî, 1307: 127). Vice Admiral Osman Pasha and Rear Admiral Hüseyin Pasha were going to guard these ships. This fleet was also going to ensure the safety of Anatolian coasts of the Black Sea, especially İnceburun and Amasra (DMA, MKT: 25/27, 35-A, 35-B; BOA, İ.HR: Nr. 5182, Appendices 4, 5, 6).

Total eight ships, seven Ottoman ships and one Egyptian ship (*Reşid Frigate*), were to be given to Brigadier Hasan Pasha (BOA, İrade-Mısır: Nr. 547). Commander of the navy sent from Egypt. He and his ships were going to carry soldiers coming from Egypt to Varna (Kurtoğlu, 1307: 24) and were going to move to the Black Sea in order to serve as security stations in Rumelia sites (DMA, MKT: 24/9).

These are written in the decree given to the Commander: “If met with Russian Ships, and if they don’t attack, act in the old style. If you are certain that they will attack and if
you understand that you can’t oppose, do not fight, come to Bosporus and inform Ottoman Navy with a steamship about the situation” (DMA, MKT: 24/29).

On the day when Egyptian Hasan Pasha moved from Istanbul, the first fire was set against Russians in Tuna; the war started between Rumelia Army Commander Inspector Ömer Pasha and Russian forces (Danişment, 1972: IV, 146). Russians arrived at Kalafat moving across Tuna from Vidin at the end of October 1853 after invading Wallachia and Moldavia. Turkish Army won the battle in Oltaniçe and heavily defeated Russians in Çatana around Kalafat. Egyptian forces had a big role in Çatana war (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, 1978: III/5, 457). Their importance is told as such (Ahmed Rıza Trabzonî, 2000:104);

“Selim Pasha arrived at the war in a moment
With two Cannonballs and one battalion of soldiers
Two cannonballs hit the enemy as such
Writer of the power written the main conquest
Enemies were hit, buried in the ground
Invisible was the area, not only one soul on earth”.

When the war started in Tuna, Nusratiye frigate under the command of English Military Officer Rear Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade (Counselor Pasha) was sent to inform (Slade, 1943: 81-82) of it and to deliver the new command to Hasan Pasha who went to the Black Sea. In this new command written to Pasha from the Admiral Office, it was written that: “You shall not attack firstly if the enemies do not attack; and if the enemies are crowded, you shouldn’t answer any attacks, move the ships to Bosporus safely and inform Admiral Ahmet Pasha with a steamship”. It is understood from both two written orders to Pasha that safety of the fleet was the primary goal in the war (Emir, 1334: IV, 485-486).

When Counselor Pasha arrived at Hasan Pasha who was patrolling in the Black Sea, the weather was bad and a storm was about to burst.Shortly after this, the rain and sleet snow besides heavy storm started to compel the fleet. Hasan Pasha protected the fleet from danger by taking Counselor Pasha’s advice into consideration and moving the fleet to open sea before the storm started. But against all these precautions, ships were damaged because of the storm and Kaid-i Zafer frigate was lost; only after it was learnt that this ship went to Sinop (BOA, İ.HR: Nr. 5182, Apendix 21; Slade, 1943: 82).

Giving this explanation on the situation of the storm and the ships, Counselor Pasha said that soldiers in the fleet of the Ottoman Empire who attended the war reluctantly were in very bad conditions; they didn’t have proper outfits for winter, they were wearing summer clothes and their foods were not enough. However, no one was complaining and everybody was willingly carrying out their duty (Slade, 1943: 83).

Additionally, he mentioned that the government shouldn’t be blamed for these bad conditions, because army and navy forces were tripled in the last three months and so the government couldn’t get through the expenses.
After struggling with a heavy storm at the Black Sea, Hasan Pasha was ordered to go back to İstanbul (Gürel, 1935: 36). He arrived at İstanbul on 16th of November and entered the Bosporus (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 560). But as his ships were scattered because of the storm, most of them arrived at different times and anchored to different places in İstanbul (BOA, İ.HR: Nr. 5182, Appendix 12).

Admiral Office wrote in an official certificate to the Sublime Port (Babîâli) that: “Hasan Pasha returned from the Black Sea and entered Bosporus. His fleet will be prepared to military expedition again by providing necessary supplies and equipment” (Emir, 1334: IV, 492). In addition to this, upon the return of Egyptian fleet Commander Hasan Pasha, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha and Brigadier Hüseyin Pasha were appointed to guard the ships in the Black Sea.

Meetings were held in Navy Assembly in order to take precautions for the Russian danger at the Black Sea. In this meeting it was decided that Vice Admiral Osman Pasha and Rear Admiral Hüseyin Pasha was going to hold a fleet which was going to ensure the safety of especially Amasra and İnceburun coasts and also protect Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha who was going to transfer munitions to Batum (DMA, MKT: 25/27, 35-A, 35-B; BOA, İ.HR: Nr. 5182, Appendices 4, 5, 6). There were 10 ships in this fleet which included a frigate called Dimyat and a steamship called Pervaz-ı Bahri from Egyptian navy (Nutkî, 1307:128; Nuri, 1930: 241-242; Kurtoğlu, 1307: 26-27).

In the order given to the commanders of this fleet which departed from the Bosporus on 5 November (Besbelli, 1937: 42) by Admiral Office, how should Turkish navy act was defined in details: “If met with Russian Navy at the Black Sea, if you are sure that you will defeat the enemy, attack without waiting any artillery shooting from them; in other situations, act carefully according to the conditions” (BOA, İ.HR: Nr. 5182, Appendix 6).

This fleet’s ships sailed across the coasts for a while according to the order, but started to anchor to Sinop harbor on 13 November because of the bad weather and a sudden storm. Vice Admiral Osman Pasha wrote to the Admiral Office on 19 November that some of his ships had lost their ways but when the weather changed, they had arrived at Sinop harbor and attended the fleet. One of these ships was Dimyat which had been lost but then anchored at Gerze, and then arrived at Sinop a few days later (BOA, İ.DH: Nr. 17798, Appendix 4).

These ships were badly damaged because of the sudden storm; the crews were mostly sick and tired so much that they couldn’t even furl sails when they arrived at the harbor (Besbelli, 1977: 42). In the meantime, it was learnt that Russian ships were very close to the Black Sea coasts which caused disturbance in İstanbul. A new order was given to the fleet and it was mentioned that if the fleet in Sinop meets any of the Russian ships, they shouldn’t attack until they are sure that they will defeat. But they should stay at the harbor and take necessary precautions (DMA, MKT: 25/27). Despite the terrible weather, Russian battleships continued to make researches at the Black Sea and were seen at Sinop offshores (Emir, 1334: IV, 496-497). Upon these, the Admiral Office decided to send a
few battleships to protect the fleet at Sinop harbor. In the order written to the captains of the ships in Sinop, it was mentioned that one regiment of soldiers and a few battleships will be sent to them in 1 or 2 days and they will be taken from the harbor, but until that time they should carefully protect the fleet (ATASE Arşiv; Klasör: 1/1, Dolap: 69, Dosya: 63, Index: 26). But Sinop destruction occurred before this new fleet departed from Istanbul, so this important and right decision couldn’t be put into practice.

Vice Admiral Osman Pasha sent one steamship named *Pervaz-ı Bahri* from the ships in his fleet to Ereğli in November in order to take coal (Emir, 1334: IV, 495; Slade, 1943: 82). When it was crossing between Amasra and Kerempe on the way to Ereğli on 17 November, *Pervaz-ı Bahri* was seen by Russian Admiral Butakov who was sent to the region by Admiral Kornilov. Russian ship Vladimir quickly approached this Egyptian ship and opened fire. Vladimir had more cannonballs and seriously damaged *Pervaz-ı Bahri* from the timber and mast. Egyptian ship started to counter attack which had short-ranged few cannonballs. In this heroic struggle, Kornilov’s nephew Lieutenant Jeleznov was killed (Tsenski, 1944: 8).

In this battle between *Pevaz-ı Bahri* and Russian ships, forty of 150 crew members in the Egyptian ship were shot or wounded. On the other hand, 3 crews were dead from the Russian fleet besides Lieutenant Jeleznov. At the end of this struggle which had continued for three-five hours, *Pevaz-ı Bahri* was taken captive by the Russian fleet; his ship was seriously damaged, the mast was broken, funnel was crushed and the deck was almost completely damaged (Tsenski, 1944: 8; Slade, 1943: 82). Admiral Kornilov’s name was given to this ship (Mozgfesky, 1935: 40) Admiral Butakov was rewarded with 2nd degree Captainship and 4th degree Gregoriy Medals (*ES*, 1892: IX, 71).

Russian fleet’s defeat of a Turkish ship pleased Russian Black Sea Fleet Crew. Russian Admiral Kornilov acted as if he defeated the Turkish navy and ordered a parade in order to increase morale and spirit of the crew of his ships which didn’t attend the battle (Tsenski, 1944: 10). While this battle wasn’t mentioned in Turkish resources, Russian gave importance and acted as if capturing only one Turkish ship was a success gained against all Turkish ships.

Besides all of these, the most important reason of the Crimean war was the event that Russian Navy forces suddenly attacked Vice Admiral Osman Pasha and Rear Admiral Huseyin Pasha’s fleet that was badly damaged in the storm and anchored to Sinop harbor. On 30 November 1853, before noon, Russian forces took the advantage of bad and foggy weather and suddenly attacked Turkish ships; Turkish navy soldiers fought heroically against Russians who were more crowded and had more weapons. One of the ships in Turkish fleet was *Dimyat* whose captain was Ahmet Şahin Bey. This ship had survived 1827 *Navarin Sudden Attack* and fought with the Russian forces who were trying to destroy and sink it. But in this attack, Russian galleons’ long-range cannonballs seriously damaged the ship and sank it (*ES*, 1895: XXX, 48). Some Egyptian Navy soldiers swam;

3) For the details of this invasion see: Özcan, 2008: 66 et all.
some others reached the coast on lifeboats, so almost 300 crew members survived (Slade, 1943: 89). 186 of the survivors departed from Inebolu and went to Istanbul with an Austrian steamship (Emir, 1334: IV, 501).

The Crimean War was told in *Kırım Zafernamesi* which mentioned this bloody war in Sinop. The part about Dimyat is given below (Salih Hayri, 1988: pp. 46-47):

“*Dimyat disappearing in the water*  
*Egyptian soldiers on it*  
*They ran from the falcon door*  
*There appeared some sailors besides the door.*”

In Sinop Sea Martyrs’ memorial at Sinop Museum, Dimyat is mentioned with these words: “*One of the seven frigates was of Egypt*”.

**English-French Military Powers’ Attendance to the Ottoman Army and Taking Action against Russia**

Sinop destruction provoked England and France who previously warned Russia about any possible attack and sent fleets to Istanbul in order to protect the Black Sea. These countries had allied with the Ottoman Empire on 12 March 1854 and declared war against Russia. According to this agreement, they were going to help the Ottoman Empire with their navies and armies (Heyet, 1963: VI, 3036; Rifat Paşa, 1229, 112 et al). Allied forces started to be sent on March 1854 and arrived at Gelibolu at the beginning of May. When the forces arrived at Istanbul, English soldiers were placed into Selimiye barrack while the French were placed into Maçka and Harbiye barracks (Uçarol, 1985: 1158).

At the same time, Egypt State continued to send military forces during the summer of 1854; almost four thousands of soldiers arrived at Istanbul on 2 April 1854 with the steamships named *Saik-i Şadi* and *Muhbir-i Sürur*. One week after their arrival, Taif and Mecidiye steamships and some more soldiers were sent to Istanbul. Some of these military forces who arrived at Istanbul from Egypt were sent to Varna like the previous ones (*Ceride-i Havadis*, 1270: Nr: 681, 682).

After Egyptian soldier’s arrival, Governor Abbas Pasha’s son İlhami Pasha asked for permission to come to Istanbul with his mother and when he was allowed (*Ceride-i Havadis*, 1270: Nr: 683), he arrived at Istanbul on 9 May 1854 and settled in the Coast Palace at Üsküdar Şemsi Pasha (*Ceride-i Havadis*, 1270: Nr: 687). İlhami Pasha was hosted very well and he was given 3rd degree Mecidiye Badge (*Ceride-i Havadis*, 1270: Nr: 690).

English-French allied fleet arrived at the Black Sea, bombarded Odesa and Sünne and blockaded Tuna and it’s surrounding. But besides all these, there was something never understood about allied Commanders; English and French Commanders didn’t want to carry any operations with Ottoman Navy (Bebelli, 1977: pp. 56-57). But according to the decision taken, a fleet of Turkish and Egyptian ships was going to meet allied fleet Admirals and go to Batum. Then they were going to take 4,000 soldiers, conquer
Sohumkale and were going to use this place as a material store and a base of operations (Slade, 1943: pp. 136-137). The fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Ahmed Pasha, arrived at the Black Sea on 6 May 1854 with 21 ships: two of the 6 galleons (Кırım and Мифах-т Цihad), one of three frigates (Bahire), one brig called Cay-т feraх and one gölet named Şaika, totally 6 ships belonged to Egyptian Navy (Besbelli, 1977: 108). The fleet arrived at Балчик after waiting for a long time in Каварна as allied forces’ Commanders said that they will carry out the operation in Балчик. The Board of the Navy decided that the Turkish-Egyptian allied fleet would protect the Mediterranean, Crete and Varna. Ahmed Pasha was going to command the Black Sea fleet and Egyptian Hasan Pasha was going to command the Mediterranean fleet. Bahriye frigate and Cay-т feraх brig were assigned to guard the area between Varna and the Bosporus while other ships had to go back to İstanbul at the beginning of July (Slade, 1943: 147-151; Besbelli, 1977: 62-65).

11th Infantry Regiment of Egyptian troops and 3 batalions of soldiers were sent to Силестре which was besieged by Russians. On June 1854, these troops commanded by Egyptian Colonel Mustafa Bey, Lieutenant-colonel İbrahim Bey and Fortress Lieutenant-colonel Mehmet Bey heavily defeated and repulsed Russian forces that attacked Arabic bastion. During these very difficult combats, Lieutenant-colonel İbrahim Bey, two Majors, an officer and soldiers were killed. The Egyptian regiment heavily destroyed was retreated and the regiment of İzmir was placed instead (Kurtoğlu, 1307: pp.41-42). 34 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 6 soldiers were wounded in this battle in Силестре (BOA, Î.MTZ.(05): 16/574).

On the other hand, on 23 July 1854, Egyptian Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha died (BOA, Î.MTZ.(05): 17/581) and Said Pasha was appointed as the new governor (BOA, Î. MTZ (05), 17/583). He made important efforts to help the country and was rewarded with a 1st degree Excellent Badge (Nişan-т Âli) (BOA, Î.MTZ.(05)TAL: 17/48) and then with a Royalty Badge (İmtiyaz Nişantı) (BOA, Î.MTZ.(05)TAL: 2/51).

Turkish fleet departed from the Bosporus and arrived at Varna on 2 August. All allied forces were gathered there without any controls or orders. After the meeting held in Varna, it was decided that allied forces should go to the Crimea; upon this decision Turkish forces which included Egyptian soldiers and battleships departed from Varna with allied army forces at the end of August. When they arrived at Gözleve on the first week of September, Turkish and French forces took the city without any combats as

4) Counselor Pasha gave very important information about the situation of allied forces in Varna, and summarized the situation as: “As a result of irregular settling, there was a fire in Varna which continued for six hours and burnt wooden Varna Bazaar besides many houses, stores and warehouses. Ammunitions were hardly saved. The town’s best houses and stores were occupied by the English and French without any payment”. Pasha also mentioned that people in Varna suffered a lot and additionally said that: “The Muscovite stayed here for two years but we never complained about them. When they left the town, the town was better than when they came. It has been more than three months since Feringis (Europeans) came here, they took our houses, we lived difficulties which we never saw in our lives and then the town was burnt because of their carelessness”. For more information see (Slade 1943: 157-161).
the community was mostly made of Muslims. A new operation was planned there and according to the plan, 5,000 Turkish soldiers were going to invade the Crimea with allied forces (Kurtoğlu; 1307: 65 et al).

Egyptian Governor Said Pasha wanted to follow the developments closely at the center and came to Istanbul on 20 August 1854. He was placed into Çırağan Palace Ferriye flat and many servants besides Steward Arif Aga were assigned to host him and his entourage. He stayed there for 23 days and went back to his country on 13 September (BOA, C.SM: 66/3334)\(^5\). When he went back, he sent 3 more regiments of troops commanded by Ahmed Pasha to Istanbul (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 60/55). These troops commanded by Ahmed Pasha were welcomed in Istanbul and all precautions were taken for their safety (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 62/64). Divisional general Ahmed Pasha was rewarded with a Mecidiye Badge for his services (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 66/22). The troops stayed in İstanbul during winter, then moved to Güzelova at the end of March (BOA, A.MKT. NZD: 139/56), and finally were sent to the Crimea (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 67/95).

Allied forces landing operation into the Crimea was completed on 17 September. After the necessary preparations were completed the main target Sivastopol started to be bombarded on 17 October. 3 Egyptian ships commanded by Hasan Pasha within Turkish ships attended this bombardment. But winter conditions started to compel the forces; the storm started on 14 October continued for one week and then a hurricane started which seriously destroyed Military camps and Crimean lands. Shelters were destroyed, soldiers were under the rain, and storages were covered in mud and flood. But the loss and damages at sea were more serious; one of the allied forces’ ships sank with some of the crew while some achieved to survive by swimming. On the other hand, Ships in the Turkish fleet were also seriously damaged; one ship sank with the crew while two were damaged. One of the Egyptian ships named \textit{Miftah-ı cihad} sank with almost 1000 people, and only 130 of them could be saved. Commander-in-chief Egyptian Hasan Pasha who was an experienced seaman and some commanders also dead (Hayri, 1988: 341-342; Slade, 1943: 199; Besbelli, 1977: 76).

Because of this hurricane disaster the hope of conquering the city before the beginning of the year 1855 was lost. Some of the Turkish and allied forces’ ships had to move back to İstanbul as they had to be repaired and refitted; some others were sent to France in order to bring more soldiers. Many soldiers and ammunitions arrived during the next six weeks and at the beginning of January 1855, allied forces in the Crimea were almost doubled when compared to the amount at the beginning (Besbelli, 1977: 76).

In 1855, allied forces’ commanders wanted some of the Turkish forces near Tuna to move to the Crimea; Commander-in-chief (\textit{Serdar-ı Ekrem}) Ömer Pasha agreed to this request and it was decided that Turkish forces would stay in Gözleve in order to defend the line of withdrawal. Until February 1855, two Turkish and one Egyptian division, totally 20,000 soldiers with horses, cannonballs, supplies, and equipments moved to the Crimea

\(^5\) Steward Arif Agha daily registered food&beverage and all expenses of these guests. \textit{BOA, C.SM}, 66/3334.
from Varna and Süzebolu. So, Turkish and Egyptian forces in the Crimea reached 40,000 (Heyet, 1963: VI, 3058; Kurtoğlu; 1307: 62-63; Besbelli, 1977: 81). In the meantime, Division general Ahmed Pasha who was the commander in chief of the Egyptian soldiers in the Crimea and Rumelia Army handed over the duty to İsmail Pasha and moved firstly to İstanbul and then to Egypt (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 77/32).

Russian attacks on the Turkish Army commanded by Ömer Pasha in Gözleve started on 17 February. Turkish forces successfully resisted and won the battle. Although Gözleve victory was recorded as if it was won only by Turkish forces, Egyptian forces were also very important who lost many soldiers in the battle (Slade, 1943: 244-245; Kurtoğlu; 1307: 65, Besbelli, 1977: 81). During the battle, Egyptian Selim Pasha who heroically fought in front of his soldiers was killed. The fight of Egyptian soldiers with the enemies and Selim Pasha’s death was mentioned in a poem (Ahmed Rıza Trabzonî, 2000: 187):

“An enemy bullet reached him
He made the profession
Martyr he became, Selim Pasha
Lamented the Egyptian soldiers”.

The army of Turkish and Egyptian soldiers fought in all of the operations including Azak Sea and Kerç invasion. Especially during Sivastopol’s invasion, Egyptian forces carried out their duties and had an important role in the success against Russian forces⁶.

After the victory, Egyptian soldiers went back to İstanbul. Upon the request of Egypt Governor on 2 September 1856 (BOA, A.MKT. UM: 17/631), Egyptian soldiers and navy moved back to Alexandria after a farewell ceremony on 12 September (BOA, A.MKT. UM: 251/2).

Rewarding Military Officers in Egyptian Army; Relief of Martyrs and the Injured

Many commanders and soldiers from Egyptian Army were rewarded with various badges. For example, Colonel Mustafa Bey was rewarded with a 3rd rank Mecidiye Badge (BOA, A.DVN. MHM: 19/43), Egyptian General Selim Pasha was rewarded with a badge (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 67/52), Major General (Mirimiran) Mehmed Fazıl Pasha, Selim Paşa, Hüseyin Pasha and Mustafa Pasha were rewarded with 3rd degree Mecidiye Badges (BOA, A.DVN. MHM: 14/88), a Commissioned Officer from Egyptian Army was rewarded with a 4th degree Mecidiye Badge (BOA, A.DVN. MHM: 19/15), Lieutenant-colonel Ali Bey and Lieutenant-colonel Doctor Ata Bey were rewarded with 4th degree Mecidiye Badges (BOA, A.DVN. MHM: 19/41).

Upon the return of Egyptian soldiers and officers, a decision was made: Soldiers and officers attended the war were going to be rewarded with Mecidiye Badges (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 96/67). A document dated 18 April 1856 proves that 4,000 Honor Badges were sent to Egypt with a private steamship (BOA, A.MKT. UM: 277/82).

⁶) For operations whose details aren’t given see: Kurtoğlu, 1307: 76 et al.
It was also seen that all necessary precautions were taken by the Ottoman Empire for the relief of Egyptian soldiers wounded or died in the battle. It was decided in a meeting that presents and salaries would be given to martyr’s families (BOA, A. MKT. MHM: 69/85). In a Military Council (Darü`ş-Şurâ-yı Askeriye) order it was mentioned that: “…families and children of the martyrs of this battle will be identified by the governors and district governors; they will be put salary in order to protect them from any financial difficulties. Additionally, people who were wounded and cannot work anymore will be retired and they will be given retirement pension” (BOA, İrâde-Mısır: Nr. 574). According to this, martyr’s families were going to be protected, they were going to take salaries and wounded soldiers were going to be retired and they were going to get retirement pensions.

In this frame, the same amount of salary that were given to Ottoman martyrs’ families and wounded soldiers families, were going to be given to the families of 34 Egyptian martyrs and 6 wounded soldiers in the Rumelian army in Sliste (BOA, İ.MTZ (05): 16-574).

All debts of Egyptian Captain Süleyman who died in Gözleve War that was won by Turkish-Egyptian soldiers were paid and salary was given to his family (BOA, A.MKT. DV: 82/81). Second level retirement pension was given to an Egyptian soldier named Hasan who became disabled in Gözleve (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 74/50) and retirement pension was given to another Egyptian Mehmed Reşid who was wounded in the same battle (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 84/74).

It can be seen from various examples that the Ottoman Empire did everything possible in order to relief martyrs’ families and veterans. 513 Egyptian soldiers and commissioned officers who got sick because of bad weather were sent to their homeland Egypt and Egyptian Governor was ordered to satisfy their needs (BOA, İ.MTZ. (05): 17/615). On the other hand, it is understood from the documents that Egyptian soldiers’ salaries were paid regularly during the war (BOA, A.MKT. MHM: 77/40).

**Financial Aids of the State of Egypt**

When the Ottoman Empire’s budget before the war is analyzed, it is seen that the budget was obviously not enough for a new war. The Ottoman Empire’s incomes and expenses were not balanced and it had already had a budget deficit in 1852-53. The amount appropriated money for the war expenses from the budget of the next year which had a high war risk, was already not sufficient. With this amount, it seemed almost impossible to cover the expenses of war weapons, ammunitions and kitchen (Güran, 1988: XIII/17, 224). The government started to search for new resources in order to cover the expenses. Firstly a special military token (Ordu Kaimesi) (Akyıldız; 1995: 43) was printed that will be used in places where military forces stayed and an aid campaign was organized firstly in İstanbul and then all over the country. In the meeting of the General Assembly, “the necessity of financial service besides physical service during a battle” was emphasized and first financial supports were made by the statesmen. In order to generalize the support
all over the country, General Assembly’s decision was sent to towns, villages and other places (BOA, İ. DH: Nr. 17751).

This aid campaign called İâne-i Cihadiye or İâne-i Harbiye resulted very successfully. But as the war continued longer than planned and expenses increased every day, the aids were turned into taxes and necessary organizations were made in order to levy the taxes from every region (BOA, A.MKT.UM: 157/25).

One of the states that gave important amount of financial aid was Egypt that had high income resources. As mentioned before, Egypt sent 10.000 bags of silver coins besides navy and army forces. As can be understood from the documents about aid campaign, Governor Abbas Hilmi Pasha supported the campaign with 4.000.000, his son Hilmi Pasha with 1.000.000 kuruses. Officers and working officials in Egypt gave 3.500.000, other noblemen sent 60.390 kuruses. So Egypt state gave an important amount of support that was totally 8.500.000 kuruses (BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver Defter, pp. 18-32; Takvim-i Vakayi, 1270: 513).

Another important support of Egypt State was that its income was shown as the payoff of the loans taken by Ottoman Empire from European countries (BOA, A.MKT.MHM: 2/96; BOA, İ.HR: 141/7403; BOA, Hr, MKT: 197/50).

Consequently, Egypt, one of the most and biggest states of the Ottoman Empire gave every possible support, made sacrifices and sent considerable amount of soldiers and battleships before the war. In addition to these, the state continued to send more military forces during the war, governors worked for the aid campaign and the taxes were paid properly.

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7) When two precautions weren’t enough to cover war expenses, the State took another precaution and borrowed from abroad for the first time in its history in 1854. For borrows see: Kiray; 1993; Refii-Şükrü Suvla; 1940, pp. 268-273.
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