

Europe of Monnet, Schumann and Mitrany: A Historical Glance to the EU from the Functionalist Perspective

Ümit Kurt*

Abstract:

The introductory article to this special issue pursues two main objectives, one empirical the other theoretical. This paper investigates the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951, as an empirical reality. After explaining the historical background of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the paper tries to explain the ECSC through functionalist approach or theory, which is very debatable among scholars. The paper then concludes that at the very beginning the best way to understand the process of European integration within the framework of theoretical conceptualization is to take functionalism as an approach or perhaps a mid-range theory what Simon Hix (2004) used.

Keywords:

ECSC; David Mitrany; Marshall Aid; Monnet's Plan; Supranationalism; task expansion

* Zirve University, Gaziantep/Turkey. umitkurt@zirve.edu.tr

*“... But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a **general agreement between the nations**; thus a particular kind of league, which might call a **pacific federation** (*foedus pacificum*), is required.” Immanuel Kant, **Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch** (1795)*

When we look back over the history of the European Community or European Union, we need to deal with three kinds of understanding. First is our understanding of the development of the Community in empirical terms, evaluated from the current perspective: its history. Second is the different theory about the Community in the various stages of its development: what contemporary students likewise I thought the reality to be. Third is a current evaluation of those ways of understanding in the light of its history: we need to evaluate the timelessness of the claims, and inevitably propose new theories and approaches (or mid-range theories).

To be more concrete, the explicit effort to theorize about the process of European integration began within the political science subfield of international relations (IR), and the field of integration theory was, until recently, dominant largely by American students of IR such as Ernest Haas, Leon Lindberg and Stanley Hoffmann (Pollack, 2000: 5). During the first few decades of the integration process, the literature was essentially divided between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. However, before these two theories accepted as grand theories, historically speaking, “functionalism” opened the scene and enabled a theoretical landscape for scholars in political science and IR.

When analyzing the evolution of competencies in the European Union (EU), many studies start with the Treaty of Rome instead of the Treaty of Paris. The foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 is hardly considered (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Schmitter 1996; Pollack 2000; Hix 2004). This is all more unfortunate because no Treaty represents better the core idea of both functionalist and neofunctionalist reasoning: close cooperation in specific economic sector is the key to overcome national sovereignty and accomplish European unity (Dinan, 2000: 14). Nevertheless, while the EU today is regarded as a true success story of economic integration, its starting point was related to peace and security instead of economic wealth (Börzel, 2005: 219). In that sense, aftermath of the Second World War, primary attempts and efforts of European integration began with the area of “high politics” (Ibid: 219). Once the negotiations on the Council of Europe had launched, federalists hopes for a United States of Europe, efforts to remove the risks of war in Europe undertook on a less attractive path which was shaped by the plan of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet to place the coal and steel production of France and

Germany in particular under the structure of common control of a supranational authority (Ibid: 219). The breakdown to institute a European political community, that would have united the ECSC with a newly founded European defense community in the early 1950s, made once again clear that successful integration would have to follow a functionalist rather than federalist logic (Ibid: 219). In this respect, I argue in this article that this functionalist logic deserves to be examined within the particular historical context for explaining the process of European integration. In this article, I am going to offer a consideration of functionalist thinking together with the ECSC by focusing on the contributions made by David Mitrany, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman and mentioning about the historical factors and context that affected early attempts for European integration process. The intention here has been to state and focus on the historical importance of functionalist reasoning in the development of European integration and integration theories.

Functionalism in European Integration

Assumptions of functionalism

Functionalism can be identified as the following:

“Classical theory of regional integration that holds that a common need for technocratic management of economic and social policy leads to the formation of international agencies.”
(Dinan, 2000: 245).

Functionalism, as a challenging approach to realism that takes the state as an ultimate focus of analysis, tries to eliminate the state by breaking away from its traditionally consolidated authority. One of the chief arguments of functionalism is that main reason why we have war is the states. For this point of view, states are insufficient to meet citizen's demands. In addition to this, functionalists assert that all national divisions, potential dangers and enemies are created by states. That is why; states have to be taken under control in order to bring peace.

Functionalism is based on cooperation rather than integration. The world-views of functionalism do not consist of the notions, which are defining parameters of the paradigm of realism such as competition, conflict, and self-interest. Thus, the center of attention of functionalism is to focus on “cooperation”. It is better for us to talk about the basic assumptions and premises of functionalism in terms of its understanding of *human nature*, of *the state* and of *international system*. As a matter of human nature, functionalists think that human beings act rationally and are essentially cooperative.

Functionalism, affected by Kantian ideals, considers human nature in a very positive view and believes the idea of human progress. For functionalism, rational, peaceful progress is possible; conflict and disharmony are not inherent features of human being (Rosamond, 2000: 31). Therefore, functionalism looks at the human nature and human development in a very positive manner in comparison to state-centric paradigm of “power politics” or realist way of account of world affairs. According to functionalism, since human beings have to decide rationally about what their needs are and they have to be creative regarding “the construction of authoritative institutions that can perform the *function* assigned to them” (Ibid: 33). Concerning the state, for functionalism, human needs and public welfare should foremost take into consideration rather than power politics. Hence, they maintain need-centric state rather than state-centric perspective (Ibid: 31). Functionalists vehemently criticized the nation-state as opposed to the realists, as an irrational actor and value-laden concept. They think that the important task is to find the most efficient method of managing to the real material necessities of people. Therefore, they argued that post-national or post-territorial basis is the best way to serve human welfare (Ibid: 33). As regards to international system, functionalists believe that state cannot solely have the might to solve the problems of human beings. Therefore, trans-national problem solving mentality has been developed and promoted by functionalism at the global level within the framework of growing interdependence among states. Both trans-national problem solving method and mutual dependence or interdependence are considered as the ways to render war irrational and impossible by means of international agencies, which are more conducive to the maintenance of international stability and peace and transcend any anarchical structures in world politics (Ibid: 33-37). Emergence and growth of international organization is an end result of the autonomy of industrial societies, which is characterized “by the progress of the forces of production, and the internationalization of socio-economic problem complexes, which can only be resolved by means of inter-state or supra-state cooperation.” (Theories of European Integration I: Federalism vs. Functionalism and beyond, p.10, See <http://www.uni-muenster.de/Politikwissenschaft/Doppeldiplom/docs/TheoriesEI1.pdf> [Accessed on 15/05/2007])

Thus, it could be made a comparison between international organizations and administrative/executive unions, which are active in principally technical nonpolitical issue-areas. At the same time, they alleviate certain tasks of states and removed some of their power by not incorporating them in a superior political entity. The reason of functional necessity governed the internationalization of problem complexes; functional necessities thus generate on the international level mechanisms of

“collective problem resolution and the concomitant adequate organizational forms.” (Ibid: 10)

The distinctive characteristic of functionalism is the fact that economic and social problems produce their own resolutions; the usefulness and efficiency of concrete, issue-specific (technical) cooperation and its outcomes legitimized international cooperation. Functionalists deal with the internal dynamic of cooperation. This is principally founded on the idea that if states work together in certain limited areas or sectors by designing new bodies to direct that particular cooperation, they will diffuse it by working together in other sectors by means of an “invisible hand” (metaphorically) of integration. According to the idea of functionalists, technical actors or experts are main carriers rather than government representatives in order to fabricate cooperation. Therefore, they strongly put emphasis on technical experts and technocrats rather than politicians to build cooperative institution. Needless to say, at the core of its agenda, satisfaction of human needs or public welfare plays a key role. Functionalism does not embrace a particular ideological philosophy (Rosamond, 2000: 33). For functionalists, nation-states do not have a transnational aspect and they tend to have certain dogmatic traits that result in lessening public welfare. Indeed, transnational actors that will be explained in details later on are central parts of functionalism particularly in the workings of David Mitrany as the father of functionalist approach. According to functionalism, the creation of integrationist international institutions was seen as an acceptance of the inevitable historical forces that driven the state towards surrenders of sovereignty. In that sense, functionalism sees the European integration as an inescapable process. Since the cost of not being a part of this integration would much more damaged than benefits of it, functionalism aims at reducing the possibility of international conflict.

David Mitrany and functionalism

At this point, it is worth talking about David Mitrany as a key figure of functionalism who was an important Romanian born British social scientist and defined functional approach as an attempt to connect authority to a specific activity to take away authority, which was traditionally associated with the state itself. Historically speaking, as Ben Rasomond underlined (2000: 33-35) functionalism was a branch of the broad movement that aimed at theorizing the conditions for ending human conflict and which came to existence in the chaotic political climate of 1940s. David Mitrany mainly tried to explain essential functions of international society. Mitrany advocated the international bodies, which had separate identity and authority over functionally

specific fields, such as security, transport, and communication. He argued that these bodies should have autonomous tasks and powers, responsible for some of the same jobs as national governments, but at a different level (Ibid: 35) Then these specific functions would create an incentive for international cooperation in a quicker way. Lastly, he strongly stated that the scope and formation of these international organizations would not have to be predetermined, however “would instead be self-determined” (Rosamond, 2000: 35-36) or “the virtue of technical self-determination” (Ibid).

To begin with, according to Mitrany (1966), capability of the state to meet and satisfy human needs, which are so complex has reduced, and the costs of wartime has increased. These situations pushed state to make cooperation with other states by making up transnational bodies or institutions for meeting the complex and various needs of its citizens (the key tasks of government). To Mitrany (1966), public organizations including modern states arise to perform the range of specific functions to satisfy human needs in society (Groom and Taylor, 1975: 53-78). He asserts that to maximize the public welfare the form of organizations should follow their functions, and must change with economic development and technological change. Moreover, a variety of organizations, undertaken by experts with an array of geographical and administrative factors, is a more appropriate pattern of governance than the special claims of the paternalistic and omnipotent modern state (Macmullen, 2004: 408) which is dominated by dogma and ideology and “whose boundaries reflect obsolete dynastic and diplomatic settlements” (Ibid: 408). Accordingly there is a progressive trend of international integration that is based upon the emergence of a network and temporary technocratic bodies in terms of functioning according to pragmatic practical criteria (Ibid: 408). In the end, one would expect a “withering away” of the European state system (Westphalia form of state) and a positive set of institutional developments of a shape “which cannot be predicted but which will be determined by functional criteria” (Ibid: 408).

On the other hand, Mitrany criticizes (1966) to perceive the state as a given entity and impose unnecessary inflexibility, which gives rise to incapability of the state to serve the requirement of human beings. Hence, for him, there has to be a certain flexibility of the state by divorcing its authority from the territory and creating transnational institutions with specific tasks and authority at the international scale for providing public welfare in a more efficient way (Rosamond, 2000: 33-35). This situation would result in two effects. As a first, by separating authority from the nation state's territory and the efficient performance of tasks by transnational organizations would lead to the process of popular loyalty transfer from nation-state level to intra-

state level (Ibid: 33). As a second, the possibility of international tensions and conflict would be reduced. At this point, it can be touched upon the notion of *task expansion* that constitutes both central and integral part of Mitrany's functionalist approach. As Mitrany explained (1966) in depth, once these functional organizations came into being, they would have to cooperate with each other within the narrow field by expanding cooperation within extensive field and widening cooperation in the same area. For instance, they would have to collaborate on technical matter regarding rail, road, and air agencies within the framework of a coordinated international planning. By taking into consideration these above, the starting point of functionalists is "low politics". As Lindberg and Scheingold pointed out "functionalists believed they could 'sneak up on peace'" (McCormick, 1999: 13-16). What they mean is that instead of trying to coordinate complicated issues such as economic or defense policy that are thought to be the subject matter of "high politics", they try to coordinate non-controversial sectors such as the electricity, transportation or postal service so as to enhance integration.

In that way, functionalism could be seen as a preparation to European integration and federalism (*Mitrany's anti-dogmatic and Technocratic vision of human governance*). Turning back to the importance of transnational bodies, for Mitrany, transnational bodies would not only be more efficient provider of welfare than national governments, but also they would help transfer popular loyalty away from the state and so "help reduce the chances of international conflict" (Rosamond, 2000: 33). Mitrany's essential strategy is to make war impossible at the international level. The transfer of loyalty to the higher level (*ECSC-High Authority*) is the end result of integration (Ibid: 34) As we have mentioned that incapability of the state to meet satisfaction of human needs or citizen's demands gives rise to the legitimacy crisis of the state which was constructed in the identity building process of the state. Unless a state meet both material and moral needs of its citizen's in a defined territory, it will have legitimacy crisis. That is why, for functionalism, states has to give up to a certain extent its authority to defeat this crisis and satisfy human needs by creating transnational bodies having with autonomous tasks and specific authority and cooperating other states at the international level (Ibid: 33, 35). This process led to the emergence of a higher level of identity and transfer of loyalty to this higher level of identity.

Practically and historically speaking, theoretical debates on functionalism were highly predominant about how the EU has evolved in 1950s. When we look at the history we see that Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman who were founders of ECSC as the initial step towards European integration can be accepted as functionalists in the

sense that they acted pragmatically and rationally not idealistically by giving incentive to the states and decided integration of a particular area that was coal and steel industry under a single joint authority. Moreover, they believed that this step would pave the way for integration in other areas. (*Task-expansion is based on the idea that co-operation within the narrow field expands co-operation within extensive field. It makes co-operation widen in the same field*). In that respect, it can be argued that functionalism was a crucial step towards integration of Europe and was a key process for a “*de facto solidarity*”. As Robert Schuman stressed on that, integration of Europe could not be achieved by a single plan rather than it would need more concrete achievements and practical requirements through step-by-step process (Burgess, 2000; Dinan, 2000: 21-24). Therefore, ECSC as a notable step created a point about the viability of integration. In that sense, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman applied two crucial sides of functionalism, which came from Mitrany's work as technocratic and rationalistic approach, to human governance for establishing a workable peace system.

It should not be forgotten that since human needs are subject to change over time and place, logic of transnational institutions has to be an open-minded and flexible process. Therefore, functionalism does not need to stick itself to any ideology or institution. The achievement of a particular integrated end state is not primary priority of functionalism instead; provision of human needs is a priority of it. (*Step by step, not a single process-Monnet and Schuman-ECSC*). That is the reason why functionalism is not accepted as a theory of integration at all. Because, the term integration implies a certain institutional end stage but for functionalism integration is an open-ended process. State is seen as a major setback for its unstable and inefficient characteristics that acts according to national and territorial interests. Functionalists accuse of the state to be responsible for not providing human welfare and needs and responsible for wars and raising nationalism. According to Mitrany (1966), state is a fixation and should not be necessarily put into center of international politics. As Jean Monnet pointed out that, the resources of a single nation were not enough to meet necessities of its citizens (Dinan, 2000: 11). Therefore, it should be gone beyond the national framework and national interest. In addition to this, for functionalism and mostly for Mitrany, state should not be seen as end itself. He continued to say that alternative structures to states would not have to be seen as the state-like entity. The most important way for realizing European unity in terms of political and economic unification, one must transcend the conception of national interest as an end itself by breaking away authority from territoriality and assigning transnational organizations with specific authority and autonomy for realizing a particular task at the international and inter-state levels.

Having said that, as it can be noticed clearly, functionalist approach with these characteristics challenges the sovereignty of nation-states. Historically speaking, sovereignty resulted from the Westphalia state order. According to Westphalia state system, nation-state or state was the sole decision-maker on laws and had supreme political authority within the well-defined territory. That is to say, state poses absolute authority to decide within its border and make its internal and external decisions. When we consider sovereignty and functionalism together, we can see confrontational and clashing points between them.

In Mitrany's words, state is not mighty enough to govern and solve the problems of public management, distribution, welfare and communication that are going to be complicated more and more day by day. For Mitrany, nation-state does not have enough capacity to solve problems of public management, distribution, welfare and communication, which are highly complex and complicated matters and need innovative thinking and transnational creativity (Rosamond, 2000: 33). To overcome these sorts of problems necessitates both a creative, sophisticated functionally, and rationally workable transnational institutions. Indeed: "because of the legalistic structure of the state and of our different worlds, *social nature*, so to speak, *has not had a chance to take its course*" (Ibid: 35). Mitrany argued (1966) that the legalistic and rigid constitutional character of the state gives rise to obstacles to understand and interpret social change and create flexible solutions to the problems of state. Thus, functionalists particularly needs of the moment. This is an essential principle, which encapsulates a network of different, and overlapping institutions of governance, varying Mitrany envisaged a wide range of flexible task-oriented international organizations to deal with prior needs of human beings (Ibid: 35). Activities of flexible task-oriented international organizations would be selected specifically and organized separately (Ibid: 34, 35). As this process works and articulates its material benefits and interests, this will let the conditions produce the expansion and reproduction of such organizations or agencies in a broader manner. As a result of these, noticeable benefits which in turn would create incentive (for instance; *Common market, tariffs*) for wider participation within these organizations and demonstrate the determined feature of state fixation (Ibid: 34). Eventually, this complex web of organizations would facilitate to strengthen interdependence processes among states and societies.

It is hardly to say that functionalism starts from a rigid set of foundational propositions and rules that are agreed by functionalists. Human needs or public welfare rather than importance of nation-state or the celebration of any particular ideological doctrine is the prior values for functionalists (Ibid: 33-35). In fact, for functionalism, it is unlikely for a nation-state to fulfill human needs own its own as

emphasized once more. Since the very existence of nation-states tends to maintain certain sorts of dogmas, this situation prevents policy from maximization of public welfare (Ibid: 33). According to one of the fundamental premises of functionalism, persons have to be both rational about what their needs are and creative concerning the creation of authoritative institutions that can carry out the function which is assigned to them. Thus, Mitrany's functionalism is based on a largely technocratic vision of human governance (Ibid: 33). It means to a certain extent that some needs could be best served by ignoring or eliminating traditions of national territory. Indeed, it is argued that transnational bodies would be better and more efficient providers of human welfare than national governments. Moreover, the construction of such bodies would pave the way a process of popular loyalty transfer away from the nation state. So then, the possibilities of international conflict would be reduced. The realization and full application of this technocratic and rationalistic approach, which are core elements of functionalism to human governance, was the basis of a working peace system in Mitrany's terms. Functionalism takes into account of the changing nature and conditions of human needs. Therefore, it does not determine rigid sets of rules about human needs; on the contrary, it embraces flexibility and openness (Ibid: 33-34, 35). The achievement of a particular integrated end state is not the central concern for functionalism. Rather, the primary concern is the prioritization of human needs. To some extent, thus, functionalism is not considered as a theory of integration at all because as Ben Rosamond pointed out (2000) the term "integration" implies a particular institutional end stage (Ibid: 34).

Functionalists, particularly Mitrany, envisaged a production of flexible task-oriented international organizations as "the means to address the priorities dictated by human needs" (Ibid: 35). Mitrany asserts (1966) that these types of organizations were to be flexible in a manner that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately- each according to its nature, "to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment" (Rosamond: 35). It can be inferred from that the formation and tasks of these traditional task-oriented institutions would differ as functions that were assigned to them varied. In order for these institutions to function efficiently and effectively, the powers needed by the respective authority. It is assumed that if these functional organizations work as it is planned and would produce evident benefits, which in turn would encourage wider participation with these bodies and indicate inability and insufficiency of nation-state. Furthermore, this complex web of organizations would increase the processes of growing interdependence among states and societies.

Functionalism and European integration

Principally, functionalism is opposed to continental unification or integration (for instance, regionalism) which is derived from a territorial closure and a defined territory. At the end of the day, this kind of integration results from interregional antagonisms and tensions (Ibid: 37). Because, both in the case of federalism and regionalism tend to draw boundaries and put limits upon membership within entities such as the Communities. That is contrary to the flexibility and openness of functionalism and threatens to peace and development by reproducing territorial state-like functions at the supranational level. Functionalist approach as a mid-range theory could be seen as an acknowledgement of the unavoidable historical forces driving the state towards contracting of sovereignty.

There are clear elements and dimensions of functional rationale in ECSC in terms of its technocratic consultative mechanisms that attached officials to producer groups and "in the inherent possibilities for cooperative contacts with non-member countries" (Groom and Taylor, 1994: 53-78). If we use the terminology of functionalism to understand the process of ECSC, we will see very concrete traces of functional logics in terms of combining two important sectors as coal and steel that emerged in post-war Europe. As Taylor and Groom (1993) stated, ECSC stands for a moment in which particular problems made concrete itself within a defined geographical scope. Actually, there is a clear-cut distinction between functional logic and territorial logic. Functional logic is associated with openness, flexible, interdependence, coordination and cooperation. It is indispensable in order for functionalism to work the departure of authority from territoriality and the main carriers or actors of functionalism are technical expertise and trans-national agencies. Functionalism apparently, as it was argued, disagrees with the idea that advocated territorial closure in the form of regional integration. For Mitrany, formation of continental unification operated within a specific territory and needed the deployment of territorial logic, as opposed to the functionalist logic, which resulted in interregional antagonisms (Rosamond, 2000: 33-35, 37). Mitrany as the master of functionalist approach opposed both the federal and regional type of unification. For him, the former one described the tendency to draw boundaries and to impose limits upon membership within entities such as Communities. The latter referred to the tendency to build up such arrangements for political purposes. In addition, in the case of regional unification, this form of unification would reproduce territorial state-like functions at the supranational level. It would also strength the power of big states in decision-making structures.

In the eyes of Mitrany, there were many elements of functionalist reasoning in the creation of ECSC. The ECSC was attractive to Mitrany because it generated functional

solution to a particular set of sectoral needs emerged in post-war Europe. For functionalist assumption, integration was “the gradual triumph of the rational and the technocratic over the political” (Ibid: 43). According to integrative logic of functionalism, nationalism should wither away and would wither away, not only because it was an anachronism or outdated in the post-ideological world of technocratic management in which Monnet and Schumann chiefly underlined, but also because supranational sentiment would begin to weaken national consciousness. Indeed, as a critical evaluation on functionalist approach, Hoffmann argued, the Monnet-Haas logic or vision would only work where “integration could ensure permanent positive sum results” (Ibid: 76-77).

Historical parameters or factors that triggered European integration

Firstly, the outcomes of the Second World War have deeply affected Europe and its leaders. The Second World War resulted in huge amount of death people and caused widespread devastation as a physical damage in terms of destruction of cities, bridges food production, agriculture and disruption of communication (Dinan, 2000: 15). That is to say, the Europe's veins of life were deteriorated. This extremely negative picture of Europe led to the European leaders to think of very differently in relation to past by leaving aside their differences and antagonisms and building bridges of cooperation that aimed at removing the causes of war. With this way, this cooperation may encourage European economic and political union. Apparently, while explaining the establishment of ECSC as starting point for a broader European integration in the long run, it should be underlined that there were different opinions and domestic priorities of states about this cooperative based integration in Europe. It is rather important to grasp better understanding of how European states approached the issue of European integration in that specific period by taking into account general historical climate of Europe in that time and circumstances. In fact, these different opinions were reflected in “the Congress of Europe”, held in The Hague in May 1948. As a consequence of negotiations and discussions of European leaders (in *The Hague Conference*) who had a wide range of different domestic priorities and opinions on European integration (Ibid: 11-14) within the framework of cooperation and coordination came to the conclusion that the major threats to peace and security were nationalism and the nation-state as functionalist logic articulated which have also triggered militarism. Besides, to this, they had been lost their credits by the atrocious and destructive war. In this respect, for many European leaders, if Germany could not be controlled and its power could not be diverted to constructive ends, it would be unlikely to settle down peace and safety in Europe (Ibid: 18-21). Thus, Germany would

be allowed to rebuild its economic and political systems provided that Germany would not threaten European security (Ibid: 18-21).

Secondly, *the Marshall Plan* provided enduring financial assistance to a Europe in economic turmoil (Mason, 1996: 10). As Mason underlined to those in the United States who feared “a slump in exports and a lapse into depression, it offered a way to revive world trade.” (Ibid: 10). For the Western powers, United States and France as the prior states, the economic isolation of Germany and the increasingly materialization of Communism, whatever Stalin's urgent policy, were unacceptable. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, any endeavour to recover its mortal enemy, Germany, without security and reparations was equally unbearable (Dinan, 2000: 18). The struggle for the controlling power over Germany lay at the heart of the grand alliance and of the Cold War (Leffler and Painter, 1994: 126-136). The success of the Soviet Union in escalating its political and social system into Eastern Europe caused to widespread fears in the West that in 1946 and 1947 perhaps Greece, then Italy, and even France would be next to fall.

As far as *Marshall Aid* was concerned the geo-strategic argument claimed that the United States had to prevent Western Europe “falling like a rotten apple” (Mason, 1996: 8-9) into Stalin's lap, by providing economic resource for Europe's structural payments deficits. With *the Marshall Aid*, the US left out the IMF and World Bank, and enhanced European integration and discrimination against dollar and US exports. The preparators of Marshall Plan supported regional integration in Europe. Because they believed that only through a single, integrated European economy and even political system could Europe hope to become viable and thus a strong and stable partner for the United States (Dinan, 2000: 17).

Thirdly, as consequence of Soviet expansionism and Soviet threat to Europe, *Cold War* which were depicted as a largely bipolar global system defined by bloc-building; political rivalry and confrontation; military competition; and a lack of free economic interaction (Woods, 1996: 81) together with ideological antagonism between the Soviet Russia and the United States and the containment policy of US helped to shift American policy in a direction towards more consistent with European interests. That is why *the Cold War* as an international historical fact played an instigating and igniting role on the reconstruction and integration of Europe (Dinan, 2000: 16, Milward, 1984: 90-91). Historically speaking, *the Cold War* was structured and institutionalized by the European Recovery Programme, by the establishment of NATO and of West and East Germany, and by the formation of blocks, which gave broad “if not total or willing allegiance to one superpower or the other: the diplomatic revolution known as the *Cold War* was in place.” (Woods, 1996: 82).

ECSC, Monnet and Schuman

For Milward (1984) *The Treaty of Paris* 1951 established the ECSC, a common market in coal and steel, which facilitated the achievement of national economic objectives in an international context. Milward argues (1984) that when national reconstruction plans depended on economic link with West Germany, then integration occurs. Milward indicates that West German economic revival was crucial in the European economic system. Because it was the main source of machine tools for its continental neighbors and a big consumer of food and steel (Milward, 1984: 129-167, 407-420). At the end of the war in 1945, it was assumed by West European states, occupied by Germany between 1940-44, that their access to German coal and markets would be secured and German steel output heavily restricted. For the sake of post-war economic recovery and reconstruction of states, steel was the main component that was needed for railways, buildings, ships, vehicles, machinery; and coal was the primary energy source (Suder, 2007: 23).

Dutch, French, Belgium and other states all needed to repair safe trading connections and links with West Germany (Dedman, 1996: 14). Their economic recovery and national reconstruction relied largely on Germanic economic revival (Milward, 1984: 492-502). West Germany's political future in Western Europe was also of central importance. As Wilward underlined:

“while Germany remained divided by internal frontiers into occupation zones and with no agreement on its future external frontiers or form of government, Europe's reconstruction had only limited perspectives” (Milward, 2002: 11).

External post-war control mechanisms over its steel and coal production was only removed from the shoulders of West Germany by ending the international Ruhr Authority's restrictions over coal exports from West Germany within the boundaries of the ECSC from 1951 (Dinan, 2000: 18-19, 20). Thus, as Milward rightly stated (1984), European economic integration took place when rebuilding nation states' economies after 1945 depended on economic links and agreement with Germany and finding a solution on how to keep Germany safely and securely in Western Europe (Dinan: 18-19).

Monnet thought the ECSC essentially means of overcoming two major post-war problems, namely, the French fear of future West German industrial hegemony and the desire for equality of treatment (Ibid: 9). The mentality of the ECSC lay in its capability to connect these two problems to a single solution that would also broad implications for Western Europe as a whole. In other words, the Franco-German problem had to be approached as a European problem and the ECSC would become “the germ of European unity” (Burgess, 2000: 293). Monnet saw European integration

as an effort to order peace. Monnet as *President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community* during 1952-1955 maintained the idea about the danger of nationalism, the anachronistic nature of the state, the importance of common solutions to common problems, the role of new institutions and the need for lasting peace in Europe. His own particular method of uniting Europe was primarily based on economic integration. He has been described predominantly as the foremost "functionalist". French domestic reconstruction was shaped by the Modernization and Development Plan, better known as the *Monnet Plan*. According to this Plan, the only way for France in order to achieve economic modernization and development objectives was the overhauling from Germany and the maintenance for some time of strict restrictions on German industrial output, particularly of steel, because the expansion of France's steel industry was the key element of the Monnet Plan (Dinan, 2000: 19-21).

Let us look at the Monnet's approach to Europe closely. Mainly, his political ideas were not close to ideological premises. Instead, they were relied on very practical and the product of the circumstances and conditions as they came out. Indeed, François Duchene tried to shed light on Monnet ideas as the combination or "fusion of idealism and the pragmatic approach" (Brinkley and Hackett, 1991: 184-209). The following extract from Monnet's *Memoirs* is worth emphasizing:

"The essential thing is to hold a fast to a few fixed principles that have guided us since the beginning; gradually to create among Europeans the broadest common interest, served by common democratic institutions to which the necessary sovereignty has been delegated. This is the dynamic that has never ceased to operate" (Burgess, 2000: 32).

Monnet aimed at changing the nature of international relations by altering the relations between peoples in terms of uniting them, solving their common problem, and convincing them to see their common interest. However, the main problem for him was how to persuade people to approach the problem in the same manner, and to see that their interests are the same, when men and nations are divided. Actually, he intended to change men's attitudes by means of "transforming the very reasons for their rivalry" (Ibid: 33) which necessitated a radical transformation of the political atmosphere where the conflicts were taken place.

The federal political idea of Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli since it has been their activities, which have been largely responsible for the peculiar evolution of European integration. They shared the common points concerning the dangers of nationalism, the anachronistic nature of the state, the importance of common solutions to common

problems, the role of new institutions and the need for lasting peace in Europe. Their ultimate goal, which should be underlined, was also the same: namely, a European federation (Dinan, 2000: 11, 12). Monnet has been described predominantly as the foremost “functionalist” and only occasionally as an “incremental federalist” (Burgess, 2000: 37).

Having said the idea of changing the context within which traditional conflicts between states occurred, Monnet was forced to give that context a solid form. He argued that institutional innovation responded the call for new habits of thought and action. He articulated that “nothing is possible without men: nothing is lasting without institutions... The union of Europe cannot be based on good will alone. Rules are needed” (Ibid: 34). Apparently, the obsolescence of the state; danger of nationalism; the urgency to change the context of problems; and the need for new institutions which would care for common interest were the assumptions that shaped Monnet’s approach to European integration. The functional links, which Monnet touched upon, were essentially economic activities and they were reflected in the ECSC initiative. This new form of sectoral supranational organization (*The High Authority*) would be the foundation of the European federation that would evolve only slowly to engage national elites in a process of mutual economic interest (Dinan, 2000: 25). These concrete benefits would gradually form that crucial solidarity or the common interest, more specifically, which Monnet believed indispensable for the removal of physical and mental hurdles or barriers. He stated in his Memoirs that “Since Franco-German union could not be achieved at once; a start would be made by the establishment of common bases for economic development” (Burgess, 2000: 35). The ECSC method of establishing the greatest solidarity among people(s) meant that gradually other tasks and other people would become subject to the same common rules and institutions, which would pave the way a new ways of thinking and attitude among peoples towards integration and would spread into other areas.

At this point, it should be pointed out that the picture that Monnet drawn primarily much more associated with economic integration rather than political integration. He believed that political integration would happen only when there was a force of necessity, which made it natural process in the eyes of Europeans. That is why Spinelli as a fervent federalist criticized Monnet on the account that functional approach did not take into consideration to be interested in the organization of political power at the European level (Spinelli, 1983, 1985). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the economic dimension and factors to integration has been considerable importance in relation to social or political aspects of the integration process in functionalism, particularly, in Monnet’s own approach to the building of Europe. What Monnet initially

anticipated and helped to fulfil in Western Europe was clearly “economic integration”, obviously, it was driven by a political imperative and his long-term goal was a European federation. Indeed the ECSC as an empirical reality did incorporate both political and economic elements that were meddle with each other in the Schumann Plan. Yet, as it has been asserted that economic priorities took precedence over political ones within the framework of integration process at the very beginning.

Monnet who was quite often viewed as a “saint” of European integration was staunchly dedicated to “the task of eliminating the risk of war in Europe and that meant defusing the antagonism between France and Germany.” (Schmitter, 2005: 256). First Monnet tried to uphold direct ways to federalism and military unification but he could not succeed. Subsequently, he used his second chance by coming up with an indirect resolution, which was based on integrate the two industrial sectors that would be necessary in the event of any future conflict, i.e. coal and steel (Ibid: 256-257). By means of Marshall Plan and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) behind him and the support and sponsorship of the United States government, he got a head to persuade six countries not only into forming ECSC but also, into endowing its Secretary-General “with very modest supranational powers, a position he subsequently occupied.” (Ibid: 257).

Conclusion

This paper has tried to offer an evaluation of functionalist thinking along with the ECSC paying particular attention to the contributions made by D. Mitrany, J. Monnet and R. Schuman and mentioning about the historical factors and context that affected early attempts for European integration process. The intention here has been to state and focus on the historical importance of functionalist reasoning in the development of European integration and integration theories. Particularly, a reading of the work of D. Mitrany is essential to show that the functionalist logic inherently carries conditions and drew the path for more peaceful and safer Europe. More importantly, functionalism opened the way for neofunctionalism as a grand integration theory. Beyond its analytical salience, functionalism was a remarkably open-minded intellectual project that enabled fertile grounds from across the spectrum of the social sciences. In that sense, at the very beginning the best way to understand the process of European integration within the framework of theoretical conceptualization is to take functionalism as an approach or perhaps a mid-range theory what Simon Hix (2004) used. Since functionalism objected to create an all-inclusive synthesis “without a reliable set of theoretical *elements*” (Moravcsik, 2005: 355), it is a framework not a

theory. Its basic theoretical contours which were claimed to link with economic, “supranational entrepreneurs are influential, institutional delegation is open-ended, and so on – are not derived from common foundations.” (Ibid: 355). Functionalism desired to elucidate long-term dynamic change without micro-foundational theories of static preferences, bargaining and institutional delegation (Ibid: 350). What this refers is that functionalism tried to build up a comprehensive synthesis without a reliable set of theoretical elements that made it an approach or a mid-range theory. Functionalism does not look for explicating a particular feature or to explore a particular reason of integration, but to offer a single framework for analyzing European integration as a whole. The ‘founding fathers,’ men like Paul-Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli, or Jean Monnet, knowing that “their federal visions threatened national leaders’ attachment to the integrity of the nation-states, chose not to specify what they were building but to name instead the process of building itself.” (Schmidt, 2007: 2). By this, they identified as ‘spillover’ process of early functionalists and neofunctionalists from one functional policy area to the next in the European Steel and Coal Community (ECSC) and, later, the ‘Community Method’ for the European Economic Community (EEC) (Ibid: 2). Scholars picked up on this; beginning with Ernst Haas (1958) followed by Leon Lindberg (1963) and Philippe Schmitter (1970), and theorized about the ‘neofunctionalist’ process of regional integration. This indicates that functionalism paved the way for neofunctionalism as a grand integration theory and also opened the scene for other integration theories to come out and develop.

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