The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals’ Hearth – Aydınlar Ocağı” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State

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Abstract

Within a particular social formation, there does not exist merely one dominant ideology, rather there are many antagonistic ideologies. The dominant ideology per se becomes dominant as long as it suppresses other ideologies not by applying violence or force. Instead, dominant ideology can manage to do it through the support of ideological apparatuses of the state. This article, in the sense of theoretical and conceptual framework drawn above, focuses on the Intellectual’s Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) as one and the most important of the ideological apparatuses of September 12 regime and tries to analyse its “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Doctrine”, which constitutes the cement of social formation of dominant ideology of the dominant class. In this article, there will be observations and considerations by following 1970s and September 12 1980 military coup period as a historical theme regarding the changing nature of the Intellectual’s Hearth particularly after the 1980 period that neoliberalism and globalization gained momentum in Turkey.

Keywords: Intellectual’s Hearth, Ideological Apparatuses of the State, “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” Doctrine, 12 September 1980, National Culture.

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Introduction

In reality, ideology is not merely grained in thinking or in idea; it does not constitute a conceptual system by itself. As Gramsci correctly emphasized ideology disseminates and penetrates into the traditions and conventions and even life-styles of individuals in a given society. In that sense, ideology becomes a far more concrete within a social formation. Indeed, a predominant ideology "forms the fundamental power of classes within a given society" (Poulantzas, 2004: 351). Above all, Gramsci insisted on that not simply the state function as having the monopoly of use of force in Weberian sense but also it bears an ideological function function (or hegemony). Thus, he remarked that the state should be considered as “organizer of the hegemony” (Gramsci, 2005). Dominant ideology becomes blatant within the particular apparatuses and institutions of society such as churches (religious apparatus), political parties (political apparatus), unions, schools and universities, media tools (newspapers, radio, cinema, t.v.), and family to a certain extent. These are ideological apparatuses of the state (Althusser, 2003: 168-169). These are different from repressive apparatuses of the state (military, police, bureaucracy, courts, and government) in a relative sense. In brief, the repressive apparatuses of the state fulfill the monopoly use of violence of the state. The upshot of vigorous class struggles for capturing ideological apparatuses of the state has been laid bare lately (Althusser, 2003: 130-131). In this respect, dominant ideology in a particular society, as Althusser vehemently underlines, “does not hold state power without applying its own hegemony over/in ideological apparatuses of the state” (2003: 172).

All these explanations compel us to apply Marxist definition of the state. According to this definition, a state is not only defined holding power of the use of force but also is defined in terms of social and political functions. State with having classes enables political class domination in a system of class struggle. The function of state with classes is the last “point/resort” in Althusserian sense for providing social integrity and togetherness and reproduction of the social forces of production. Function of the ideological apparatuses appears in that situation depicted above. Generally, dominant ideology forges the cement of a social formation. Repressive apparatus of the state does not solely contribute to its own reproduction, at the same time it provides political dynamics of the function of ideological apparatuses of the state by means of suppression. As Althusser pointed out the role of ideology of the dominant class that holds the state power mostly comes out here. However, ideological apparatuses of the state both in reciprocal relationships with themselves and relationship with the state apparatus have “relative autonomy” that repressive apparatus of the state does not have. This relative autonomy attributed to the ideological apparatuses of the states is
based on the fundamental dimensions of class struggle in the field of ideology. Within a particular social formation, there does not exist merely one dominant ideology, rather there are many antagonistic ideologies. The dominant ideology per se becomes dominant as long as it suppresses other ideologies not by applying violence or force. Instead, dominant ideology can manage to do it through the support of ideological apparatuses of the state.

This article, in the light of theoretical and conceptual framework drawn above, focuses on the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı) as one of the most important ideological apparatuses of the September 12 regime and tries to analyze its “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis Doctrine”, which constitutes the cement of social formation of the dominant ideology of the dominant class.

The leftist ideas flourished in the cultural and political life of Turkey by means of broad liberal atmosphere vis-à-vis the past that the 1961 Constitution brought about (Ahmad, 1993). In those years, a group of right-wing conservative university academicians and writers came together in order to make their voices heard and to create an alternative against the left. Their primary purpose was to struggle against the dissemination of leftist ideas and to unite Turkish right. The Intellectuals’ Hearth was established on 14 May 1970. Some of its main figures and founding members were rather important names coming from conservative milieu such as İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Altan Deliorman, Muharrem Ergin, and Ahmet Kabaklı. The Intellectuals’ Hearth started to work as a think-thank center where nationalist-conservative intellectuals came together and organized panels and conferences to discuss crucial issues regarding Turkish political life. The Intellectuals’ Hearth was also open to public. Their ideas gained of great importance and had substantial impacts.

The main impetus and motivation behind the establishment of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth in 1970 was to obstruct the rift between the right power block of nationalist intelligentsia and right mass grassroots. The Intellectuals’ Hearth tried to make a compromise between Turkish nationalism and universal Islamic community issued its first official declaration in 1973 under the name of a book titled “The Vision of the Intellectual House: Today’s Issues of Turkey”. In this voluminous and comprehensive book, the ideas in accordance with “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was defined and systematized in details. These ideas articulated in this book made guidance to September 12 military coup in political and ideological fields.

As has it been mentioned above, the most important historical motivation lying behind establishment of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth was to curtail the separation that happened in “great right federation (Justice Party + Nationalist Action Party + National Salvation Party) and to prevent different power rhetorics of these political entities. For
the The Intellectuals’ Hearth, this kind of danger might have led to an insurmountable peril for the sake of Right vis-à-vis the Left, particularly the Republican People’s Party (RPP). Indeed as Tan1 Bora and Kemal Can emphasizes:

“As a result of ossification by reinforcing specific discourses of the DP and more importantly the NSP and the NAP appear ‘risk’ of cleavage of the Right in a permanent manner” (1991:131).

The leading figures of the The Intellectuals’ Hearth such as İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Altan Deliorman, Muharrem Ergin and Ahmet Kabaklı were depicted as:

“They are neither under the effect of mason sides of the JP, nor NSP’s religious and the NAP’s nationalist contours, they are close to all segments but do not stand for anyone.” (Dilipak, 1988: 50-61)

This argument is very significant to take into account since it basically indicates the politico-ideological emptiness of the Intellectuals’ Hearth. But, the Turkist (Turkcu)-nationalist pasts of the first president of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, and the most visible figure of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in daily political life, Muharrem Ergin, and also anti-communist parameter that constituted central point in the establishment of the Hearth became highly influential in terms of building a political bridge between the JP and the NAP. When we look at the position of Islam in the ideology of the Intellectuals’ Hearth; we can argue that the Hearth fairly had an instrumental understanding with respect to the Islam. In that context, it can be said that the tradition of the DP and the JP with regards to the understanding of Islam, which was secular in its essence and status-quo-conservative, and also which regarded religious as one of the elements that transformed people into a nation, was carried on.

In this sense, ideology of the Hearth does not conceive Islam as a determining point and category. This perception reflected the Intellectuals’ Hearth political practices and deeds. For instance, the proponents of the Hearth did not support Erbakan’s National Order Party. This stance led to a far more official and even aloof relationship between the Hearth and the National Salvation Party. In fact, reaction and backlash of the Hearth against the coalition government between the NSP and the RPP in 1973/74 aggravated political distance between the Hearth and the NSP.

The first real visibility of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in political arena was the role that it played in the establishment of the first National Front government. The Ortadoğu (Middle East) newspaper in which the Hearth members wrote and especially the
campaign activity, held under the leadership of Muharrem Ergin, which envisaged to unite nationalist parties in line with anti-communism shaped content of this role mentioned above. The Intellectuals' Hearth as a leverage and an anchor of the first National Front within the intelligentsia gained significant fame in the eyes of dominant bloc and National Front parties. Obviously, the Nationalist Action Party had a peculiar, distinguishing and special place among this dominant bloc. The putative emphasis on Islamic motives and patterns in the NAP's rhetoric towards the mids of 70s increased its harmony, nexus and rapprochement with the Intellectuals’ Hearth. However, it could be underlined that this harmony and amiable relationship was confined to “civil-military bureaucratic state elites who were very close to Türkeş” (Bora & Can, 1991: 132).

The first and foremost level of identification of the Intellectuals’ Hearth as the agency of the dominant state apparatus with the Kemalist civil-military bureaucracy, which seriously contradicted the populism of the Turkish right, manifested itself in assessment and interpretation of the leading figures of the Intellectuals’ Hearth concerning May 27. One of the leading figures of the Hearth, Muharrem Ergin, criticized the DP in his book named as *Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri-Today’s Issues of Turkey* in order to think of:

> “Eighty percent of the country is peasant, we (DP) will stay in power until 2000 by relying on peasants- memleketin yüzde sekseni köylüdür, biz yalnızca ona dayanarak 2000 yılınna kadar iktidarda kalırız” (Ergin, 1973: 219);

and explained main reason of May 27 as:

> “incomparable undermining and neglect of officers and intellectuals in Turkish history” (1973: 235).

Although attitude of the Intellectuals’ Hearth towards May 27 showed a serious deviation from the populist democracy rhetoric associated with general stance-line of Turkish right that was much unexpected, this deviation undubiously made the Intellectuals’ Hearth and its intellectuals rather sympathetic in the eyes of bureaucracy and particularly of military. There was an evident positive relationship with “Kemalism or Atatürkism-Atatürkçülük-” and Atatürk in the Intellectuals’ Hearth rhetoric/discourse. The striking repercussions of this positive and organic relationship could be seen in texts of the Intellectuals’ Hearth regarding “Ataturk reforms and Ataturk principles”, which was situated in the book of “Today’s Issues of Turkey”- *Türkiye’nin Bugünkî Meseleleri*. In
these texts, “Atatürkçülük” was taken up at doctrinaire level and it was claimed that these texts were the most correct and the purest version of “Atatürkçülük”.

Indeed, intellectuals of the Intellectuals’ Hearth perceived the early years of the Republic when Atatürk was alive as ‘old happy days’- asr-ı saadet”. In their imagination, Atatürk was the most progressive Turkish nationalist (Ergin, 1973: 320-323). In addition to this, for intellectuals of the Intellectuals’ Hearth, the state took “national culture” as an essential issue in the era of Atatürk (Ergin, 1973: 312-313). Intellectuals’ Hearth maintained authority for designing social structure and process. It took its legitimacy from conformity with national culture and hence allegiance to national culture was sufficient to regard political authority as legitimate. It did not have any difficulty to bear parallel ideological parameters with Kemalist authoritarianism, which associated people’s will with nation, nation’s will with language, history, culture with the State (Köker, 1990: 79-85, 115-117). Intellectual climate and map of the Hearth always had an approach that praised and sublimed Turkish military with chauvinist, offensive and anti-communist elements. This was also in parallel with identification of the military with nation.

The Intellectuals’ Hearth supported the military government of the September 12 regime without any conditions by emphasising more often the military-people/nation character of the Turks aftermath of September 12 and gave of great importance to build up solid relationships with military officers. The Intellectuals’ Hearth had a prerogative to present its prepared constitution draft to the National Security Council in 1982 when there was a prohibition for making proposal on behalf of the institutions. Indeed, leading people of the Intellectuals’ Hearth overtly pointed out that the 1982 Constitution was tantamount to their prepared draft at the rate of 75-80% (Bora & Can, 1991: 134). Activity of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in September 12 and afterwards depended upon its restructuring of official ideology. The “National Compromises” in which the Hearth presented, formed core of the official ideology and its basic dimensions.

“National Compromises” and Historical Outlook to the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

At the very beginning, it should be essential to argue that the “Doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, which the Intellectuals’ Hearth underwent its preponderance and ideological carrier, was a fundamental vehicle and symbol of the Hearth operations and unduly nationalist inteligensia aftermath of September 12. The efforts for generating a synthesis between Turkishness, Islam and the West in Turkish intelengisia go back to the era before the Republican period. As Taha Parla perfectly emphasized:
“In 250 years cultural identity quest of Turkish ruling class, ‘Turkishness, Islam, and West(ernism)’ elements had become fundamental; differentiations were determined according to how, in what extent these three elements were synthesized. Also, Kemalizm as an official ideology explains synthesis of West-Turkishness-Islam according to order of importance by marginalizing Islamic element” (Parla, 1986: 40-41).

Since the mid-1960s, the right-wing version of Kemalist interpretations grasped all sectors of society that wondered about existence of the regime by setting out polarization between the right and the left as principal structure to political life and in this framework by getting strong opposed forces against the left under the name of anti-communism. By and large, “civil-military sectors” that socialize in the RPP’s tradition was not excluded from this effect (Bora & Taşkın, 2001). In that sense, endeavour of this republican elite in order to substitute regime with a conservative one should be considered within dynamics of the ‘Right’ version of Kemalism-Sağ Kemalizm-. Because the indispensable factor of ‘Right’ Kemalism was actually the preaching of Kemalism as nationalism.

At this point, the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis enabled official Kemalism-the Right Kemalism to make more organic integration with national-conservative. Muharrem Ergin, in his book named as, Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleri, depicted nationalism, which played a dominant role in this integration as:

“Nationalism was an essential principle of Atatürk’s doctrine that gathers all other principles around itself. Atatürkism referred to the nationalism and its requirements. So, in Atatürk, nationalism is essential component and other principles complement to it” (Ergin, 1973: 320-321).

Since 1960s the NAP and the NSP represented two mainstreams in the struggle of intensification of Turkishness and Islam of the right bloc defined as nationalist-conservative. The NSP focused on an area where Islam was hegemonic ideology and the NAP focused on an arena where Turkishness was a basic category. The Intellectuals’ Hearth doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in its practical political meaning was an attempt to set up common point and bridge between the NAP and the NSP and official ideology or official synthesis which united with Right Kemalism ( Sağ Kemalizm) or conservative republicanism or nationalist-conservatism.

The reason why such a political imagination was presented as a “doctrin” is the fact that it obtained practical political validity and endorsement and last but not least became a basis for an ideological identity. Doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis could be evaluated as an eclectic and vulgar rheotic-discourse not an integrated theory. Its “Success” was based on the fact that authoritarian regime projection (Bora
& Can, 1991: 138-143) presented by “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” constituted ideological baggage, support and legitimacy of September 12 government. At the beginning of September 12 1980 military intervention, it was evident that efforts of regime restoration was limited to high politics and cultural institutions and also Kemalism was not able to provide mass support and consistent successes. Escalation of political polarization in 1970s made Kemalism, which was lack of doctriner and programmatic content, ambiguous, not cyristalized and presented as an empty framework, deprived of a possibility that made Kemalism as a power with its hegemonic codes until that time.

As a matter of the fact, the military, as an entrenched defender and guardian of Bonapartist power haunt (Bora & Taşkın, 2001: 529-545) the way in which 12 September regime forged and bare framework of “neutral” Kemalism, noticed of the fact that it was necessary to transform Kemalism to both doctriner and popular project. In this manner, since September 12 government needed anti-communist motivations of nationalist-conservative elites, they tried to made alliance with nationalist-conservative elites. 12 September ledership recognized that supports of republican conservatives who were ideologically close to September 12 ledership both in the fields of economics and culture for generating legitimacy and consent did not suffice. So, the “intellectuals" particularly around the Intellectuals' Hearth, who were able to unite nationalist-conservative thematics and sensibilities with authoritarian-statist ferment and “spontenausly” (Copeaux, 1998) doctrinated rhetoric of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in cultural dimension of restoration policies, gained significance.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis enabled September 12 rule was to integrate Islam to the official ideology. As Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can stated (1991), this situation facilitated association of official ideology alongside Islam by not doing this at the expense of depreciating or ignoring weight of Turkishness and Western elements. Name of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis for the Intellectuals' Hearth was preached as “Synthesis of Turkishness-Islam-West” (Bora & Can, 1991: 139). Inclusion of the West in Synthesis at the level of alliances between technology and economics, political and military made doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Syntehsis closer to projections of the NAP rather than the NSP.

In brief, quintessences of the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis carved out an endeavour to combine Turkishness and Islam in efforts with an authoritarian regime imagination on the axis of vulgar and eclectic discourse. This content of the Synthesis was presented and appealed as an unwritten constitution under the name of “National Compromises” and in essence it also generated central mentality and spirit of written-official constitution (1982 Constitution). The bunch of suggestions, which consisted of
an organic integration and overlapped with basic parameters of the regime was gathered under the title of “National Compromises” in conjunction with 40 articles in the seminar of “Ülkemizi 12 Eylül’e Getiren Sebepler ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Oyunlar-The Causes that brought Our country to 12 September and The Games Over Turkey”, organized by the Intellectuals’ Hearth in 1984. In this seminar, approaches and suggestions of Turkology Professor Muharrem Ergin’s book Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri-Today’s Issues of Turkey” were summarized. Muharrem Ergin, who was the second president of the Hearth, heavily played a crucial role in determining daily political strategies of the Hearth since the establishment of National Front governments. The Synthesis of Turkishness-Islam- (West) as a political-ideological premise was first manifested itself in this declaration and it was specified that “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is unchanging core, on the other hand the West wing is subject to changing and developing dimension” (Bora & Can, 1991: 140-142).

The most important problematique of “National Compromises” is the “continuity of Turkey”. The importance of that was depicted within the classical anti-communist cold war rhetoric as “Four sides of Turkey were surrounded by enemies-dört yanı düşmanlarla çevrili Türkiye-” (Ergin, 1973: 74-76) by September 12 rule and high military officers. This “myth of threat” is in accordance with an understanding of racist-chauvenist “Turkishness” and in line with which of “national culture” almost presented as “engine of history” in an anti-communist context:

“The most mature, the strongest, and the greatest one of human societies is nation. Culture and cultural factors solely give this characteristic to nation”. (Ergin, 1973: 19)

On the other hand, Turkish culture was one of the most valuable cultures in the world and came up with “formation of an ideal society that gave direction to world history.” (Ergin, 1973: 19). According to Muharrem Ergin, the reason for the “collapse” before September 12 was a failure of fulfilling requirements of being a national state, in other words failure of applying or realizing national culture policy. Ergin, who regarded September 12 as “an elusive opportunity” (Ergin, 1973: 211-213), viewed September 12 as path breaking in terms of making national culture predominant again and realizing second “Turkish renaissance” aftermath of Ataturk renaissance. However, for achieving this “Turkish renaissance” and solving all urgent problems, it was a condition to provide “political peace” as the most important problem after “continuance case-beka davası”. According to Ergin, political peace in Turkey especially was broken afterwards Ataturk’s era and democracy period between 1938
and 1945. For Ergin, the reason of this situation was “wrong democracy”. To him, democracy was carried out in a wrong way and at this point losing of hegemonic position of national culture had a strong place. According to Ergin’s understanding of democracy: “democracy means national will... national will refer to the national culture” (1973: 230). As it was seen, Ergin thoroughly placed “national culture” in the focus of politics and he looked for practical political solution of every problem in this magical word that he made. From this perspective, for Ergin, it was rather appropriate that September 12 launched “drive of returning national culture”. Because, according to him, September 12 intervened “wrong democracy” and he defined it as:

“Actually it took aim at “culture” of Pentagon more than “national culture” and it was a “sacred movement” by preventing a calamity”.

Both intellengia of the Intellectuals’ Hearth and publishing organs that were defenders of idealist movement -Ülkücu Hareket- in the period of September 12 such as Bakış, Yeni Hamle, Yeni Düştinçe, acted entirely in line with Middle East strategy of the U.S. Ergin contemplated and envisioned a nationalists-corporatist social model and regime that made the state sublime authority and that was without classes, doctrine, and ideology and not based on right-left polarization. These ideas and contemplations of Ergin had an intimate nexus with explanations of Kenan Evren at the period of September 12 and in accordance with political regime of September 12. This intimate nexus tried to provide legitimacy for September 12 regime in the full sense of the word. Ergin believed in that, September 12 regime with its constitution “met a democracy necessity of Turkey for a century” (Ergin, 1973: 242).

According to Ergin, “failure to provide supremacy of mind and science” (1973: 283) gave rise to economic instability, hampered political and social peace/order and harmed security of the country. This positivist diagnosis of Ergin, as Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can (1991) marked, reflected the idea that in every field, authority and power ought to be left experts and technocrats who worked “neutrally” without being influenced political considerations. The principle of supremacy of mind and science preached that significant preferences, which had important social and political outcomes, should be considered as “out of politics”. This Westernization perception of Ergin, who defined it as “taking technic and civilization in the light of mind and science” (1973: 325), and positivist standpoint mentioned above were important reference points of an ideology of the Intellectuals’ Hearth in the process of integration of it to Kemalizm. In this respect, another important reference point that is worthwhile to be explained here is that redefinition of Kemalism by embracing Ziya Gökalp’s differentiation between culture and civilization. Here, the Intellectuals’ Hearth in its “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” maintained Westernization-modernization mission of
Kemalism that was perceived as “positive science- müsbet ilimcilik”. This stance of the Intellectuals’ Hearth became crystallized in “National Compromises”.

According to Muharrem Ergin, there was a problem of “wrong democracy” just as there was a problem of “wrong Kemalism”. “Correct version of Kemalism” was depicted as “culture or scientific nationalism”, which explained social development and basis of humanity according to nation and national culture (1973: 310-312). At this point, it was argued that Atatürk transcended Ziya Gokalp who was the founding father of Turkish cultural nationalism and Gokalp’s culture-civilization distinction was applied; in other words:

“These two notions were completely excluded each other, affluent interaction between civilization-culture and among cultures was ignored.” (Bora & Can, 1991: 144)

The founding father of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and of its history thesis that was based on this doctrine and the first president of the Intellectuals’ Hearth was Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kafesoglu. Kafesoglu made a book this thesis of “synthesis” under the name of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Aydınlar Ocağı Yayınları, Istanbul 1985). Actually, perspective of Kafesoglu in this book was not inherently different from his approach about the period of Romantic Turkism particularly in terms of dealing with the issue of Islam. There is a continuuity in his ideas in terms of conceiving Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a stage of “ideal of Turk’s world sovereignty” (Tanı Bora/Kemal Can, 1991:145).

In this doctrine, Islam is not a categorical priority and transascendental idea; rather it is one of the elements of Turkish culture and cultural nationalism. For that reason, national culture and patterns of cultural nationalism are superior to Islamic vein and prioritize Islam. The existence of Islamic notion of national culture as a secondary factor became much more concrete in Kafesoglu’s book. The existence of Islam as a secondary component including national culture was materialized in Kafesoglu’s book. Kafesoglu tried to explain Islam as an amenable religion for monotheism of Turks. In that respect, he “easily” disclosed coalescence of Turks as an ethnicity with Muslims. Compatibility of the belief of “Gök-Tanrı” with Islam was exaggeratedly presented in Kafesoglu’s book as:

“Turk converged much more solid, book-learned and convincing system than their ancient beliefs” (1985: 159-164).

In this way, admitting Turks to Islamism in a massive way, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis entered into the way of realization (Bora & Can, 1991: 145-146). These ideas articulated in Kafesoglu’s book together with considering Turkishness as primary
premise by ascribing its jointed link with Islam, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis reached its channel.

The framework of “National Compromises-Milli Mutabakatlar” and doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis constituted footings of September 12’s policies towards Islam. The formula of Muharrem Ergin that he used in “Today’s Issues of Turkey- Türkiye’nin Bugünkü Meseleleri” was a clear-cut summary of these policies: “Turkey will not be a religious country, but he will always stay devaout.” According to Ergin, religion as a peaceful establishment had an important place in social life and “Islam was very strong spiritual gun that protected Turkishness” (1973:199-207). Ergin thought that strengthening and organizing of religious sects in Turkey were important “obstacles for a modern community, which has to fulfill necessities of contemporary world” (1973: 199-207). In that case, functions that were expected from religion in Turkey ought to be realized through state intervention. (Ergin, 1973: 199-207). That kind of approach is in harmony with religion policy of Kemalism that aimed at controlling religion and creating a civic religion in accordance with laisicit policy that is peculiar to Kemalism. Indeed, religion policy was the most concrete area in which September 12 regime made use of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an ideological apparatus of the state. In order to disseminate this ideology (to reproduce itself) the Intellectuals’ Hearth, by organizing a seminar under the title of “National Education and Religious Education” in 9-10 May 1981, put forward the view that “state has to give compulsory religious education and this situation does not contradict with compulsory religious education of secularism”. Nationalist intelengisia and most of the other intellectuals who were close to the NAP supported this stance of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in terms of uniting it to the official ideology of September 12. Consequently, compulsory education in secondary schools was both stated in 1982 constitution and was enforced. Another remarkable development that enabled doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis integrate into the official ideology of September 12 and penetrate into all aspects of social life as an ideological apparatus of the state (by producing its own consent mechanisms) is the fact that this doctrine was suggested in order to draw a framework of official culture policy by Supreme Institution of Ataturk Culture, Language and History. This event was a striking development in terms of acceptance of doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the eyes of military as a genuine protector-defender of official ideology.

Doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did not work well to realize its holy mission/purpose and its establishment ethos, which was based on synthesizing and embracing ideological expansions of the Turkish Right. It did not bring the Turkish Right to come into power. As stated at the beginning of this article, in terms of intensive
ideological eclecticism, pragmatism and instrumentalism of the doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis did prevent this situation. Doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was rather voluntarily accepted by nationalist intellectuals vis-à-vis Islamic intellectuals. This identification of nationalist intellectuals with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has emerged out of ideological motives and strategic and clientalistic calculations in political sense. In terms of ideology, since doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was obviously depended upon priority of “Turkishness”, (Ortaylı, 1988: 46-47) it became effective on nationalist intellectuals in terms of associating with Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Vulgar and ajitative discourse “Nationalist-conservative” of nationalist intellectuals in this doctrine, which was plastered with anti-communism, had the opportunity to refresh its “faith” and ritualize. In the period of 1983, this social segment, who tried to protect and reproduce its political identity by identifying itself with September 12 and acted together with the NAP’s staff in a consistent manner, welcomed organic nexus of doctrine of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis with official ideology as a development that apparently confirmed the motto of “his idea is in power but he is in prison-fikri iktidarda kendi zindanda”

**Concluding Remarks**

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was established on 14 May 1970 for the purpose of “expanding national culture, national consciousness and Turkish nationalism” (Dursun, 2006) by rightist intellectuals and thinkers gathered around the Intellectuals’ Hearth. The Synthesis draws its ideological horizon by organizing the promise for protecting unity and integrity forever and for providing social order after the September 12 coup when extraordinary conditions existed. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an official ideology of September 12 1980 military coup tried to become a hegemonic ideology having political, social and cultural codes in the process of restructuring relationships between state and society.

In this context, it functioned as an ideological apparatus of the state. The real claim of this ideology is that the nexus between Turkishness and Muslim or Islam is a relation of harmony. According to this, Turkish nation obtained a privileged position with its vanguard role in the history of Islam’s diffusion and by embracing tevhid-unity principle; it gained the feature of being nationhood. According to the Synthesis, the ideal one is that all Muslims ought to have an understanding of being one ummet or nation in contemporary sense. At this point nationality bears great importance and Turkish nation was privileged as “en fazla rahmaniyyete mazhar olmuş-” (emphasis U.
(Ergin, 1973: 199-207) among Islamic nations. In fact, such a privileged position of the Turkish nation made it easier to integrate with different identity elements, which were based on ‘ummetcilik’. As a result, the imaginary bond between Muslim or Islam and Turkishness was reinforced in the ideology of Synthesis. Before 1980 military intervention, this ideological spatial that emphasized being a Turk was possible with being Muslim turned into a framework, which restructured social arena for “unity and integrity”, desired after September 12. This ideological spatial of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis came into scene for the purpose of perpetuating social and political status quo of the period that was too resilient to change (Güvenç and et al., 1991).

The interesting point that I want to argue here is that since the day of its establishment the House, as the most important thinking place for the Right that played a crucial role in terms of determining who came to power in Turkey and defended Turkish-Islamic Synthesis idea, is drawing a new route for itself nowadays. Although fulfilling an encompassing umbrella in the Right by maintaining Turkish-Islamic Synthesis idea and acting together with nationalist wing-Ulusalcılar-or Red Apple Coalition under the guidance of Kemalism and embracing nearly the same discourse of these two old disputed groups create surprising situation for the Intellectual’s Hearth and its ideology actually, this picture vindicates our explanations that I tried to put forward above by indicating the eclectic and volatile ground-basis of the ideology of the Intellectual’s Hearth.

I would say that the new thing today is the fact that this ancient authoritarian and nationalist propensity (nationalist left, third world left, or Turkish left), which insists on defining itself as the left, became parallel with the conservative parameters of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. This nationalist left and nationalist conservative convergence, which got realized under the shadow of the holy state, beloved nation and magnificent saviour, are being guided by Kemalism. This new synthesis is trying to rely on the golden age of Kemalism by increasing its religious-mystic dimension.

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