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Sigorta Piyasalarında Asimetrik Bilgi ve İstenmeyen Tercih: Etik Tehlike Problemi

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard

Journal Name:

  • Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2009

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

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Abstract (2. Language): 
The problem of asymmetric information occurs when one party of an economic transaction has insufficient knowledge about the other party to make accurate decisions. The moral hazard, on the other hand, is the risk that one party to a contract can change their behaviour to the detriment of the other party once the contract has been concluded. In insurance market the moral hazard is tendency by which people expend less effort protecting those goods which are insured against theft or damage.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Asimetrik Bilgi problemi bir ekonomik işlemin taraflarından birinin doğru bir karar verebilmek için diğer taraf hakkında eksik bilgiye sahip oldugu durumlarda ortaya çıkan bir problemdir. Öte taraftan Etik Tehlike kavramı ise, bir sözleşmenin tamamlanmasından sonra taraflardan birinin digerinin zararina olacak sekilde davranişini değiştirmesi riskini ifade eder. Sigorta Piyasalarında Etik Tehlike kişilerin sigorta ettirilen şeyin zarara uğramasi veya çalınmasi risklerine karşı daha az çaba harcamasi şeklinde ortaya çikar.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral hazard accessed on 10.02.2005

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