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Rethinking the American Era: A Historical Perspective of Iranian Islamic Revolution and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)

Journal Name:

  • Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2012

Key Words:

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 that occurred as a result of Ayatollah Rouhoullah Khomeini leading the overthrow of Shah’s regime is an Islamic revolution. The revolution was viewed partially as a way for Iranian conservatives to counter the Pahlavi who was so attached to the West, especially the United States. Before the Revolution, all foreign intelligence services believed that the Shah was strong and decisive and would not shy away from what he needed to do. The role of nationalism and its twin in Iranian domestic politics, anti-Americanism, was missed and misunderstood by the CIA station in Tehran. The CIA could not foresee the Revolution because they had no connection with the streets, bazaars, and mosques. After taking the oath of office as president, Ronald Reagan ordered a covert action directed by National Security Council (NSC) to support Iranian paramilitary and political exile groups. This study aims to develop our understanding of how a country’s foreign policy and its decisionmakers was affected by an intelligence agency.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Ayetullah Humeyni’nin, ran Sahı Rıza Pehlevi’yi 1979 yılında devirmesi ile gerçeklesen ran Devrimi, slami özellikler tasıyan bir devrimdir. ran slam Devrimi, özellikle ABD olmak üzere, Batılı güçler ile yakın iliskileri olan Sah’a karsı, islami özellikleri agır basan ran muhafazakârlarının bir tepkisi olarak görülmüstür. Devrimden önce bütün yabancı istihbarat birimleri, ran Sahını güçlü, kararlı ve yapması gerekeni yapmaktan çekinmeyen bir lider olarak degerlendirmislerdir. Ancak, ran iç politikasında birbiriyle neredeyse aynı anlama gelen ulusalcılık ve Amerikan karsıtlıgı hesaba katılmamıs ve/veya yanlıs anlasılmıstır. Sonuçta, CIA ran stasyon Sefligi, ran halkının nabzını tutmakta yetersiz kalmıs ve devrim önceden tahmin edilememistir. Devrimden hemen sonra göreve gelen ABD Baskanı Ronald Reagan, devrim karsıtı paramiliter ve siyasi grupları destekleyebilmek adına örtülü bir operasyon yapılması için Ulusal Güvenlik Konseyi’ne talimat vermistir. Bu çalısma, bir ülkenin dıs politikasının, o ülkenin istihbarat kurumunca nasıl etkilendigini ve bu durumun olumsuz sonuçlarını ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
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  • 15
19-30
  • English

REFERENCES

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