Buradasınız

Anasayfa » Content

Análisis longitudinal de las consejerías cruzadas y su papel en la organización económica española

Journal Name:

  • Harvard Deusto Business Research

Publication Year:

  • 2014
DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/hdbr.7

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author Name
Abstract (2. Language): 
Interlocking directorates build relationships between corporations, and define the national economic organization. We analyze the corporate network of the IBEX 35 companies, plus two savings banks, and compare it with the same network in 2005. The most central positions in the network are occupied by large Spanish corporations, privatized in the 90s. On the other hand, in 2008 banks lose centrality, while savings bank’s centrality rises.
Bookmark/Search this post with
Abstract (Original Language): 
Las consejerías cruzadas establecen relaciones entre empresas y determinan la organización económica de un país. En este artículo se analiza la red corporativa formada por las empresas del IBEX 35 en el año 2008 más dos cajas de ahorros y se comparan con la misma red de 2005. Observamos que las grandes empresas privatizadas en los años noventa siguen manteniendo posiciones de elevada centralidad. Por otra parte, en 2008 los bancos pierden centralidad, mientras que la de las cajas de ahorros aumenta.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
PDF icon arastirmax-analisis-longitudinal-de-las-consejerias-cruzadas-y-su-papel-en-la-organizacion-economica-espanola.pdf
  • 2
63
75
  • Spanish

REFERENCES

References: 

R. V. (1998). Directorship Interlocks in a Comparative Perspective: the Case of Spain. European
Sociological Review, 14(4), 319-342. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018243
Alcántara, D. B., López de Foronda, O., & Romero-Merino, M. E. (2012). The convergence between continental
and anglo-saxon models of governance: The role of banks in Spain and the United Kingdom.
Transformations in Business and Economics, 11(3), 222-237.
Azofra, V., & Santamaría, M. (2004). El gobierno de las cajas de ahorros españolas. Universia Business Review,
2, 48-59.
Byrd, D., & Mizruchi, M. (2005). Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 11, 129-173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2003.09.002
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., &. Freeman, L. C (2002). UCINET VI for Windows: Software for social network
analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
CMNV (2006). Código unificado de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas. [Fecha de consulta: 23-05-2010].
Disponible en http://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/CodigoGov/Codigo_unificado_Es...
Davis, G. F. (1991). The Agents without Principles – The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate
Network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(4), 583-613. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393275
Davis, G. F., & Mizruchi, M. J. (1999). The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U. S.
System of Corporate Governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 215-239. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/2666995
Dooley, P. C (1969). Interlocking Directorate. American Economic Review, 59, 314-323
Faces, F. (2004). El gobierno corporativo en las cajas de ahorros españolas: un modelo eficiente y precursor.
Boletín de Estudios Económicos, 59(82), 209-224.
Fernández, Z. (2003). Banca y empresa industrial en España (1978-2003): Historia de una larga relación.
Economía Industrial, 349-350, 193-202.
Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification. Social Networks, 1(3), 215-239.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7
Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1093/0199247757.001.0001
Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to social network methods. Riverside, CA: University of
California, Sociology Departament. [Fecha de consulta: 21-05-2010]. Disponible en http://faculty.ucr.
edu/~hanneman
Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of Directors: A review and research agenda.
Journal of Management, 22(3), 409-438. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639602200303
Mintz, B., & Schwartz,M. (1981). Interlocking Directorates and Interest Group Formation. American
Sociological Review, 46(6), 851-869. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2095083
Mizruchi, M. S. (1996). What Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique and Assessment of Research on
Interlocking Directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 271-298. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
soc.22.1.271
Mizruchi, M. S., & Stearns, L. B. (1988). A longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 194-210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393055
Mizruchi, M. S., & Stearns, L. B. (1994). A longitudinal study of borrowing by large American corporations.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 118-140. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393496
Pennings, J. M. (1980). Interlocking Directorates: Origins and Consequences of Connections Among Organizations’
Boards of Directors, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: a Resource Dependence Perspective, New
York: Harper & Row.
Ren, B., Au, K. Y., & Birtch, T. A. (2009). China’s Business Network Structure During Institutional
Transitions. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26, 219-240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10490-008-9106-3
Rodríguez Inciarte, M. (2004), La expansión exterior de la banca española. Universia Business Review, 3, 12-25.
Scott, J. (2000). Social Network Analysis: A Handbook, London: SAGE Publications.Scott, J. (1991). Networks of Corporate-Power a Comparative-Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 17, 181-
203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.17.080191.001145
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
Sicilia, C., & Sallan, J. M. (2007). Las Relaciones entre las Empresas Cotizadas Españolas: Un Análisis a
Través de las Consejerías Cruzadas. Dirección y Organización, 35, 30-36.
Stearns, L. B., & Mizruchi, M. S (1993). Board composition and corporate financing: The impact of financial
institution representation on borrowing. Academy of Management Journal, 36(3), 603-618. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/256594
Useem, M. (1984). The Inner Circle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce II, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review
and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/014920638901500208
Zajac, E. J (1988). Interlocking Directorates as an Interorganizational Strategy – A Test of Critical
Assumptions. Academy of Management Journal, 31(2), 428-438. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256558

Thank you for copying data from http://www.arastirmax.com