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Baskanlik Sistemi ve Parlamenter Sistem K arsilastirmasinda Bürokratik Reformların Zamanlamasi ve Tasarımı: Teorik Bir Yaklasım

DESIGN AND TIMING IN BUREAUCRATIC REFORM IN PRESIDENTIAL VS PARL IAMENTARY SYSTEM: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

Journal Name:

  • İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2004

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
While the study of comparative bureaucratic organization within the advanced, industrial democracies has made significant progress in recent years (Moe and Caldwell, 1994), we have a much thinner understanding of the causes and consequences of bureaucratic structure in the developing world. In order to generate hypotheses about both the timing and persistence of bureaucratic reform across different institutional settings, first we maintain that fearing agency’s power loss and diminished policy-making flexibility, executives in presidential democracies have incentives to wait until the very end of their term before insulating their policy preferences in an institutional form. In contrast, it can be argued that the inherently unstable nature of multi-party coalitions within most parliamentary systems requires undertaking the insulation task right at the beginning of one’s term in office. Second, we argue that due to their extreme concentration of power, Latin America’s presidential democracies are highly susceptible to institutional instability, while the multiple veto gates embedded in South Eastern Europe’s parliamentary democracies render them inherently more resilient to subsequent tampering by politic ians. The paper concludes by noting the implications the analysis has for the current literature on policy reform
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Günümüzde, gelismis-endüstriyel demokrasilerde karsilastirmali bürokratik organizasyonlar konusunda yapilan çalismalarda önemli ilerlemeler saglanmasina ragmen (Moe ve Caldwell, 1994), gelismekte olan ülkelerde bürokratik yapiyi olusturan neden ve sonuç iliskileriyle ilgili kapsamli bir anlayis gelistirilememistir. Bürokratik reformun zamanlama ve devamlilik özelliklerinin farkli kurumsal düzenlemeler iç indeki yansimalari, genel bir hipotezi ortaya çikarmistir. Çalismada ilk olarak baskanlik sistemiyle yönetilen demokras ilerde reform çalismalari sirasinda, kurumlarin etkinlik kaybetme korkusu ve kamu politikasi-üretme esnekliklerinin azalmasi olgusu incelenmektedir. Baskanlik sisteminde yönetimler hizmet sürelerinin sonuna kadar kamu politikasi tercihlerinin kurumsallastirici faaliyetlerden kendini izole etmektedir. Buna karsin parlamenter s istem iç indeki çok partili koalisyonlarin dogal yapisi nedeniyle yönetimler, görev süresinin baslangicinda kamu politikasi tercihlerini belirlemek zorundadir. Ikincil olarak, özellikle Latin Amerika'daki baskanlik sistemiyle yönetilen demokrasilerde kuvvetlerin asiri derecede konsantrasyonu, kurumsal devamlilik sürecine zarar vermektedir. Diger yandan Güney Dogu Avrupa ülkelerinin parlamenter demokrasilerinde çok yönlü veto kapilarinin içsellesmes i, politikacilarin tahrifatlari karsisinda sisteminin esnekligini saglamaktadir. Sonuç bölümünde, kamu politikalari reform çalismalarinin uygulamalariyla ilgili güncel literatür taramalarindan elde edilen bilgilerin analizi yapilacaktir.
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  • 30
51-64
  • English

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