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YOLSUZLUK VE YOLSUZLUĞUN VERGİ YAPISI ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ

Corruption and Effects on Tax Structure

Journal Name:

  • İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2005

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
Corruption hasn’t a new phenomenon, but in recent years It has attracted increasing attention. Corruption which has been defined in many different ways, that is the abuse of public power for private benefit. This is the definition used by the World Bank. Especially in the decade of the 1990s, the fact that corruption has attracted a great deal of attention in developed - developing countries has based on many reasons. Corruption has so a complex structure that it hasn’t been explained only one factor. The improved factors that promote for corruption of explaining this complex strucutre can gather two main titles: Direct factors (regulations in law and authorizations, tax structure, spending decisions, provision for goods and services at below market prices etc.) and indirect factors (Quality of the bureaucracy, level of public sector wages, penalty system etc.) Also, corruption includes many economic, financial, social and politics effects. It is showed that corruption level is higher in developing countries than developed countries. In this area, various invetigations on curruption are showed that tax structure is one of factor to be causing corruption. At the same time, it has been indicated that tax revenue are influenced negatively by the level of corruption in taxation. Countries with high level of corruption have lower collection of tax revenue in relation to GDP (given other factors). This paper presents relationship between corruption and tax structure as empirical study for Turkey. In addition, given main measures against corruption have taken place in this paper.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Yeni bir fenomen olmayan yolsuzluga, son yillarda artan bir ilgi sözkonusudur. Farkli tanimlari yapilan yolsuzluk, en yaygin ve basit sekliyle özel çikar için kamu gücünün suistimal edilmesi olarak tanimlanabilir. Bu Dünya Bankasinin kullandigi bir tanimdir. Özellikle 1990’li yillardan sonra tüm gelismis-gelismekte olan ülkelerin yolsuzluga daha fazla önem vermelerinin çesitli nedenleri bulunmaktadir.Yolsuzluk tek bir faktörle açiklanamayacak kadar karmasik bir yapiya sahiptir. Bu karmasik yapiyi açiklamak üzere gelistirilen, yolsuzlugu tesvik edici faktörler iki ana baslikta toplanabilir. Bunlar; dogrudan faktörler (hukuki düzenlemeler ve izinler, vergileme yapisi, harcama kararlari, piyasa fiyatinin altinda mal ve hizmet sunumu gibi) ve dolayli faktörlerdir (bürokrasinin niteligi, kamu sektörü ücret düzeyi, ceza sistemi gibi). Yolsuzlugun birtakim ekonomik, mali, sosyal ve siyasal etkileri vardir. Ayrica yolsuzluk düzeyinin gelismekte olan ülkelerde, gelismis ülkelere göre daha yüksek oldugu görülmektedir. Bu alanda yapilan çesitli arastirmalar, vergi yapisinin yolsuzluga neden olan bir faktör oldugunu göstermektedirler. Ayni zamanda vergileme alaninda yolsuzluk da vergi gelirlerini olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir. Yüksek yolsuzluk düzeyine sahip ülkelerde tahsil edilen vergilerin GSYIH içindeki payi (diger faktörler veri iken) daha düsük olmaktadir. Bu çalismada Türkiye’de yolsuzluk ve vergi yapisi arasindaki iliskisiyi göstermeye yardimci olan bir ampirik çalismaya ve yolsuzluga karsi alinmasi gereken temel önlemlere yer verilmektedir.
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  • 32
111-138
  • Turkish

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