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The Role of Animal Reason in Hume’s Ethics

Hume’un Ahlak Felsefesinde Hayvan Zihninin Rolü

Journal Name:

  • Kaygı: Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2009

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
Hume’s anti-rationalist tendencies towards moral issues can be seen in the parts of his books allotted to animals. However, the problem considering animal reason has not been examined in detail by Hume’s interpreters; I think the deficiencies in both his observations and his poor analogies cause this lack of interest. In this paper I want to argue with Hume’s view of morality in respect to animals for doing so provides great insight into both Hume’s examination of the dominance of reason and his naturalism. Hume uses animals both for stating his theory about reason and for his moral theory. It is assumed in this paper that his assertion to show that morality does not come from relations ― therefore reason ― fails to be persuasive due to the poor design and choice of his analogy.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
David Hume’un ahlakta akılcılık karşıtı eğilimleri kitaplarında hayvan zihnine ve doğasına değindiği bölümlerde de yer almaktadır. Hume’un hayvan zihni ve doğası hakkındaki görüşleri yorumcuları tarafından ayrıntılı bir şekilde yeterince incelenmemiştir. Hume’un hayvan zihni konusundaki gözlemlerinin yetersizliği ve kıyaslarının zayıf olması yorumcuların ilgisizliğinde etkendir. Hume’un ahlak anlayışı hayvan zihni doğrultusunda tartışılacaktır. Böylelikle Hume’un aklın egemenliği ve tabiatçılık konularındaki etkinliği de anlaşılacaktır. Hume hayvanları hem zihni açıklarken hem de ahlak teorisinde kullanmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Hume’un hayvan zihni ve doğasından yola çıkarak kıyaslamalarla ulaştığı ahlakın akılcı çıkarımlardan kaynaklanmadığı iddiasının ikna edicilikten uzak, zayıf kıyaslarla ortaya konduğu gösterilecektir.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
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133-147
  • English

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