Buradasınız

Bilgi Arayışında Tamamlayıcı Öğeler Olarak Kesinlik ve Şüphecilik

Certitude and Scepticism as Complementary in the Search for Knowledge

Journal Name:

Publication Year:

Author Name
Abstract (2. Language): 
This paper proposes that the demand for certainty and the continual raising of the doubts (skepticism) about our epistemic claims be seen and considered as efforts toward the same direction, namely, to attain knowledge. This has become necessary as the debate between certitude and scepticism in traditional western epistemology attends to the concept of certitude and skepticism as if they are exclusive and contradictory. This has left the revolving discussion in an endless debate The search for certitude in our knowledge claims is to ensure that we have justification for our claims to knowledge and the skeptical considerations that over shadow our knowledge claims are equally demands that we have justification for our knowledge claims so that we do not treat mistaken opinions or lucky or educated guess as knowledge. The African theory of knowledge, which is built on African ontology that treats the divide between the object and subject as two aspects of the same reality, encourages this proposal. As such, this paper analyses and evaluates the debate between certitude and skepticism as we have it in traditional western and African epistemology, thus providing the grounds on which the proposal to consider certitude and skepticism as complementary in the search for knowledge.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu makale, epistemik iddialarımıza yönelik kesinlik talebini ve şüphelerin sürekli ortaya çıkışını, aynı yöne doğru yol olan, yani bilgi etmeye yönelik olan, çabalar olarak görülüp değerlendirilebileceğini ileri sürer. Geleneksel batı epistemolojisi içinde kesinlik ve şüphecilik arasındaki tartışma, kesinlik ve şüphecilik kavramlarına onlar sanki ayrıcalıklı ve tutarsızmış gibi baktığından, bu sözü edilen değerlendirme zorunlu hale gelmiştir. Bu bakış, tartışmayı sonsuz bir münakaşaya bırakmıştır. Bilgimize yönelik kesinlik arayışı, bilgi iddialarımız için bir haklılandırmanın temin edilebileceğini ileri sürer ve bilgi iddialarımıza gölge düşüren şüpheci değerlendirmeler de, hatalı kanıları ya da şanslı ve eğitimli tahminleri bilgi olarak ele alamayacağımıza ilişkin bir bilgi iddiasının haklılandırılabileceğini eşit derecede savunur. Özne ve nesne arasındaki bölünmeyi, aynı gerçekliğin iki görünüşü olarak ele alan Afrika ontolojisi üzerinde kurulmuş olan Afrika epistemolojisi, bu öneriyi destekler. Bu makale, kesinlik ve şüphecilik arasındaki tartışmayı geleneksel batı ve Afrika epistemolojisinde olduğu gibi analiz etmekte ve değerlendirmektedir, böylece kesinliğin ve şüpheciliğin, bilginin arayışında tamamlayıcı öğeler olarak değerlendiren öneriye temeller sağlayacaktır.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
81-92

REFERENCES

References: 

Achebe, C., “Chi in Igbo Cosmology” in C. Eze (ed.) (1988), African Philosophy: An Anthology Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Aigbodioh J.A., (1997), “Imperatives of Human Knowledge Illustrated with EpistemologicalConceptions in African Thought” in Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies, No.7 Oct, 1997.
Anyanwu K. C., (1983) The African Experience in American Market Place. New York: Exposition Press.
Ayer, A. J. (1956), The Problem of Knowledge, London: Macmillan
Bewaji, J. A. (2007) An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Ibadan: Hope Publications.
Brown, L. M., (2004), “Understanding and Ontology in Traditional African Thought” in Lee M. Brown, ed. (2004), African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press.
Cardinal, D.; Hayward, J.; & Jones, G. (2004). Epistemology: The Theory of Knowledge, London: John Murray Publishers Ltd.,
Clarke, M., (1963), “Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper” in Analysis,
Dancy, J., (1985), An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Ekanola, A. B., (2006), “Metaphysical Issues in African Philosophy” in Oladipo O. (ed.) Core Issues in African Philosophy, Ibadan: Hope Publications.
Gbadegesin, O., (1984), “Destiny, Personality and Ultimate Reality of Human Existence: A Yoruba Perspective” in Ultimate Reality and Meaning, vol. 7, no. 3.
Gyekye, K. (1987). An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jimoh, A., (1999), “A Critique of Rorty’s Epistemological Behaviourism” , MA Thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Ambrose Alli University, March 1999.
Certitude and Scepticism as Complementary in the Search for Knowledge
92 2012/18
Moser, P. K.; and Vander-Nat, A., (1987). Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Onyewuenyi, I. (1993), African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism, Nsukka: UNN Dept. of Philosophy,
Owolabi, K., (2000), “The Nature and Problems of Epistemology” in K. Owolabi, Issues and Problems in Philosophy, Ibadan: GROVACS.
Pollock, J. L., (1986), Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers.
Rorty, R., (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
Ruch, E. A.; and Anyanwu, K. C., (1984), African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, Rome: Catholic Book Agency – Officium Libri Catholicum,
Slote, M. A., (1970), Reason and Scepticism, London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.
Udefi, A., (2005), “Theoretical Foundations for An African Epistemology” in R. Akanmidu, (ed.) Footprints in Philosophy, Ibadan: Hope Publications.
Uduigwomen, A. F. (ed.) (1995). Footmarks on African Philosophy. Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers Ltd.
Wittgenstein, L., (1969), On Certainty, trans. By Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombed, Oxford: Basil Blackwell’s.

Thank you for copying data from http://www.arastirmax.com