Buradasınız

Anasayfa » Content

Suç ve Suçla Mücadelenin Ekonomik Analizi

The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement

Journal Name:

  • Polis Bilimleri Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2011

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The economics of crime is a relatively new approach to the study of crime and law enforcement. This article provides a review of basic arguments and important discussions of economics of crime literature. Economic approach refutes the time-stable individual differences as an explanation of criminal behavior, and argues that crime is a product of some proximate and situational factors. Criminals are rational utility-maximizers, and, like everyone else, they respond to the incentives available to them. They compare the benefits and costs of legitimate and illegitimate activities, and commit the offense if they find that crime pays. Increasing the severity of punishment and using fines wherever possible are economically optimal law enforcement strategies. One of the most important contributions of economic approach to the study of crime and law enforcement is the application of econometric models in the field. On the other hand, this became one of the most criticized aspects of economic approach.
Bookmark/Search this post with
Abstract (Original Language): 
Suçun ekonomik modellerle analizi, suç ve suçla mücadele alanında nispeten yeni bir yaklaşımdır. Bu makalede, suçun ekonomik analizi literatüründeki temel konular ve tartışmalar sunulmaktadır. Ekonomik yaklaşım suçun; kişilerin sahip oldukları farklılıklarla açıklanmasını reddederek, kişinin çevresi ve çevresinde gerçekleşen olayların bir ürünü olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Buna göre suçlular, elde edecekleri faydayı maksimize etmeye çalışan ve herkes gibi çevresindeki etkilere cevap veren kişilerdir. Suçlular, imkânları dâhilindeki yasal ve yasa dışı faaliyetlerin fayda ve zararlarını karşılaştırmakta ve illegal aktivitelerin kârlı olacağını düşündüğünde suçu işlemektedirler. Cezaların şiddetinin arttırılması ve mümkün olan yerlerde para cezalarının tercih edilmesi ekonomik açıdan optimal suçla mücadele yöntemleri olarak belirginleşmektedir. Ekonomik yaklaşımın suç ve suçla mücadeleyle ilgili çalışmalara en önemli katkılarından birisi, ekonometrik modellerin bu alanda kullanılması olmuştur. Diğer yandan, ekonometrik modellerin bu alanda kullanımı ekonomik yaklaşımın en sık eleştirilen özelliğidir.
FULL TEXT (PDF): 
PDF icon arastrmx_295_13_pp_123-146.pdf
  • 2
123-146
  • Turkish

REFERENCES

References: 

Becker, Gary S., (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach”, The Journal of Political Economy, C.76, S.2, ss.169-217.
Becker, Gary S., (1993), “Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking
at Behavior”, Journal of Political Economy, C.101, S.3, ss.385-409.
Becker, Gary. S. and Stigler, George J., (1974), “Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers”, The Journal of Legal
Studies, C.3, S.1, ss.1-18.
Block, Michael K., and Heineke, John. M., (1975), “A labor Theoretic
Analysis of the Criminal Choice”, The American economic review,
C.65, S.3, ss.314-325.
Block, Michael K. & Lind, Robert C., (1975), “Crime and Punishment
Reconsidered”, The Journal of Legal Studies, C.4, S.1, ss.241-247.
Brown, William W. and Reynolds, Morgan O., (1973), “Crime and
‘Punishment’: Risk Implications”, Journal of Economic Theory, C.6,
S.5, ss.508-514.
Cameron, Samuel, (1988), “The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A
Survey of Theory and Evidence”, Kyklos, C.41, S.2, ss.301-323.
Chiricos, Ted G., and Waldo, Gordon P., (1970), “Punishment and
Crime: An Examination of Some Empirical Evidence”, Social
Problems, C.18, S.2, ss.200-217.
Cohen, Mark A., (1988). “Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of
the Cost of Crime to Victims”, Law and Society Review, C.22, S.3,
ss.537-555.
Ehrlich, Isaac, (1973), “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation”, The Journal of Political
Economy, C.81, S.3, ss.521-565.
Ehrlich, Isaac, (1981), “On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An
Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and
Deterrence”, The American Economic Review, C.71, S.3, ss.307-322.
Ehrlich, Isaac, (1996), “Crime, Punishment, and the Market for
Offenses”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, C.10, S.1, ss.43-
67.
Eide, Erling, (1995), RDEU models of crime. Working Paper Law and
Economics, Institutt for Privatrett University of Oslo.
Eide, Erling; Rubin, Paul H. and Shepherd, Joanna. M., (2006),
Economics of Crime. Now Publishers Inc.
Fisher, Franklin and Nagin, Daniel, S., (1978), “On the Feasibility of
Identifying the Crime Function in a Simultaneous Model of Crime
Rates and Sanction Levels”, Alfred Blumstein; Jacqueline Cohen and
Daniel Nagin, (Eds.), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the
Effects of Criminal Sanctions in Crime Rates. National Academy of
Sciences.
Forst, Brian, (1976), “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: Further
Empirical Findings”, Policy Analysis, C.2, S.3, ss.477-492.
Friedman, David, (1999), “Why not Hang Them All: The Virtues of
Inefficient Punishment”, Journal of Political Economy, C.107, S.6,
ss.259-269.
Friedman, Lee S., (2002), The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis.
Princeton University Press.
Gül, Serdar Kenan, (2009), “An Evaluation of the Rational Choice
Theory in Criminology”, Girne American University Journal of
Social and Applied Science, C. 4, S. 8, ss.36-44.
Goertzel, Ted, (2002), “Econometric Modeling as Junk Science”, The
Skeptical Inquirer, C.26, S.1, ss.19-23.
Gould, Eric D.; Weinberg, Bruce A. and Mustard, David B., (2002),
“Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United
States: 1979-1997”, Review of Economics and Statistics, C.84, S.1,
ss.45-61.
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe; Merlo, Antonio and Rupert, Peter, (2000), “On the
Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime”,
International Economic Review, C.41, S.1, ss.1-26.
İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe; Merlo, Antonio and Rupert, Peter, (2004), “What
Accounts for the Decline in Crime?”, International Economic
Review, C.45, S.3, ss.707-729.
Kessler, Daniel and Levitt, Steven D., (1999), “Using Sentence
Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and
Incapacitation”, Journal of Law and Economics, C.42, S.1, ss.343-
363.
Landes, William M., (1971), “An Economic Analysis of the Courts”,
Journal of Law and Economics, C.14, S.1, ss.61-107.
Lattimore, Pamela and Witte, Ann, (1986), “Models of Decision Making
Under Uncertainty: The Criminal Choice”, Derek B. Cornish and R.
Clarke (Eds.), The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice
Perspectives on Offending, ss.129-155.
Levitt, Steven D., (1996), “The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime
Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation”, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, C.111, S.2, ss.319-351.
Levitt, Steven D., (1997), “Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an
Explanation for the Use of Prison Sentences Instead of Fines”,
International Review of Law and Economics, C.17, S.2, ss.179-192.
Levitt, Steven. D., (2004), “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s:
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not”,
Journal of economic perspectives, C.18, S.1, ss.163-190.
Miller, Ted R.; Cohen, Mark A. and Rossman, Shelli B., (1993), “Victim
Costs of Violent Crime and Resulting Injuries”, Health Affairs, C.12,
S.4, ss.186-197.
Myers Jr, Samuel. L., (1983), “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime:
Employment versus Punishment Effects”, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, C.98, S.1, ss.157-166.
Nagin, Daniel S., (1998), “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of
the Twenty-First Century”, Crime and Justice, C.23, 1-42.
Nagin, Daniel. S. and Paternoster, Raymond, (1993), “Enduring
Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime”, Law
and Society Review, C.27, S.3, ss.467-496.
Nagin, Daniel, S., (1978), “General Deterrence: A Review of the
Empirical Evidence”, Alfred Blumstein; Jacqueline Cohen and
Daniel Nagin, (Eds.), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the
Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates. National Academy of
Sciences.
Paternoster, Raymond, (1987), “The Deterrent Effect of the Certainty and
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues”,
Justice Quarterly, C.4, S.2, ss.173-217.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, (1982), The optimal use of
fines and imprisonment. NBER.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, (2007), “The Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law. In A. Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell,
Steven, (Eds.), Handbook of law and economics, C. 1, ss. 403-454.
Reilly, Barry and Witt, Robert, (1996), Crime, Deterrence and
Unemployment in England and Wales: An Empirical Analysis.
Bulletin of Economic Research, C.48, S.2, ss.137-159.
Shavell, Steven, (1987), “A Model of Optimal Incapacitation”, The
American Economic Review, C.77, S.2, ss.107-110.
Tauchen, Helen; Witte Ann D. and Griesinger, Harriet, (1994), “Criminal
Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort”, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, C.76, S.3, ss.399-412.
Trumbull, William N., (1989), “Estimations of the Economic Model of
Crime Using Aggregate and Individual Level Data”, Southern
Economic Journal, C.56, S.2, ss.423-439.
Witte, Ann D., (1980), “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with
Individual Data”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, C.94, S.1,
ss.57-84.

Thank you for copying data from http://www.arastirmax.com