

KIRKBİRİNCİ KONFERANS

## Turkish Intelligentsia

and

## Turkish Economics

(TÜRK İKTİSADİYATI VE MÜNEVVER ZÜMRE)

by

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— I —

### Introduction

During this spring, I received a kind invitation for which I am extremely thankful to your Institute, to the Rector, Prof. de Vries, to the Dean of Studies, Dr. Cahbot and to the Gen. Sec. of the MSSRC, Prof. Nieuwenhizze, on behalf of myself and of the Institute of Economics and Sociology of the Istanbul's University. It has been really a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity of talking to you about some of the social and economic problems of Turkey.

Before I start with my speech, I would like to stress the following points.

In the days when I received a conference invitation from I.S.S. and M.S.S.R.S. some economists and sociologists in Turkey were, by organising conference series and by publishing some articles in scientific reviews, commemorating the 90. th birth anniversary of a famous Turkish Sociologist, *Ziya Gökalp*, who proved his value even in the West. I request your permission to handle as the start point of my speech, this great thinker who had, at the sametime, a strong spirit of sociology as an economist. In the Library of your Institute two valuable studies written in

English, the first one by Dr. Z. Y. Hershlag who had been in I.S.S. before and the second by Prof. Hyd, a well-known Turcologist from Israel.

Secondly, as Dr. Chabot writes in his nice paper of introduction, and as Prof. Nieuwenhuijze said in his introductory speech, this is actually my second stay in The Hague. In fact, eight years ago, I was one of the reporters of the *Seminar on Turkey*, organized by your I.S.S. I always remember it with great pleasure, that very useful scientific experience.

Thirdly, I would like to confess here, very sincerely, that my speech can be considered as a single description of some intellectual trends relating to Turkish economics. This description will be full of many linguistic defects and with some unpleasant pronounciations, for which I ask in advance, your forgiveness and tolerance.

Finally, a few words about the choosing of our subject. As the I.S.S. would not hint at nor impose a definite subject, I felt complete freedom in deciding on one. Let me remind you that the title of my report, presented to the previous *Seminar on Turkey* was as follows: *Social Changes in Mustafa Kemal's Turkey*<sup>1</sup>. During that Seminar, the Students asked me many questions. One of these questions was about the leading group, about the *Elite*, about the *Intelligentsia* and its role in the process of the social changes in Turkey of 1923 - 1938. Perhaps, being within these social events themselves, prevents the Turks, even the Turkish sociologists, from appreciating them quite properly.

The attendants of that Seminar were mostly from underdeveloped, or developing countries. Consequently, they were extremely interested in some common problems. The questions they put forth were quite important, such as:

- The present state and the future of religious problems in Turkey
- Integration of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey
- The behaviour of the Turkish Intelligentsia vis-a-vis economic development, and so on.<sup>2</sup>

It will be shown later on that one of the reasons of the coup - d'Etat of 1960 is to be seen partly in the necessity to replace or to complete the *Economic Development*, that is to say, the *Industrialization Policy*, with the *Community Development*, relating to the Turkish peasantry and to its rural problems. The enormous effort for a rapid, from above guided, industrialization, must be replaced, if not entirely but partly with the Agrar Policy, with the social improvement of the rural classes, until now

willingly or unwillingly is neglected. Thus, the policy of industrialization, practices in some limited and already advanced regions of Turkey, must be replaced with the problems concerning the rural Anatolia, the population of which constitutes roughly 80 % of the total population of Turkey. Under the influence of this viewpoint change, a new Ministry, "Ministry of Rural Affairs", is added to the serie of Ministries. In connection with this, the agricultural cooperatives are gaining a very great importance. A new cooperative movement starts enthusiastically and creates a new Cooperatist Intelligentsia among academic and non-academic circles. The Turkish Parliament will discuss next month a new project of a law which will unify the existing different cooperative laws, in a general and universal cooperative legislation.

In my introduction, I gave you this information in order to show why your MSSRC in collaboration with the Institute of Economics and Sociology chose as the subject for Istanbul's eSminar, held during February 1965, the topic of *Economic Development and Cooperative Movement in Turkey*<sup>3</sup>.

I would like in this way to combine in my speech some elements to two Seminars (Seminar of 1957 : The Hague, Seminar of 1965 : Istanbul), and to assure a kind of continuity between them.

## — II —

### A t y p o l o g i c a l e s s a y

It is needless to say that there is interrelationship between the historical and the social structure of a country, and its *Intelligentsia* as a whole. During the last two decades this mere term of *Intelligentsia* has been the favourite subject of many sociologists. I would like to put aside the historical phases of the Turkish *Intelligentsia*<sup>3</sup> and begin with the present period which can be divided as follows:

- I. Period of Mustafa Kemal (1919-1938);
- II. Period of İsmet İnönü (1938-1950);
- III. Period of the Democratic Party (Dr. P. 1950-1960);
- IV. Period of "National Unity Committee" (N.U.C. 1960-1961);
- V. Period of Coalitions (1961-1965).

Now, let us have a short look at these periods from the angle of our subject.

During this first period of two decades (1919-1938) which lasts till the death of M.K. a part of the Turkish Intelligentsia consisted of those intellectuals belonging to the previous periods of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire. Even M.K. and his military and civil friends were educated during 1900-1923 and they took part in the Revolution of 1908. Another section of the Intellectuals transformed from the military group to the civil servants class. During the particular period of 1919-1930 the Intelligentsia and a part of the landlords - called *aga* in rural circles, and *Bek*, *Beg* or *Bey* in urban centres - worked together with M. K. 's group for the war of Independence and for the rebirth of a new Turkey.

But later, when an extremely enthusiastic *Westernization* process started, these landlords who represent a sort of feudalism, and with them *Ulemas* and the *Sheyks*, (the Moslim Theologians and Mystics) were left out of the process of current Turkish social and cultural changes. During this period the Intelligentsia has had a very dynamic character. This dynamism speeded up the process of Westernization which had been continuing for almost about a hundred and fifty years'.

During the nineteenth century and for decades of the twentieth century, the intellectual circles usually had their formation in the high military and civil schools of Istanbul. Very few of them had the chance to complete their education in Germany and in France. But, during the first period, M.K. and his group realised the necessity of spreading the education of intellectuals throughout the country.

It was one of his greatest ideals and his first experiment, the establishment of a Law Faculty in Ankara in 1925. With the addition of five other Faculties, the second University of Turkey in Ankara was established with the aim of educating people in all professions. So, the period of 1938-1950 had its intellectual circles supplied by these new educational institutions.

Both the periods of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü were based on a Unique-Party system, except for some short period of democratic experiments. But after 1946, a great tendency towards a Multi-Party system began to appear as a result of the following reasons.

First of all, a great increase in population (in 1927 : 13,648,270 in 1960 : 27.0-0.000 and now in 1965 : probably 32 millions). One of the

results of this increase and unproportional growth of the graduates of higher educational institutions: The number of the intellectuals is increasing as well<sup>5</sup>.

On the other hand, the Second World War ended with the victory of countries belonging to the democratic camp, and throughout the War, Turkey stayed neutral with sympathy towards the democracy.

In this way the Democratic Party, that is the second political party, came into existence as a result of some internal and external factors. One of the characteristics of this new political party was that its intellectuals, its "Elite" were almost completely civilians. Because of this characteristic of the structure of the Democratic Party which came to power after a free election in 1950, some foreign and domestic political observers began to point out the positive results of the process of *Westernization* in Turkey, they even thought of including Turkey in the group of free and democratic nations which keep their armies away from politics.

Here I would like to note that since the transformation of the ancient military system of *Yeniçeri* into a modern army in the eighteenth century, the Turkish Army and the military *Intelligentsia* always kept away from politics. Only when the circumstances made it necessary they interfered temporarily. The Army was mostly satisfied with the managing capacity of the civil servants and civil politicians. We think that this behaviour of the Turkish Armies is due to an education similar to those in Western countries. Actually the westernized military teaching in Turkey was being directed during the nineteenth century by a group of foreign military teachers and by some Turkish officers sent to western countries for their professional education<sup>6</sup>.

But the internal and even foreign satisfaction, due to the dominating power of civil political direction during the period of 1950-1960 did not last long. The existence of the Republican Party — founded by M.K. Atatürk, stayed in power for 27 years — and its new function as an opposition party between 1950-1960 did not please the Democratic Party at all. If the Democratic Party, its civil *Intelligentsia* were a political and administrative organization from a military background, we could perhaps have explained this nervous behaviour as a result of strict military education. How could such a new civilian political *Elite* adopt such a negative, non-democratic, anti-western attitude towards an opposition? Putting this psychological point aside, I would like to ascertain that the coup d'Etat taking place on the 27 th May 1960 can be considered as a result of the nervousness and non-tolerant political behaviour of the Democratic Party.

The military revolutions happening during the last century of the Turkish history had generally a temporary nature. Civil government were allowed to come to power soon. If any military man wanted to stay in politics he had to resign from the Army. This last point has been analysed by some Western observers. For instance, E. Herriot, a former French Prime Minister, points out in his book (*Orient*, 1934, Paris, Chapter IV) that Atatürk was never to be seen after the War of Independence of 1923 in military outfits in any occasion. On the other hand, in the history of military revolutions, it is quite possible to meet many occasions, where military men keep their uniforms and grades after revolutions. Even when civilians make a revolution they sometimes prefer to be seen in military outfits in public and try to acquire grades for themselves quite generously!

The Military Committee, which made the Coup d'Etat de 1960, finally left power to the civilians. But before leaving the power, the N.U.C. (National Unity Committee) emphasized the necessity of the formation of some organizations in order to strengthen and guarantee the democratic *régime*. Thus, the N.U.C. can be considered as the forerunner of some new organisms and institutions, such as *State Economic Planning Centre*, *Constituant Assembly*, a new *Constitution*, a new *Election Law*, a *Senate*. In this way, the re-establishment of the multi-party system and the formation of today's Coalition Government are partly connected with this last period of 1960.

### — III —

#### **Economic Policy and the Intellectuals**

After describing very shortly the political side of Turkish Intelligentsia, I pass now to the economic aspect of our problem.

In relation to economic development policy, the Turkish *Elite* can be classified as follows:

The first group of some economists or some economic writers are still influenced by the liberal doctrine of nineteenth century. According to them, the underdeveloped state of the Turkish economics was a result of the meaningless interference of the State. A sort of "*Etatism*" or "*Interventionism*" prevented and prevents still the economic improvement of the country.

In reality, the government had prepared a law in order to encourage the private sector even before M.K. Atatürk, that is to say, before 1919. During the first decade of the Republic, 1919-1933, a second law was promulgated again, inviting the Turkish investors and enterprises to use all kinds of economic and financial facilities of this encouraging legislation. The first (1913) and the second (1927) *Law of the Industrial Encouragement* were condemned to be *lettres-mortes*. The Turkish entrepreneurial group do not show the same attitudes that were and are now quite typical in Western *Bourgeoisie* such as 1) economic courage, 2) collecting private savings and forming capital, and finally 3) great intentions for agricultural and industrial investments, not only in the already industrialized regions, but also in the very remote to views of Central and Eastern Anatolia which are considered by economists as the most underdeveloped regions of a developing country. The savings that this entrepreneurial group can collect together with their own capital is mostly invested in short term internal and external commercial business, or in land building speculations. The Turkish cooperatist Intelligentsia is always complaining on this point and, consequently, sympathizing with very cruelly exploited consumers en masse.

The second group of economists and some non-academic thinkers want to invite the State to take the industrialisation and the improvement of the agricultural sector. The first experiment of this takeover was made in 1915-1917 and the second began after 1934. For this second "etatist" experiment, the Turkish liberals and some foreign writers were — and still are — saying that this State-guided economic policy is influenced by the Russian planned industrialisation. In fact that is not true. The state tried this experiment before the Russian revolution of 1917. The second attempt in 1934 was made not under an ideological guiding, but under the influence of some educational principles. One of these principles was "to initiate the people for economic enterprise". Indeed, the planned industrialisation movement that started in 1934 has already created a new group of entrepreneurs, who later left the public sector and became private enterprisers. They are working sometimes together with the State. This trend, represented by a third group of economists, is described as a "Mixture of two sectors: Public, private".

The limited amount of industrial investment then — that is to say the new entrepreneurs — mostly did and do still together with the public sector, can be seen in a few spots only, such as the industrial cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir. Consequently, the most underdeveloped regions,

as we mentioned above, are left almost without any efficient investment. The importance of agriculture was never realized and so no attempt for its improvements were made.

As I said, the private sector showed no interest in this respect. The very big, unexpected growth in rural population shows us an alarming great rural exodus, towards the already limited urban centres. In the meantime, some developed countries of Europe, including Netherlands, have been demanding workers from Turkey. This situation temporarily relieves the danger of this rural exodus and its alarming results. The comparative sociology of the working classes can see in these very interesting phenomena of exodus and of migratory movements of the Turkish workers some similarities with developing countries of Europe during the nineteenth century<sup>9</sup>.

— IV —

**A N E W R U R A L S O C I O L O G Y**

It is a fact that economic and social organs are the main factors that give orientation to the economics of underdeveloped or developing countries. Now, we shall stress the necessity of this fact, thought in the same *Gestalt* from the Turkish viewpoint.

It is very seldom that our economists give any attention to the social and cultural aspects of economic development. Many plans and projects are prepared with the help of very famous theories of the Western, or — since the end of World War II — American economists! that's all! If the experiences and their effects in the field of practice do not give the expected results, not the theories and their Turkish representatives, but the facts and the reality itself are responsible.

We have, fortunately, some cases which show us that the Turkish economic thought is beginning to get rid of the kind of scholastic behaviour, and is starting to be imbued with a sociological mentality.

Since the beginning of the XXth century, the Turkish sociologists, have had always insisted that *Economics* must be in very close contact and collaboration with *Economic sociology*. Prof. U. Heyd has already explained the methodology of a great Turkish sociologist, *Ziya Gökalp*, in his book, published in 1947 in London<sup>10</sup>.



In fact, Ziya Gökalp thought, even before the Russian Revolution of 1917, that the social structure of some underdeveloped countries — and of Turkey — needed an economic development policy which must be guided and financed by the State. For, the private domestic enterprise “is too weak to carry out a comprehensive programme of economic development<sup>11</sup>”. Let’s quote some phrases: “Therefore, our State, our Provinces and our Municipalities, must take the initiative and start industrial undertakings with the help of foreign experts<sup>12</sup>.” Besides, he ascertained that “it is necessary first to study the economic reality with the help of the sociological viewpoint, and then to organize a new Ministry of Economic Affairs”.

This conception of a State guided economic policy had considerably influenced during the First World War. But the collapse of the Turkish Empire, with its destructive consequences, did not permit to its continuation. After the War of Independance (1919-1923), the new Republic, established a Ministry of Economics, and followed, after 1933, a State guided and planned economic policy, the target of which was especially an accelerated industrialization.

Some domestic and foreign economists are wrongly considering this kind of orientation as being the imitation of Soviet economic policy, in fact this policy is not, but the continuation of economic policy of our Turkish sociologist, before the Russian Revolution. According to the view of Professor U. Heyd, “it must be considered as the realization of the previous thought of *Ziya Gökalp*<sup>13</sup>”.

Moreover there is a very important difference between the sociological viewpoint of our sociologist and the policy of the Republican Turkey. Ziya Gökalp has a system of thoughts, which takes into account the Turkish Economics as a whole, aiming to the industrial as well as to the agricultural development of the Empire of 1914. The new Republic paid all its attention only to the industrialization. After the *coup - d'Etat* de 1960, the viewpoint of our sociologist appears again and influences the economic and social policy of Turkey in such a way, that from now on the problems of the “society development”, which aimed only to industrialize some urban centres must be considered in close connection with the “community development”. In other words, it is necessary that the national state behaves at the same time as representative of the peasantry, which constitutes roughly 80 % of the whole population. One must establish at least a parallelism between two policies, in such a man-

ner that the "divorce" leaves its place to a new "remarriage", as we have already hinted above. From an economic point of view, the industrialization policy must be guided together with the improvement of agriculture, which will organically prepare afterwards the conditions of some agricultural industries.

That is the first point. The second point is that the gap between the industrialized — urbanized centres and rural regions should be not so large. Otherwise the village will maintain its "social divorce" from the urban neighbourhood.

Thirdly, the educational policy has to take into account the necessity of this urban-rural conciliation. And finally, given that the Turkish Republic considers itself among the free and democratic countries, the political importance of the peasantry is evident. As Professor J. S. Szybowicz says "The recent developments in Turkey have once again demonstrated the important role that the peasantry will play in determining the country's future. Only a reconciliation between the peasantry and the Government, a realization on both parts, that they must learn to work together for the good of the country, can save democracy in Turkey<sup>14</sup>."

Among these four points — that is to say: economic, social, pedagogical and political — the third point has attracted the attention of some educational leaders, the establishment of 22 teacher's training Schools, called under the name of "*Köy Enstitüleri - Village Institutes*" is one of the results of this education policy. I don't need to recount to you here the adventure of these "Institutes".<sup>15</sup> I would like only to show you its relationship with the first part of our speech: Intelligentsia.

Towards the end of 1945, a young village teacher, who after completing one of these "Village Institutes", in the virginity of *Kayseiri* was designated, as a primary school teacher for the village *Nürgüz*. During this time he wrote and published a book: "*Bizim Köy — Our Village*". This publication has been a sensational event in Turkey as well as abroad. An English Turcologist, *Sir W. Deedes* translated it into English and published it in London<sup>16</sup>. This publication gave an opportunity to many foreign scholars, writers and journalists, interested in Turkish social problems. After the publication and the translation of this one-sided, but interesting book, a kind of rural or ruralist intellectual group became — and still becomes — very active in the field of literary publications as well as in that of social writings. From now on, more abroad — especially in England — than in Turkey, we see a very interesting sociological and

socio-psychological studies, using and utilizing as materials the content of this book: "*Our Village*". We consider it as a literary reaction to the Turkish Economic Policy of the first half of the twentieth century. As we have already hinted above, this policy has neglected the economic and social improvement of the rural regions.

Now begins in Turkey a very "enthusiastic" current, which wants to create a new Turkish Rural Economics and Turkish Rural Sociology. We hope that this "enthusiastic" movement will not be deprived from some "realistic" behaviours<sup>17</sup>.

— V —

#### A N E W R U R A L E C O N O M I C S

Now after four decades, we are going back to the system of thoughts of Z. Gökalp, through a group of young Turkish sociologists and economists. With great pleasure I introduce you to one of them, Mr. Y. Ülken, Professeur — Agrégé at the Faculty of Economics of Istanbul. In his recently published book, he discusses very seriously the mechanic and organic views of the society as a whole and especially the economic policy, relating to the economic planning<sup>18</sup>. He also attracts our attention to a new methodology for Turkey, which must be related not only to pure economic side of reality, but also to its extra-economic factors. In other words, economics must be considered in connection with economic psychology and sociology. For instance, if an underdeveloped country has no upper, or lower middle classes, that is to say its *Bourgeoisie*, it would be completely meaningless to be inspired by a highly developed country and by its economic policy. If an underdeveloped area is deprived of political stability, neither domestic, nor foreign credit can help its economic improvement. The economic mentality, *The concept of the World and Society* is one of the main determining factors in this case. Shortly said, this methodological view must be taken into account if we want to influence the socio-economic structure. Otherwise, our efforts will be condemned to be ineffective. Under the light of this kind of methodological principal, one understands very well why, despite the economic policy, which has conducted Turkey to an enthusiastic industrialisation, the economy as a whole has stayed almost unaffected. This state of things is described by many economic writers. What are the main reasons of this ineffectiveness?

Our young economist explains this very clearly with the help of non-economic factors<sup>19</sup>.

Under the influence of the new economic writings, we see the emergence of an economic policy which considers "community" and especially the rural life more vital than "society", that means the regions of the urban centres. The last period of our typology about the Turkish Intelligentsia shows that after 1960 a very important change takes place in this direction. Thus, the first Economic Plan of 1963-1967, prepared under the supervision of your famous economist, Professor Tinbergen, following one of the clauses of the new Turkish Constitution, takes into consideration all branches of the co-operative above mentioned Seminar of MSSRC, during the February of 1965. Mr. Celal Uzel, General Secretary of the Turkish Co-operative Association, gives us very useful explanations about the directives of this Plan<sup>20</sup>. Another member of the Seminar attracts our attention and says "In the First 5 years Plan, which is equal in force to the laws from the point of view that it has been approved by the Turkish Parliament, it was foreseen that the reasons creating obstacles against cooperative movements will be suppressed..." Shortly said, all papers on the economic development and the co-operation, relating especially to the major problem of the Turkish economics.

First of all, agricultural development through the agricultural credit co-operatives the number of which was at the end of the last year, 1658 and through the agricultural sales co-operatives and their Unions, the number of which are respectively 226 and 13. Finally, the agricultural production co-operatives are taken into consideration in order to improve the Turkish agriculture as a whole. Until now, we see only in the field of the sugar beat production, some experiences of these kinds of co-operative. According to the report presented to the already mentioned Seminar there are 18 *Sugar Beat Production Co-operatives* in Turkey of today's which are guided from above, in order to "familiarize the Turkish Peasantry to the modern agricultural technique"<sup>21</sup>. The First Turkish Economic Plan is aiming at the extension of this kind of production co-operatives to all branches of the Turkish agriculture, which is in a very poor and primitive situation. We observe now among the Turkish economic Intelligentsia, a new movement, which criticise such an extension policy. One is afraid that this kind of agricultural policy can create among the rural population, rightly or wrongly, an impression of the "Kolhozisation."

There is another problem, which constitutes a very great difficulty for such an economic policy. The worst drawback to the Turkish agriculture is the splitting up of the lands into small strips. Each peasant family has often — it depends of course on the regions of Anatolia — 5, 10, and more strips and all these are mixed together with other farms of the village. The Plan of 1963 - 1967 wants to make the first step towards a morphological change: to distribute to the villager whose lands are split some available terrains, in such a way that they will get land all in one, or two pieces in order to increase their agricultural productivities and to facilitate the process of mechanization in agriculture.

Today's Turkey is very busy with these two difficulties, which are relating at the same time, to some ideological questions. If the rural communities under the leadership of their own leaders, their own educated social workers and co-operators, attempt to take into consideration the necessary solution, one has nothing to say. But, given the state of things in the Middle Eastern countries, it is not so easy to say that this way can be experimented. According to some groups of the Turkish Intelligensia who are qualifying themselves as *socialists*, the State must force the people to leave their villages and to go out somewhere, where they will get land in one or two pieces. Besides, the co-operatist intellectuals are deploying all kinds of efforts in order to improve the co-operative movement, at least in some sectors such as the agriculture, or the *artisanat* and the small-scale industries through their co-operatives. They have even their own economic philosophy, which will conduce likely Turkey to an expected, organic and rooted industrialization, instead of a mechanically accelerated and State-guided one, as we have seen during the last three decades in Turkey. We hope that the Seminar of M S S R C of Istanbul will encourage the Turkish co-operatist intellectuals in this direction.

— VI —

S o m e c r i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

As final remarks, we are going to move to some critical and analytical parts of our speech. These criticisms and analysis are already made by many domestic and foreign scholars who inspired me in the following reflections.

### A. — ABOUT THE NEW RURAL INTELLIGENTSIA :

First of all, the graduates of the "Village Institutes" and their defenders can be considered as the true representatives of the rural regions? In spite of that, that its origin is rural, it is the continuation of the urban intellectual group, plunged in the "mystification" of a *to be westernized*, and of a *to westernize the whole country*.

Many domestic and foreign scholars who are occupied with the Turkish social and cultural changes, are of this opinion. As an example I will mention the name of a Turkish Social anthropologist, Prof. M. Turhan, who is already known among his Dutch colleagues, for instance as Dr. Chabot, published in 1958 a very interesting book the title of which is: "*Garblileşmenin Neresindeyiz?*" — *Where we are in the path of westernization?*". According to Prof. Turhan, an unreasonable Intelligentsia with a false and superficial view of "Westernization" has prevented Turkey from developing in the real, organic sense for about almost two centuries. Thus, it is quite necessary to understand the *West* properly. Actually, when we think how far we have gone in the path of westernization, we will realize the anti-western qualities of our views and opinions with regret.

As another example, I would like to refer to the book, recently published in England "*Turkish Village*". The author, Prof. P. Stirling, knows very well the Turkish reality and its intellectuals do not think differently. Putting aside the Intelligentsia of the previous periods of Turkey, taking into account especially those who are originating themselves from rural regions, he says: "They had little realistic notion, about the possibilities of village reform, less about Western society. Their new ways and ideas, their pretensions created a social barrier between them and the villages"<sup>23</sup>.

During the Ottoman Empire, even during the constitutional (1908-1918) and the first Republican periods (1923-1950), a latent divorce existed already between the rural and urban regions, and between their Intelligentsias. One pretends that this "divorce" is due to the urban origin of the rural leaders. Now, the Turkish villages have partly their own intellectuals. In spite of that, the "divorce" is not ended. The village teachers, were before "of the village and yet not of it"<sup>24</sup>.

If this is true, we have to arrange a new "*remarriage*", a kind of understanding between these two areas, and consequently between

their intelligentsias, in such a way that instead of ideological hostility, a collective sympathy for the whole Turkish community will lead all efforts of the intellectual classes.

#### B. — ABOUT SOME CONCEPTS :

After four decades, we are in a turning point of the Turkish economic policy. A new Committee is formed in order to re-organize the State-owned industrial establishments and to study the main reasons of their uncontrollabilities.

On the other hand, one recognizes now the importance of the agriculture, and with it, of the role of the peasantry. Just at the beginning of the process of industrialization a Western author thought that "Turkish industry must rely on intensive agriculture; without agriculture no surplus will arise; without surplus no profits and no capital formation; without capital formation there is no possibility of extending employment facilities and no industry"<sup>24</sup>.

The economic policy of three decades can be taken into consideration under the light of this reflection. Logically said, there is any direct relationship between the enthusiastic industrialization policy and economic development. Of course, to industrialize a country should be one of the wants of an economic development. But, because of this policy, we should not put aside and neglect the agriculture and its other problems. At least, we have to combine both in a synthesis. Today's Turkey is realizing finally the necessity of this conciliation.

Under the influence of this change in behaviour, one starts now to take into consideration the problem and to create a new point of view about the nature of the process of investigation, which was and still is for some westernized intellectuals a kind of "dogma", or a sort of thing for a "mystification".

One asks now : — What is the goal of this process? What is the "West"? First of all, we have to ascertain that the concept, of "westernization" is closely connected with another concept: "Urbanization". The more industrialized we are, the more modernized we are and vice versa. Here we see the reason of sympathy for the intellectuals of the great urban centres. Given the social structure of the underdeveloped countries, these intellectuals are not but civil and military servants. In order to avoid all kinds of resistance and reactionary movements which

can happen among the rural population towards some social and cultural changes, it is necessary to increase and thus to reinforce the population of the urban centres, through an accelerated industrialization.

Now another problem: — What is the true urbanity? An urban centre has to have an integrating force, an assimilating role, whereas the urbanization of many Turkish “Kasaba - little town, district” does not mean that these “Kasabas” are well urbanized. In spite of the existence of some state-owned establishments, they are still rural localities in such a way that under the influence of the exodus and internal migrating movement of the rural population, these urban centres are disurbanized or even “ruralized”. In other words, a simple agglomeration is entirely different from a true urbanization.

You see that we need a philosophical analysis and revision of this kind of concepts: *Industrialization*, *Westernization*, *Urbanization*. The true Turkish Intelligentsia of today attracts our attention to the necessity of this revision. Therefore, we consider the year 1965 as a date of a turning point in the Turkish cultural history. Will this turning point be its expected positive results? All depends on the possibility of the replacement of the “Enthusiastic” behaviour with the “Realistic” one. As the Turks say “We are living in a world of hope — Ümit dünyası bu!”.

We hope that, it would be possible to find the most accurate one among these three processes and to consider it as a guide for the economic policy. Nowadays, Turkish intellectuals are still debating on the way of real industrialization, on the meaning of real westernization and on the view of real urbanization. After several months, among the elite members of five or — if the recently established Labour Party would complete its organization under the Election Law — six parties, the discussion will, by the occasion of general elections, be held much more excitedly.

Let me please, to point out the formulas of these parties only from the view of their economic policy:

- 1) Republican People Party -- C.H.P. : Economic **etatism** with some tolerance for the private sector;
- 2) Justice Party — A. P. : Great liberty for the private sector -- along with an economic policy, guided by state in some fields, especially in the field of heavy-industry.
- 3) National Party -- M. P.
- 4) New Turkish Party -- Y. T. P.
- 5) Republican-Peasant-National-Party -- C.K.M.P.



These three parties are represented in the Parliament by very few deputies who defend the improvement of private and liberal economic policy.

6) Turkish Labour Party -- T. İ. P. : Nationalization of main economic activities.

This socialist principle is very vague. The intelligentsia who are the members of this young party, want to represent not only the interests of the Turkish workers but that of the landless peasants also who desire to have their own land, and that of the Turkish middle classes containing all the handicraftsmen, the lower ranks of the employees and even all the Turkish white-collar groups.

Therefore, this new party reminds us the very well-known advices of Karl Marx's "Manifesto" for the general policy of the communist parties which are on the eve of their expected power.

The struggle for the elections which will occur, following the next four months, at the 10th of October, 1965, will happen among these six, but especially between the two parties. We, while you are here and your lecturer in Turkey, shall follow the occurrence of the struggle, on the Turkish economics, especially between the two parties the first of which, C.H.P. is rather aiming at the left, and the second, A.P., at the right, and we shall also observe the role of all the other parties in this political fight and the results of it.

I finish my speech. I would like to repeat again that I am very glad to have the opportunity to talk to you after a long interval about my country, Turkey.

To deal with the Oriental countries and to study their cultural historical problems is not a new unexpected for Holland, which occupies a distinguished position in the history of Orientalism.

As a result of this, Holland has been a leader in guiding Europe on the languages and cultures of the East since the sixteenth century, both in research and in educating scholars in Persian, in Arabic and in Turkish. Let me to add a few words about the relationship between this point, that is to say, the Orientalism and the *theory of social changes*. During the previous centuries, the linguistic and religious questions have attracted the attention of the Orientalists. Now their subjects are changing. The economic and sociological problems are

entering the field of Orientalism as well. Let me give you a concrete sample. Before the 20th century, some Dutch scholars visited Turkey. Studied Turkish and brought some Turkish manuscripts in order to enrich the Library of the University of Leiden. As for today, Professor Tinbergen and Professor Nieuwenhuijze are coming to Turkey in order to participate in the economic meetings, to collaborate with their Turkish colleagues, one, Prof. Tinbergen, in the field of the economic planning, the latter, Prof. Nieuwenhuijze, in the field of the sociology of community development. The ISS and the MSSRC and their activities can be considered as a continuation of the Dutch Orientalism in a more modern direction.

Now, I finish my speech, expressing my personal gratitude with that of the *Institute of Economics and Sociology* of the University of Istanbul to the Dutch scholars who assure this cultural and scientific continuation.

Thank you for your patience and attention!

#### **B I B L I O G R A P H Y :**

- 1) See our report : Social changes in Turkey, 1957. Unpublished (one can see it in the "Documentation Office" of the ISS). Only two parts of this report are published by the Faculty of Economics of the University of Istanbul in its Review, 1960 and in "Glim: Gray's Lincoln's Inner Middle". London, 1957, N. 24, p.p. 17-21.
- 2) For some of these points : Religious change in Turkey, by P. Stirling, also unpublished, 1957 (Documentation Office of the ISS). This paper is later published: "Middle East Journal" of 1958.
- 3) The reports of this Seminar will be published by the ISS.
- 4) The very interesting book of Professor Bernard Lewis can be consulted: The emergence of modern Turkey, 1961, Oxford University Press. We saw among the reports of the ISS in the library of the ISS an unpublished paper, prepared by Miss Nicols, which contains some critical thoughts about the book of Prof. B. Lewis. They are relating to the history and present state of the stratification in Turkey.
- 5) The official "Institute of Statistics of Turkey" is preparing for 8th census of Republican Turkey (1927, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960) next October 1965.

- 6) About this problem there are many studies. For instance: D. A. Rustow: *The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic*, 1959 (*World Politics*, 1959 p. 515-552); G. S. Harris: *The role of the military in Turkish politics*, 1965 (*Middle East Journal*, V, XX, N. 1).
- 7) It is true that the Turkish National Planning Policy began after the military coup d'Etat of 1960. Before 1960 one only had a Regional Local Planning Committee, attached to the Ministry of Reconstruction.
- 8) See: *Some Reports on Eco. Devel. and co-operatives in Turkey*. These reports are presented to the Seminar of Istanbul organized by MSSRC (8-14 February 1965).
- 9) This very important point attracted during this speech the attention of some listeners. One asked me about the economic, social and even cultural consequences of the return of these workers to their country. In fact this is a very interesting point. If the worker of a certain cultural environment, after working for some time in the work place of a different cultural environment, returns to his native-land for such and such reasons (for example, in case there is no demand in Holland for the work supply of these 7000 Turkish workers about which we have been informed by our celebrated listener) what the position will be? Superior living style is not exist and superior technique is not available in Turkey. Under such conditions what the social and psychological results of this return may be? It is possible to ask more questions. But just now, let us make you aware of the fact that Institute of Economics and Sociology of the University of Istanbul which is M.S.S.R.S. in collaboration with Mediterranean Council, in collaboration with Mediterranean Council, is preparing a report on this migrating phenomenon; in collaboration with a German sociologist, Prof. Neuloch. I would like to get an opportunity to present later to your Institute a rather detailed report written on this subject.
- 10) See: U. Heyd, *Foundation of Turkish nationalism and Ziya Gökalp*, 1947 London.
- 11) *Ibid.* p. 143.
- 12) *Ibid.* p. 145.
- 13) Dr. Z. Y. Herschlag, one of the graduated of ISS, gives very useful information about the sociological system of Ziya Gökalp, in his book "Turkey, an economy in transition". See p. 12: "Ziya Gökalp, one of the main intellectual leaders of the Turkish renaissance, preached the progress of the Turkish nation through a rise in the cultural and economic level of the masses, in particular of the peasants".
- 14) See U. Oeyd : p. 145.
- 15) See Mahmut Makai : *A Village in Anatolia*, 1954, London, translated in English by Sir W. Deedes. This translation has a foreword, writ-