

THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE THEORY: Case of the Albanian Parallel Education System

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ABSTRACT

It is confronted by *Theory of Power* of Gene Sharp who guides for any groups to want to secede from domineering power by using which peaceful tools without any violence action. In the period of the 1990s, the Kosovar Albanians who suppressed by Milosevic, the Serbian nationalist, applied to such theory in the name of survival of integral and identical community and this struggle was pioneered by Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovar leader. This study analyzes *Theory of Power* in context to the strengths and weaknesses in case of the Kosovar Albanian Parallel Education System. In the during of this analysis it was taken into consideration of critics to the Theory and as possible as all dimension of the Albanian Parallel Education System. The importance of this study is to provide hints of how such group living hegemonic power can be independent without applying to violence as currently witnessed.

Key Words: Gene Sharp, Theory of Power, Non-violent Peace Theory, Peaceful Struggle, Kosovo, Albanians, Passive Resistance.

ŞİDDET İÇERMEYEN DİRENİŞ TEORİSİNİN GÜÇLÜ VE ZAYIF YANLARI: Arnavut Paralel Eğitim Sistemi Örneği

ÖZET

Herhangi bir devletin sınırları içinde yaşayan gruplara hiçbir şiddet olayına karışmadan hangi barışçıl yöntemleri kullanarak bağımsız olabileceklerine dair yol gösteren Gene Sharp, karşımıza *Güç Teorisi* ile çıkmaktadır. 90'li yıllarda Sırp milliyetçisi Milosevic döneminde baskı altında kalan Kosovalı Arnavutlar, kimliksel ve bütünsel olarak hayatta kalabilmek için Gene Sharp'ın bu teorisine başvurmuş ve bunun öncülüğünü de efsanevi Kosovalı lider İbrahim Rugova yapmıştır. Bu çalışmada Kosovalı Arnavutların kurmuş oldukları Paralel Eğitim Sistemi baz alınarak *Güç Teorisi*'nin güçlü ve zayıf yanları analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu analiz sırasında Teoriye olan eleştiriler göz önünde bulundurulmuş ve Arnavut Paralel Eğitim Sistemi'nin olabildiğince tüm yönleri ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın

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önemi egemen devlet altında yaşayan belli bir grubun günümüzde yaşandığı gibi şiddete başvurmadan nasıl bağımsızlık kazanabileceklerine dair ipuçları sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gene Sharp, Güç Teorisi, Şiddet İçermeyen Barış Teorisi, Barışçıl Mücadele, Kosova, Arnavutlar, Pasif Direniş.

"Of all the leaders of former Yugoslavia, Rugova has perhaps played the shrewdest game... He has avoided giving the Serbs an excuse to use force to try to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. His policy is one of waiting until there are simply no more Serbs left in Kosovo or their numbers become so insignificant that somehow the province falls to his people like a ripe fruit. It is a long-term policy and, despite discontent aroused by the relief that so far it has achieved nothing, in fact it has achieved much. It has saved lives and, unlike the Krajina Serbs for example, kept Kosovo's Albanian population ... in their homes"¹.

The Milosevic government, namely the voice of Serbian nationalism, became a threat to the survival and autonomy of the Kosovar Albanian society in the beginning of the 1990s. In response to the increasing Serbian nationalism, Kosovar Albanians developed a strategy to overcome the repressive regime and to retrieve their own privileges and rights over Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovo non-violent struggle, mobilised the Albanian society and initialized a peaceful action for his community which gave way to independence for Kosovo. Firstly, they started by mass demonstrations and protests, then they rejected the political cooperation with the Serbian nationalist government, and finally, they established the parallel state systems such as new parliament and government².

This study examines the parallel education system in Kosovo according to Sharp's theory, Theory of Power. First part is consisted of a brief background to the Theory of Power. In addition its contribution will be emphasized to illuminate its status in non-violent action literature and for the Kosovo case. The next section will clarify the reasons why the parallel education system played a key role in the non-violent struggle deployed by Kosovar Albanians against the repressive Serbian government. In the third section, the parallel education system will be critically analysed to shed light on its strenghts and weaknesses within the remit of the Theory of Power. Finally, the conclusion of the essay will examine the extent to which the parallel education system has been implemented as a successful non-violent action in Kosovo.

¹ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Yale University Press, Yale, 1997, p. 307 cited in Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 186.

² Clark, *ibid*, pp. 18, 95, 106, 108, 116.

1. Theory of Power – Gene Sharp

Gene Sharp, one of the most prominent theorists, generated a framework which allows us to understand how non-violent action works. The contributions of Gene Sharp to the literature of non-violent struggle are formerly the classification of methods of non-violence and which later on was developed into a theory of power which clarifies how non-violent struggle works³. Sharp considers that non-violent action is a kind of peaceful struggle against an opponent party⁴. Such opponent generally retains political, military, administrative, police and economic resources or capacity. That is to say, the adversary could be usually regarded as the state organisation ruled by a sovereign that might be seen as a threat to the interests of the majority of society⁵. In this sense, this theory seeks to guide suppressed societies to topple their rulers without using violence.

The Theory of Power constitutes an essential framework for non-violent actions. Even when it is merely seen as a passive struggle, such violent action rejects passivity in reality and portrays specific tools of peaceful struggle. As Sharp indicates, “*non-violent action is a technique by which people who reject passivity and submission, and who see struggle as essential, can wage their conflict without violence*”⁶. In other words, “*it is action, not inaction*”⁷. Besides, the proportion of possible casualty in non-violent action is lower than that in guerrilla or conventional wars⁸. In addition to these, Sharps provides successful instrument which is not needed a radical revolution of society. Furthermore, the Theory of Power comprises

³ Kate McGuinness, “Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power: A Feminist Critiques of Consent”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol: 30, No: 1, 1993, p. 102.

⁴ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2000, <http://www.aeinstein.org/organisations/org/TheRoleofPowerinNonviolentStruggle-English.pdf> (12 Ekim 2012), p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Gene Sharp, “Non-violent Action: An Active Technique of Struggle”, in *Non-violence in Theory and Practice*, edited by Holmes, R. L., Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1990(a), pp. 147 – 148.

⁷ Gene Sharp, “The Technique of Non-violent Action”, in *Non-violence in Theory and Practice*, edited by Holmes, R. L., Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1990(b), p. 148.

⁸ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2000, <http://www.aeinstein.org/organisations/org/TheRoleofPowerinNonviolentStruggle-English.pdf> (12 Ekim 2012), p. 9.

political, social and economic interaction⁹. That is to say, the main contribution of such theory to the World context is to provide a pragmatic model for the subjects who may use non-violent action against their tyrannies. At this juncture, I will attempt to give a brief background of this theory and then explain its importance within the Kosovo context.

1.1. Political Power

Gene Sharp indicates that power is one of essential element of non-violent action. This presupposes that the meaning of “power” cannot be underestimated as it is clarified and defined by Sharp. Power, as means of all of pressures, sanctions and influences, is accessible for not only the rulers but also for their subjects. That is to say, society holds power in order to implement its policies as well as conduct any conflict that might help achieve its goals. In this sense, the subject has the ability to change any policy that is being introduced by the ruler; to oppose the established policies that are seen as a threat to society; and to alter or replace the present system¹⁰.

Accordingly, Gene Sharp defines political power as “(a) kind of social power which wielded for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions”¹¹. That is to say that power, can represent absolute authority, control, and pressure which are (kinds of) tools for powerholders so as to implement its wishes over the society¹². When considering this context, power is neither omnipotent nor infinite for the sovereign and thus, power cannot be generated itself. This is because of the assertion that the power is dependent on the cooperation and obedience of subjects¹³.

⁹ Iain Atack, “Nonviolent Political Action and the Limits of Consent”, *Theoria*, Vol: 53, No: 111, p. 87.

¹⁰ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2000, <http://www.aeinstein.org/organisations/org/TheRoleofPowerinNonviolentStruggle-English.pdf> (12 Ekim 2012), pp. 2 - 3.

¹¹ Gene Sharp, *Power and Struggle*, in the part one of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1973, pp. 7 - 8.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Gene Sharp, *The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle*, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2000, <http://www.aeinstein.org/organisations/org/TheRoleofPowerinNonviolentStruggle-English.pdf> (12 Ekim 2012), p. 3.

According to Sharps¹⁴, political power is comprised of the interaction of several or all authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material sources and sanctions. These instruments are mainly expressed by the intensity of authority of the ruler, the density of the population who obey, the skills of the ruler to manage her subjects, ideological or psychological attitudes toward submission of the subjects, possessing natural resources or economic resources, as well as accessibility to any sanctions against subject respectively. The above aforementioned sources determine the degree of the ruler's power. Providing a strong relationship with such elements helps rulers to increase their power over society. As a result, the extent to the accessibility of these sources without restriction determines the degree of the sovereign's power¹⁵.

Similarly, such sources of the ruler's power are closely shaped by co-operation and obedience of the subject. As Sharp indicated that "*political power disintegrates when the people withdraw their obedience and support*"¹⁶. If society disobeys, the government can hold power no longer. This assumption is the key point of Sharps' theory¹⁷.

1.2. Loci of Power

The subjects have a mechanism of control against their ruler according to this theory. Needless to indicate, such mechanism of control can differ from society to society. In this case, Sharp raises the concept of "loci of power". Accordingly, the degree of the capacity to control a particular ruler, named as loci of power, is subjected with the society's structural condition. It is therefore significant for society to hold the aforementioned sources of power. If society possesses much power relating to such sources, it will be able to act much more independently. In other words, the success of society, which has ability to withdraw it, depends on the degree to act independently against the ruler. With regard to this, Sharp gives six forms and description of what pertains to the degree of loci of power¹⁸.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Gene Sharp, "Non-violent Action: An Active Technique of Struggle", in Non-violence in Theory and Practice, edited by Holmes, R. L., Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1990(a), p. 147.

¹⁷ Gene Sharp, The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle, The Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, 2000,

<http://www.aeinstein.org/organisations/org/TheRoleofPowerinNonviolentStruggle-English.pdf> (12 Ekim 2012), p. 4.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 7 – 8.

Firstly, the desire of the population to control their power; secondly, the quantity of the independent organisations of the society; thirdly, the degree of ability to act independently and the strength or capacity of such organisations; fourthly, the degree of controlling of institutional sources; fifthly, the degree of social power that the subject can control independently; and sixthly, the ability of the society to refuse or deny its consent as well as assistance¹⁹.

1.3. Methods of Non-violent Action

If subjects refuse to obey the rule of the government, the ruler will no longer have power. With regard to this, Gene Sharp presents some methods of how the subject can struggle against the ruler. Non-violent action utilised economic, social, political and psychological methods in order to apply to punishments and pressure without using violence. Approximately two hundred instruments could be used by non-violent action. This is mostly expressed in the form of protests, strikes, economic boycotts, social and political non-cooperation, and also non-violent intervention. Shortly, there are various methods from sit-ins to establishing parallel state structure. Gene Sharp defines such tools as “weapons” of non-violent struggle²⁰.

Such “weapons” of non-violent action are categorized into three parts: (1) non-violent persuasion, (2) non-cooperation, (3) non-violent intervention. The first category is usually seen as symbolic action of peaceful action. Protests, marches, demonstrations, posters, meetings could be given as examples of non-violent persuasion. The second method is divided into social, economic and political non-cooperation. To illustrate these, social boycotts, economic strikes and political boycotts respectively. Sharp highlights that the capacity of the subject to exercise such economic, social and political boycotts is very significant for non-violent action. The third category contains a kind of intervention in the situation by non-violent obstruction, fasts, and the establishment of new social networks and even parallel government. One of the significant features of Sharp’s theory is based on rational persuasion of the opponent by using their own “weapons”²¹.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 1 – 2.

²¹ Ibid, p. 10; Gene Sharp, “Non-violent Action: An Active Technique of Struggle”, in *Non-violence in Theory and Practice*, edited by Holmes, R. L., Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1990(a), pp. 148 – 150; Gene Sharp, “The Technique of Non-

1.4. The Importance of Theory of Power in the Kosovo Context

The economic, legal and educational autonomy of Kosovo was limited due to the 1989 Serbian Constitutional amendment whereas previously the autonomy of Kosovo had belonged to the Albanians since the establishment of the 1974 Constitution. The suspension of the autonomy of Kosovo and the veto on changes to the Serbian Constitution were quashed and the use of Albanian language as the official language was abolished²². The newly drafted Constitution of Serbia, on the other hand, provided clauses concerning freedom of belief and religion, the rights of minority to create political organisations and parties on an ethnic basis and also the right of a minority to have education in their mother tongue²³.

The dissolution of the rights led the Albanians to counter the repressive Belgrade regime. With regard to such action, it will be explained the merit of the Theory of Power in the case of Kosovo with two main arguments. The first significance of the Theory of Power is that subjects have the ability to abolish the legitimacy of their rulers. In the Kosovo context, the Albanians refused the legitimacy of the Serbian government over Kosovo. In this sense, they demonstrated massive protests and boycotted the elections and then established their own parliament. Secondly, the Albanians tried to build up walls of social solidarity among their communities thereby reacting in unison against the enemy²⁴.

The second importance of the Theory of Power provides a path for subjects to dispose repressive regimes. In the Kosovo context the Albanians managed to abolish the authority of Belgrade and became independent with the aid of soft power. As a result, implementation of the non-violent action according to Sharp's model caused the Albanians to be successful against the Belgrade regime. To my mind, the aforementioned factors both provide enough as the main contributions of the Theory of Power within the Kosovo case²⁵.

violent Action", in *Non-violence in Theory and Practice*, edited by Holmes, R. L., Wadsworth Publishing Company, California, 1990(b), pp. 151 - 152.

²² Vladimir Ortakovski, *Minorities in the Balkans*, Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000, pp. 254 - 256; Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 77; Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, Minority Rights Group Press, London, 1991, p. 70.

²³ Paskal Milo, "The Constitutional Rights and Minorities in the Balkans: A Comparative Analysis", *Perceptions*, Vol: 2, 1997, www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume2/s (29 Ağustos 2011), pp. 3, 6, 7.

²⁴ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 186.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 187.

2. The Albanian Parallel Education System

This section will focus on Kosovo's parallel educational system which emerged in response to the limitation of Kosovar Albanians' rights as enshrined in the 1989 Serbian Constitution. In this regard, I will explain why such a parallel education case became notable as a milestone of non-violent struggle for Kosovar Albanians.

2.1. Emergence of the Parallel Education System

After the 1974 Constitution the educational system of Kosovo had been controlled and managed by the Albanians. The 'privileged' rights given by the 1974 Constitution led the Serbian authorities to view minority groups with deep suspicion as a result of the Kosovar Albanians' successes in gaining minority rights. In the ensuing public debate in Serbia at that time, Kosovo's education was highlighted as presenting a threat to the territorial integrity of Serbia²⁶. The number of Kosovar Albanians had been increasing consistently throughout this period from an initial 67% in 1961; then 73,7% in 1971, 77,5% in 1981 and then to a peak of 90% in 1991 respectively. In contrast to the increasing Albanians population, the number of Serbs in Kosovo had been consistently decreasing constantly with Kosovar Serbs falling to 10% in 1991²⁷. This situation, in essence, was started to be seen as the primary cause for growing demands for Albanian secessionism among Serbians.

In an attempt to prevent Kosovar Albanians from declaring their own independence from Serbia, the Milosevic government adopted the Law on the Education Council of Serbia. This law annulled the autonomy of Kosovar Albanians on education and gave the only authority for revising the curriculum to the Serbian Educational Council. In this sense, the Serbian Educational Council was granted full control over not only the educational content of Kosovo but also control over student enrolment across the network of secondary and primary schools in Kosovo. Furthermore the Serbian Parliament took control of Pristina University and adopted a new Law regarding control and content of the University. As a result of these, Kosovo's educational system became uniform with that of

²⁶ Vladimir Ortakovski, *Minorities in the Balkans*, Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000, p. 254; Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 74.

²⁷ Vladimir Ortakovski, *Minorities in the Balkans*, Transnational Publishers, New York, 2000, pp. 254, 256.

Serbia and Kosovar Albanians lost their authority to control education²⁸.

Due to the rights provided by the new laws, the Serbian Education Council issued a new curriculum for Kosovo in 1990. Kosovar Albanians, however, appealed to laws that were supposed to be valid under the 1974 Constitution which entitled Kosovar Albanians to compile the Kosovo curriculum. Consequently, mass demonstrations occurred in Pristina and some Kosovar Albanian teachers and headmasters of primary and secondary schools were dismissed due to refusing to obey the Serbian authorities and to follow the new curriculum. This development was recognised as something of a milestone for Kosovar Albanian non-violence resistance against Serbian nationalist policy²⁹.

The rejection of the new curriculum by Kosovar Albanians were presented in the Serbian media as 'separatist' and 'racist'. One Serbian education official pointed out that it was inaccurate to describe the new curriculum as being a totally Serbian curriculum emphasising that some differentiations had been made in the Albanian language education. These differences were designed regarding "the national identity of the given national minority"³⁰. Some changes were made in the new curriculum such as increasing the length of Serbian history and culture in textbooks. Conversely, most courses were taught in Serbian language whilst the Albanian language instruction in secondary schools was a secondary option for Kosovar Albanians although the newly adopted curriculum embraced Albanian authors and certain events and periods in the Albanian history. Furthermore, the Serbian authorities implemented a new policy in 1992. As a result of this, teaching in all secondary schools was to be conducted exclusively in the Serbian language³¹.

In the new school year of 1991, Kosovar Albanian teachers were prevented from teaching at schools unless they accepted the new Serbian curriculum. Kosovar Albanian Professors and teachers

²⁸ Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 77, 78.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁰ S Popovic, "Odlucan raskid sa dosadasnjom praksom", *Prosvetna Rec*, Quoting Dragoljub Vuckovic, Deputy Director of the Temporary Management of the Institute for the Advancement of Education in Pristina, 1991, p. 3 cited in Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 80.

³¹ H Poulton and M Vickers, "The Kosovo Albanians", In *Muslim Identity and The Balkan State*, edited by Poulton, H. And Taji-Farouki, S., Hurst & Company, London, 1997, p. 162; Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 81.

also refused to teach on the basis of the new curriculum and many teachers were consequently fired because they continued to lecture in the Albanian language. In response to this situation, Kosovar Albanians boycotted classes³². Accordingly, the Albanian Coordination Council which was made up of representatives of education authorities, associations of teachers and political parties postponed the commencement of the new academic year for Kosovar Albanian students and teachers. In a response to such an exclusionary policy by the Serbian authorities, which further deprived them from universities and school buildings, Kosovar Albanians were somewhat compelled to initiate the development of a parallel education system³³. Consequently, Kosovar Albanians “turned to parallel underground teaching” and Albanian students and teachers began arranging an education system in private houses, shops and mosques as the police force occupied schools³⁴. In spite of this regressive educational policy reform, it is significant to note that primary school buildings could still be used by Kosovar Albanians. The Serbian authorities permitted this situation in order to avoid international condemnation given that primary school education was compulsory³⁵.

2.2. The Parallel Education System as a Milestone of Non-violent Struggle

Kosovar Albanians launched their own parallel institutions in response to wanton domination and incessant repression promoted by the Milosevic government over the management of state institutions in the beginning of the 1990s. The first initial step was to establish their own educational system in order to allow their

³² H Poulton and M Vickers, “The Kosovo Albanians”, In *Muslim Identity and The Balkan State*, edited by Poulton, H. And Taji-Farouki, S., Hurst & Company, London, 1997, p. 162; Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 93; Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, Minority Rights Group Press, London, 1991, p. 69.

³³ Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 93, 94; Şule Kut, *Balkanlar’da Kimlik ve Egemenlik*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 151.

³⁴ H Poulton and M Vickers, “The Kosovo Albanians”, In *Muslim Identity and The Balkan State*, edited by Poulton, H. And Taji-Farouki, S., Hurst & Company, London, 1997, p. 163; Şule Kut, *Balkanlar’da Kimlik ve Egemenlik*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 151.

³⁵ Ayşegül Bostan, “Has Turkish identity among Kosovar Turks experienced any transformation during the parallel education system which emerged in the beginning of the 1990s?”, unpublished MA thesis, University College London, London, 2011, p. 26.

children to be educated in their mother tongue. Clark stated that “*the struggle for education became a central symbol for the Albanians of Kosovo [and] the proudest achievement of the parallel system*”³⁶. The parallel education system became a milestone of Kosovar Albanian non-violent action against the Serbian government³⁷.

The reason for which the parallel educational system was seen as a key stone of Albanian non-violent struggle was that education is a significant mean of fostering national consciousness and developing language. According to Duijzings³⁸, identity “*represents primarily a link between the individual and a specific category or group of people*”. This sameness could take different forms such as ethnicity, religion, language, gender and so on. In the case of Kosovo, it is perceived that religious identity is of central importance compared to ethnicity. For instance, South Slav identity is shaped by religion such as Bosniaks (Muslim), Serbs (Orthodox) and Croats (Catholic). In contrast, Albanians are not unified by religion. Instead, language and distinct ethnic background constitute the dominant factor in Albanian identity³⁹. When taken into consideration, the Albanian language education plays the most important role in the development and survival of a national identity among Albanian young generation.

With the 1989 Serbian Constitution, some privileges of Kosovar Albanians were abolished. Instead of the limited rights of Kosovar Albanians by such new drafted Constitution, Kosovar Albanians also lost the right of education in their mother tongue⁴⁰. Halim Hyseni, head of the Pedagogic Institute in Pristina, interpreted this as an attempted assimilation of Albanians by Serbians. For instance, the Serbian music curriculum that was taught in the first grade of primary school did not include any Albanian songs. Moreover, Yugoslav songs translated into the Albanian language

³⁶ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 96.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ger Duijzing, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, London, 2000, p. 18.

³⁹ Aydın Babuna, “The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion”, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 28, No: 1, 2000, p. 67; Ger Duijzing, *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, London, 2000, p. 19.

⁴⁰ Denis Kostovicova, “Albanian Parallel Education System and Its Aftermath: Segregation, Identity and Governance”, *Transition and Politics of History Education in Southeast European*, edited by Augusta Dimou, V&R Unipress, Berlin, 2009, p. 201.

provoked Kosovar Albanians because of the Serbian denial of their national identity⁴¹.

The most significant reaction of Kosovar Albanians was to tackle the educational system. The reason was that Albanian language education is very important for instilling the Albanian national identity in the young generation in Kosovo. If not provided, the Albanian identity would not maintain its survival against Serbians in Kosovo. Kostovicova also stated in her book that “... education played a critical role. In fact, education was the only functioning, albeit imperfect system of the Albanian parallel state. This bestowed significance on the education system in Kosovo, which exceeded its mission of enlightening the youth. As an embodiment of the Albanian state, it assumed national relevance”⁴². In this sense, there seemed to be no way to establish a parallel education system for the young generation. The parallel education system, therefore, was seen as a milestone of Albanian non-violent resistance.

3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Parallel Education System

This section will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the parallel education system as one of the non-violent methods of such theory. There are some strengths and weaknesses associated with the Theory of Power. For instance, the theory prevents conventional war among the state and her subjects so that ‘peaceful’ struggle could be concluded by low-rated casualty. On the other hand, it is difficult to keep society to remain in non-violent struggle for a long-term period. Also the subject could face some difficulties to finance its parallel system. In this section, it will be focused on arguments that illuminate ways of preventing wars, financial difficulties; keeping the awareness of the subject for a long-term, gaining international support, positioning minority groups, and the problem of transformation into violent action by the Kosovo Liberation Army.

3.1. Preventing a war

The Theory of Power does not employ violence tools; thereby not provoking violence. This situation causes low-rated casualty

⁴¹ Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 80, 81.

⁴² Denisa Kostovicova, “Albanian Parallel Education System and Its Aftermath: Segregation, Identity and Governance”, *Transition and Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*, edited by Augusta Dimou, V&R Unipress, Berlin, 2009, p. 202.

when compared to conventional war fare. Furthermore, such a situation helps to prevent war with opponents⁴³. In the case of Kosovo, the Albanians protested the suspension of the autonomy of Kosovo and the abolishment of the use Albanian language as the official language. These demonstrations stimulated massive political mobilisation among Kosovar Albanians. Kosovar Albanians realized that they could not counter with massive protests and demonstrations against “*the process of the ‘Serbianization’ of Kosovo*”⁴⁴. Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of Kosovar Albanians developed an action without using physical violence. His first objective was to maintain the Kosovar Albanian community. In this sense, he adopted a strategy of peaceful struggle against the opponent. This led Kosovar Albanians to prevent going to war with the repressive Serbian government which was supporting the bloody inter-war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in favour of Serbs. In this sense, Rugova adopted a non-violent action in the name of survival of its community⁴⁵.

The population of Kosovar Albania was predominantly young. Also, education was very important for instilling an Albanian national identity into the young generation in Kosovo. As a result, it was inevitable to provide the Albanian curriculum for Kosovar Albanians. Ibrahim Rugova and other Albanian politicians (the Democratic League of Kosovo) therefore launched a parallel education system as one method aimed at applying the Theory of Power. The reason for this was that Kosovar Albanians had no military power in order to be able to fight with the Federal Army dominated by the Serbians. This situation also led Kosovar Albanians to avoid a conventional war with the Serbian state. Thanks to this, such conflict resulted in low-rated casualty like not being in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴⁶.

3.2. Financial Support

According to the Theory of Power, the subject could establish parallel system against the ruler. It is however questionable how such a system will be financially sufficient. With regard to overcoming the perceived problem that may have been caused, Kosovo was a good example. Kosovar Albanians developed ‘informal’ tax concept in order to financially support and sustain the parallel

⁴³ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 9.

⁴⁴ Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, p. 42.

⁴⁵ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 71.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 9, 64, 69, 71.

educational system. Accordingly, Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo or abroad would pay their 'informal' taxes to the parallel government of Republic of Kosovo. This tax was obtained 3 per cent of one person's income. This situation resulted in a parallel system that "*operated essentially as a large NGO, outside government funding or control*"⁴⁷.

It is important to note that the annual budget of the parallel educational system was estimated at about \$ 45 million. This budget was created by the 'informal' taxes of Albanians. Also, approximately 267,000 Kosovar Albanian children participated as beneficiaries of the parallel educational programme⁴⁸. I am therefore inclined to agree with Sommer and Buckland that "*it was an impressive achievement*"⁴⁹ for a non-violent action. As a result, Kosovar Albanians were able to overcome the difficulty of financial resource mobilisation that was central to the parallel educational system.

3.3. Long-term Social Solidarity

When one consider the absence of crucial infrastructure such as school buildings, amidst limited resources to support education, it will be easy to presume that the parallel system of education was only good enough to provide low-quality training for Kosovar Albanian children. As Kosovar Albanian teachers and educators admitted, there were inherent weakness of the parallel education system; most of which undermined the quality and impact of the alternative educational system. Nonetheless, the system continuously kept the children in alternative schools. Furthermore, this strategy is widely seen as a contributory factor to the low rate of illiteracy. This suggests illiteracy levels would have been astronomically high without the parallel educational system. Even when indeed the parallel system could not provide high-quality education for Kosovar Albanian children, it undoubtedly kept children in schools, restraining them from street and street fighting that became rife between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian forces⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Crighton et al., Thematic Review of National Policies for Education-Kosovo, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, [http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CCNM/DEELSA/ED\(2001\)6&docLanguage=En](http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CCNM/DEELSA/ED(2001)6&docLanguage=En) (03 Aralık 2012), 2001, p. 14 cited in Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, p. 44.

⁴⁸ Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, pp. 44 - 45.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 45.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 46.

Apart from the above, it is possible to argue that the parallel educational system “*had tremendous symbolic power*”⁵¹. As a Kosovar Albanian administrator emphasized, “*teaching the parallel system expressed rebellion to the Serbs*”⁵². In this sense, the establishment of the parallel educational system could be aptly described as the heartbeat of non-violent action in the region. This also facilitated the mobilisation of all segments of the population as education is seen as a sensitive case.

Furthermore, the Kosovar non-violent action started in the beginning of the 1990s and lasted until the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008⁵³. The non-violent struggle that was deployed during that period had a duration of approximately 20 years. I believe that this long-term action seriously needed the full attention of the population in order to sustain struggle against the Serbian government. In my view, the parallel educational system undertook this crucial role. In the course of every academic or school year, the level of consciousness and awareness of the Albanian society was refreshed and passed from old generation to new generation.

3.4. International Support

Even when Kosovar Albanian children could not receive quality in the parallel schools, it nevertheless controlled the acceleration of illiteracy. Furthermore, attending schools that offered parallel education did not also promote political extremism among the younger generation. Therefore such peaceful struggles that were devoid of political extremism made the Kosovar Albanians attractive to gain international support against the Serbian government⁵⁴.

International lobbying is not only very significant in any non-violent struggle, it is also indispensable to convincing external actors for the attainment of foreign influence and intervention. If the subjects or the governed can mobilise international support, it will be easier to overcome the repressive pressure of the ruler. To be

⁵¹ Crighton et al., Thematic Review of National Policies for Education-Kosovo, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, [http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CCNM/DEELSA/ED\(2001\)6&docLanguage=En](http://search.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=CCNM/DEELSA/ED(2001)6&docLanguage=En) (03 Aralık 2012), 2001, p. 8.

⁵² Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, p. 43.

⁵³ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 73.

⁵⁴ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 105; Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, p. 43.

distinct, international pressure could put a brake on the authoritarian government⁵⁵.

3.5. The Position of Minorities

In response to the minority groups living in Kosovo, this national confrontation between Albanians and Serbs led the minority communities to align with one of the two sides in conflict because of spatial segregation between Albanians and Serbs. For example, the Bosniaks, Serbo-Croat speaking Muslims, largely continued their education. This situation led Kosovar Albanians to blame Kosovar Bosniaks for being “*the enforcers of Serbia education laws*”⁵⁶. Clark asserted that “*the situation also created a choice for members of other minority groups. Turks often joined the parallel system to continue with their own 1990 curriculum, while Slav Muslims were more likely to opt for the Serbian curriculum*”⁵⁷.

Here it should be recognised that the so-called Serbian curricula did not create major difficulties for the Kosovar Bosniaks as they belonged to the same ethnicity and shared the same history and culture of the Serbs and Montenegrins despite the fact that they were Muslims. Kosovar Turks, one of the other minority groups, also remained in schools with Serbs and Bosniaks. Kosovar Turkish teachers and headmasters accepted the so-called Serbian curriculum and implemented it even they did not share the same language with either party. They retained their education in state schools with these curricula designed in Belgrade⁵⁸.

In my view, the reason why the Bosniak and Turkic communities did not join the parallel education system was to avoid financing it from their own resources⁵⁹. One of the weaknesses of the non-violent struggle is the position of minority to join such peaceful struggle.

⁵⁵ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, pp. 69, 71.

⁵⁶ Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 95.

⁵⁷ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, Pluto Press, London, 2000, p. 98.

⁵⁸ Ayşegül Bostan, “Refusing the Parallel Education System in the Name of the Survival of Kosovar Turkish Entity”, presented at The Third of International Balkan Annual Conference, Sarajevo, October 2013, (published phase), pp. 26 - 27; Denisa Kostovicova, *Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 95.

⁵⁹ Ayşegül Bostan, “Refusing the Parallel Education System in the Name of the Survival of Kosovar Turkish Entity”, presented at The Third of International Balkan Annual Conference, Sarajevo, October 2013, (published phase), p. 37.

3.6. Transformation into Violent Action

Until around 1995, Kosovar Albanians mostly agreed on non-violent struggle against the infamous Milosevic government. The struggle however experienced a breaking point after the disappointment of Kosovar Albanians by the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The Kosovo Liberation Army was formed to initiate violent reprisals against the Serbian police and armed forces. This violent action was expanded, leading to many Albanian and Serbian civilians being killed and sustaining a wide range of injuries, most of which were fatal and deadly. In 1998, the KLA managed to control most of cities in Kosovo. In responding to this, the Serbian government initiated a massive but aggressive military operation against the KLA forces. In 1999 alone, 45 Albanians were killed by the Serbian troop in Racak. This situation led the NATO allies to initiate a military intervention⁶⁰.

In the light of this knowledge, there could be a possibility of international support to be abolished by the international society as using armed struggle not only the Serbian forces but also the Serbian civilians. In the author's view, the establishment of the parallel educational system could be seen as a successful policy of Kosovar Albanian politicians that prevented Albanian children from participating in the armed forces so that the density of violence could be kept very low. In addition, it could be said that such violent actions from both sides was successfully managed by the leaders of KLA because NATO was convinced that a military operation led to the transformation into armed action from non-violent struggle.

CONCLUSION

It is certain that the parallel educational system played a very significant role as the corner stone of Kosovo's non-violent struggle. Frankly, it was a unique example to demonstrate that Kosovar Albanians were able to establish a parallel education system that relied on a quasi-economic system with the help of 'informal' taxes. This system operated well until the time of Kosovo's independence. Perhaps, the reason behind the effective functioning of the financial support system may account for the persistent social solidarity amongst Kosovar Albanians. It should be accepted that this social solidarity played a significant role in the wake of Kosovo's

⁶⁰ Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo*, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, 2004, pp. 32, 33.

independence. Thanks to this well-persistent economic system, they somewhat could afford the parallel educational system effectively.

Above all, the strategy which effectively kept children in schools and also instilled a sense of national consciousness amongst the younger generation enormously prevented a high calibre of conventional war among Kosovar Albanians and the Belgrade government. These modest achievements to a large extent refreshed and emboldened the identity consciousness in the community. Despite the fact that minority groups in Kosovo did not participate in the parallel educational system, this phenomenon transformed into an advantage to the Albanians. Frankly, the participation of minorities in the educational system brought about additional cost for Kosovo Albanians.

In conclusion, it could be said that it was a successful non-violent action to a large extent when analysing the parallel educational system to shed light on its strengths and weaknesses within the ambit of the Theory of Power.

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