BUREAUCRATIC REDUNDANCY THEORY (BRT) AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN TURKEY

Bürokratik Çokluk Teorisi (BÇT) ve Türkiye'de İstihbarat Hizmetlerinde Uygulanması

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──────── **Özet** ────────

Temsili demokrasilerde, kendi menfaatini düşünen ve yeniden seçilme planları olan politikacılar ile kendi menfaatini düşünen ve belli makamlara görevlendirilme istekleri olan bürokratların; kamu menfaatini düşünmeleri ve kamu yararına iş yapmaları beklenmektedir. Bu açıdan bürokrasinin denetlenmesi önem arz etmektedir. Politikacılar, güvenlik politikaları yapmakta ve bürokratlar da çıkarılan bu kamu politikalarını uygulamaktadırlar. Ancak, iktidarda bulunan politikacılar, çıkardıkları politikaların, bürokratlar tarafından gerektiği gibi uygulanacağı konusunda emin değillerdir. Bürokratik Çokluk Teorisi (BÇT) bu soruna açıklık getirmekte ve bir öneri sunmaktadır. BÇT, bir kamu örgütünün görevini yerine getirememesi ihtimaline karşı, aynı görev için birden fazla kamu örgütü görevlendirmeyi amaçlar. Böylece, birden fazla kamu örgütünü aynı kamu politikası problemini çözmek üzere görevlendirmektedir. Bu uygulama sayesinde, kamu politikalarının etkili bir şekilde uygulanabileceğini iddia eder. Bu makale, Bürokratik Çokluk Teorisinin bir ülkede, istihbarat görevinin birden fazla istihbarat örgütüne verilmesi, bir istihbarat örgütünün kamu menfaatinden farklı faaliyet göstermesi veya işlevini yerine getirememesi durumunda, güvenlik politikalarının diğer istihbarat örgütlerince etkili uygulanmasını sağlayabileceğini tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bürokratik Çokluk Teorisi, İstihbarat Bürokrasisi, Bürokratik Kontrol, Kamu Politikaları.

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Abstract

In representative democracies, it is expected that self-interested, reelection-seeker politicians and self-interested and office-seeker bureaucrats pursue public interest. Particularly, it is important to control bureaucracy. Politicians make policies (such as security or criminal justice policies) and bureaucrats (i.e., intelligence community) execute them. However, political principals are not sure that bureaucratic agents will execute public policies as intended by them. Bureaucratic Redundancy Theory (BRT) provides an explanation for this problem and offers a solution. Bureaucratic Redundancy Theory indicates that allocating a task to more than one agency, in case of a single agency's failure, or assigning multiple agencies to a policy problem may lead to more effective policy implementation. This article discusses that the solution of Bureaucratic Redundancy Model may increase the reliability of intelligence agencies and may ensure successful execution of security policies in a country, when the job is given to more than one single intelligence agency.

Key Words: Bureaucratic Redundancy Theory, Intelligence Bureaucracy, Bureaucratic Control, Public Policy.

Introduction

Making and implementing policies are not an easy task, especially with self-interested politicians and bureaucrats. Defining the public interest is hard in the self-interested environment where human beings are at the center. In representative democracies, politicians are defined as self-interested reelection seekers (Mayhew, 2004). In addition, bureaucrats are defined as office seekers. Their best-interest is to keep their positions or ask for promotion in their job. While they are expected to pursue public interest, they may pursue their own self-interests legally or illegally using the bureaucratic means and resources.

In that sense, no organization is error-free. There is always the possibility of failure. The risk of breakdown may motivate a political principal to create at least two agencies for a single/similar task. Political principals may assign a single task to multiple agencies in order to reduce the risk of collapse. Assigning a single task to multiple agencies may make organizations more reliable and more efficient in the future (Lerner, 1986).

Political principals may face agency failure while implementing security policies. Because of fallibility of individual intelligence agents, failure-proof intelligence agencies or intelligence administrations are almost impossible. For instance, in the assignment of the heads of intelligence services, political loyalty may be one of the main criteria. Is it possible that the ruling party may give an order to the chief of intelligence agency to gather intelligence against opposition parties? Thus, it can be said that breakdown in intelligence services is probable. In such a case, one solution would be the Bureaucratic Redundancy Model's assigning intelligence gathering task to multiple intelligence agencies in order to reduce the risk of intelligence agency breakdown. The research questions that are explored in this article are "How can a highly reliable implementation process be designed? How can intelligence agencies be controlled for error or failure? How can the implementation process of security policies be controlled?"

1. Problem

The problem is the shirking behavior of the bureaucratic agents predicted by the Principal-Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). In the principal-agent relationship, the principal delegates work to the agent and the agent performs that work on behalf of the principal. Principal-Agent Theory emphasizes that bureaucrats and politicians have conflicting and dissimilar goals. Bureaucrats have information and expertise, but politicians do not, which may, in turn, lead to information asymmetry. Hence, bureaucrats have the opportunity to shirk, they can produce services costly, and they can manipulate principals. As part of this relationship, the principal asks for confirmation that the agent is actually doing the work (Eisenhardt, 1989) and that the work that was delegated will be done by the agents, as intended by the (political) principals.

Two agency problems exist that may hinder the completion of the delegated work: moral hazard and adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005). Moral hazard means that the agent does not make an extra effort toward accomplishing the work but he/she shirks his/her duty. The moral hazard problem exists because the principal cannot know what the agent has really done. Adverse selection refers to the idea that the principal does not know that the agent has the necessary knowledge and skills to accomplish the given task by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). If the principal observes the behavior of the agent, it is expected that those

two agency problems will be lessened or eliminated. Hence, the principal installs information systems and monitors the agents to prevent such problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005).

The past FBI administration may be a good example of shirking behavior. It is not only counted as an intelligence agency, but also it is an operational (mainly investigation) enforcement agency. Former FBI director Edgar Hoover had an unchecked bureaucratic power. He had been in that position for 47 years. Under Hoover's direction (1924-1972), the FBI abused its bureaucratic power such as, manipulation of crime data to exaggerate the effectiveness of the FBI, violation of the constitutional rights of citizens systematically, compilation of extensive blackmail files on elected officials. In addition, the FBI spied on political groups, violated the civil rights of minorities, wiretapped illegally, burglarized the groups' offices that it was spying on, and spied citizens due to their political beliefs. Hoover manipulated all presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Richard Nixon (Gentry, 1991; Theoharis and Cox, 1988; Walker and Katz, 2005). During his post as FBI director, he worked with six presidents. Some of them (Truman, Kennedy, Johnson) wanted to dismiss him, but they believed that the political cost of dismissing Hoover as FBI Director would be so great (Hack, 2007).

Hoover's abuse of his bureaucratic power allowed him to be the director of the FBI almost half a century. It seems that Hoover pursued his self-interest rather than public interest while he was the director of the agency. On the other hand, it can be the reason why FBI directors have been appointed for maximum 10 years after his administration (Ulkemen, 2008). With a maximum 10 year of appointment, it can be said that the political principal imposed a control mechanism over the law enforcement bureaucracy (bureaucratic agent) in order to ensure bureaucratic agency or the head of the agency will pursue the public interest. Unfortunately, no any other law enforcement or intelligence agency managed to stop Hoover's misuse of power at that time. None of the control mechanisms could stop his misconduct either.

Monitoring the behavior of the agents is one way of control in the prevention of shirking behavior. Another control mechanism may be the assignment of a task to multiple agencies to make sure that the policy or task is carried out successfully. The Bureaucratic Redundancy Theory (BRT) may offer a solution for the shirking behavior problem of the bureaucrats predicted by the principal-agent theory. No doubt a control

mechanism is necessary to ensure that bureaucratic agents implement the policy as intended by the political principals.

1.1. Problems with Intelligence Services: Intelligence Failure

Information and intelligence is highly important for a country. Intelligence agencies use the government's tax-money to gather intelligence. They have the means to gather intelligence and protect homeland from the probable enemy threats and attacks. However, it is sometimes not appropriate in terms of efficiency and effectiveness to give the intelligence gathering task to a single agency. If these agencies are occupied by some corrupt bureaucrats, they may use the intelligence for their personal gains such as keeping their positions or else. Hence, another intelligence agency may provide checks and balances for such a problem. In that regard, Bendor's (1985) point is to assign more than one independent agency to one problem or one program in order to receive more reliable proposals from each agency. One of the most essential justifications for redundancy is uncertainty because it is not clear whether a single agency will accomplish the task as intended by political principals.

Hence, the intelligence gathering task may be assigned to more than one intelligence agency in order to ensure the successful execution of security policies. It seems that almost all developed countries, including Turkey have more than one intelligence agency. One of the reasons among others may be as the BRT explains.

There might be some dubious issues in intelligence gathering job and with the nature of intelligence agencies. First of all, there is measurement problem of performance in intelligence agencies' work. Most of the time, when criminal activities or terrorist activities are increased; this could be commented as inefficiency of the intelligence services by the people and the media. Therefore, some might think that intelligence agencies failed to prevent some terrorist attacks. In that sense, it can be said that it is difficult to figure out whether the personnel assigned to intelligence units work efficiently. For example, after the 9/11terrorist attack, people started to question the effectiveness of the intelligence agencies in the U.S.

Second, the intelligence agencies may have accountability problem with their secret funds because they spend secret funds for their covert

operations and it is confidential or sometimes it is a state secret and classified. Hence, it is not clear whether expenditures done from tax-revenues are spent appropriately and efficiently.

Third, partisan politics may influence intelligence agencies because the directors of intelligence agencies are appointed by the political principals. They are political appointees. Self-interested politicians want to be reelected. Hence, the ruling party or political principals may ask for gathering intelligence against the leaders of opposition parties. Or political principals may ask for destroying the intelligence which includes evidence against them. Playing politics is expensive. Sometimes, it may require illegal relations between interest groups or businessmen.

Fourth, intelligence agents may intentionally collect information against their political principals. Some bureaucrats may be office seeker. Intelligence agencies use high tech devices to collect intelligence. While collecting intelligence, they can collect other information for blackmailing high level bureaucrats or particularly politicians. Hence, they may keep such secret information for blackmailing.

Fifth, some intelligence agencies might be so curious to learn what other intelligence agencies think and know on some points. This might be a counterintelligence issue, or the intelligence agency might be willing to collect all credits of a successful operation, as well. With these or some other reasons, the intelligence agencies may be reluctant to share intelligence with other intelligence agencies and they may not be willing to cooperate with them. This may lead to unsuccessful and/or inefficient attempts in preventing some serious incidents or tragic terrorist attacks.

Hence, in sum, the intelligence organizations are subject to a breakdown; thus, they must be controlled via using different tools including redundant intelligence agencies.

2. Solution: Assigning a Task to Multiple Agencies

2.1. Bureaucratic Redundancy Theory (BRT)

Most of the work on the redundancy theory has been done by Martin Landau (Landau, 1969; Landau, 1991; Landau and Stout, 1979; Landau and Chisholm, 1995). According to Landau (1969:347), "redundancy is a powerful device for the suppression of error". He (1969, 1991) assumes that organizations are fallible or they are prone to error and asks "can we design organizations that are stronger, more reliable, and more effective,

than any of their units?" (1991:15). In terms of public policy implementation, the question explores how the implementation process can be designed as more reliable, stronger, and more effective. The answer is to add sufficient redundancy where the duplication is defined as the simplest form of redundancy (Landau, 1991). Miranda and Lerner (1995:194) define the redundant service delivery arrangement as "the use of more than one organization to deliver the same service".

Landau (1969) explains redundancy with a simple example: after a commercial plane's emergency landing, it experiences a mechanical failure. It is found out that there was a problem with the rudder. He was surprised how the pilot directed and landed the plane. The pilot informed him that he used additional features of aircraft which compensate for the impairment of rudder. Even though the rudder did not work, the pilot was able to land the plane via using safety factors built into the plane. It was a redundant landing system. A redundant system increased plane's reliability of performance and prevented the plane to crash into the ground. Another example can be the parachute system. While parachuting, a parachutist wears a second parachute in case of failure of the main parachute. Executives may want at least two administrative assistants in their offices just because one of them may be sick or absent.

Ting (2002) cites from Landau (1969) that redundancy theory is about making bureaucracy redundant so that politicians can secure themselves against unexpected failures. In addition, Bendor (1985) asserts that in order to reduce an agency failure, and make sure that the tasks will be executed with limited or zero failure; the legislature assigns same tasks to various agencies. Congressmen want to reduce expected failures during implementation process; therefore they assign more than one agency in order to have them implement the law successfully.

According to Bendor (1985), people can make mistakes or people can fail to accomplish their tasks. Organizations are not exempt from this risk. They can make mistakes and they may not perform perfectly, either. While doing their duties, they can miss some of the vital points. In order to reduce agency failures, and in order to be sure that tasks will be executed with less failure or without failure, the legislature assigns same tasks to various agencies. Thus, redundancy makes the organizations less vulnerable to human failures. Redundancy creates a trustworthy organization from unreliable parts. According to Bendor (1985:28), redundancy theory asserts that "encouraging bureaus to duplicate each other's functions will enhance overall reliability".

There is an association between successful execution of policy and bureaucratic efficiency (Mertha, 2006). Creating a single agency for a single task is less expensive, but does not promise successful execution of a single task because of human failure or "every actor is a risky agent" (Bendor, 1985:27). Hence, using redundancy in organizational design or in policy implementation process may increase organizational reliability, and may reduce the risk of failure.

Redundant organizations may prevent bureaucratic monopoly. It was claimed that assigning a governmental task into an agency may create or increase departmental monopoly. Competitive redundancies may produce some advantages during implementation process. Public organizations are financed by the tax-money, so there is no risk of bankruptcy. It means that even though public officers do not work efficiently, it is very difficult to fire them or their public organizations may not go bankruptcy. Caves and Christensen (1980:958) point out, "any tendency toward inefficiency resulting from public ownership has been overcome by the benefits of competition". Competition may increase the performance of public officers and agencies. Competition between at least two intelligence agencies may increase the quality of work done by intelligence agents. In other words, each agency may do its best to bring the best proposal to solve the security problems.

Public agencies' jurisdictions are legally identified and determined in order to prevent violations of duties, responsibilities, and authorities that may lead to complexities, duplications, and dilemmas. Bendor (1985) explains how bureaucratic duplication develops. First, ambiguous boundaries produce redundancy. Assigning a problem unambiguously to one agency may be impossible. In addition to technical ambiguity, there is jurisdictional uncertainty. There is still no certain decision that bureaucratic organizations are organized by purpose, process, place, and clientele. Hence, public agencies fight over programs. Second, executive intention can create competition among subordinates for his/her interest. Third, vertical integration can cause redundancy because an agency can justify its jurisdictional expanding for technical reasons. If an agency claims that in order to perform X job, it needs to Y which is assigned to another agency. In other words, an agency develops a new program in a jurisdiction already assigned to another agency.

Private sector monopoly is one of the enemies of the New Public Management (NPM), particularly, in outsourcing. If a service is produced by a unique private sector agency, competition cannot be created, so there

is no guarantee to buy high quality services with low cost from private sector monopoly. Redundancy is appreciated in private sector but it is disliked in public sector (Landau, 1991). Landau (1991) focused on private firms like BART (high-speed trains) and AC transit (a traditional bus operator) in the public transport services that compete with each other in the San Francisco Bay Area. Landau (1991) found their coordination and cooperation a good example for the redundancy model. The goal of these redundant systems is to provide effective transportation even when one of the transportation systems is broken. A breakdown happened in a BART train in the transbay tube in 1979 because of fire. While BART transportation system failed, the stranded passengers were transported by AC transit to their destination. While the transbay tube closed for a while, AC transit covered BART system. This incident showed that the parallel system (or redundant private sector organizations) increased the reliability of the Bay Area transit system.

Frederickson and LaPorte (2002) question the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 by focusing on the reliability and security of the U.S. commercial air travel. They argue that airport security operations must be error-free operations and error-free operations can only be done by highly reliable organizations. According to them, structuring redundancy is one of the requirements of highly secure commercial air travel. In other words, one of the functions of the internal reliability of airport security operations is structured redundancy. Local airport police and local units of the TSA (Transportation Security Administration) are some of the examples of redundancy in airport security operations because both of them work for the security of the commercial air travel. It is important for TSA staff to build strong working relationships with local airport police. Also, local TSA staff should work with harmony with administration of local airports. These redundant units must be loosely coupled because failure in one unit will be caught by the redundant unit. In addition, two personal-identification checkpoints, random searches, and video surveillance in airport security operations are the examples of loosely coupled redundant processes (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002).

2.2. An Important Criterion of Bureaucratic Redundancy Model: The Independency

Bendor (1985) claims that there is more communication within an organization than between agencies. So success breeds success

intraorganizationally than interorganizationally. On the other hand, Bendor (1985) asserts that in order to get maximum utility from redundancy, channels must be statistically independent from each other. It means that different agencies which are assigned to the same problem must be independent from each other. In his first proposition, he suggests that independent structure (interorganizational) is more reliable than intraorganizational structure because "two relatively independent heads are better than two relatively dependent heads" (1985:47). If one problem is assigned to two different organizations in the same agency, they can influence each other for good or bad than two independent agencies. If one problem is assigned to two independent agencies, most probably one of their proposals will be more satisfactorily. More monopolistic structure will most probably produce two bad solutions than two good solutions. He claims that all decision makers whether they are satisfiers or optimizers will most probably prefer interorganizational structure to intraorganizational structure. Hence, the redundant intelligence agency or agencies must be independent each other.

2.3. Disadvantages of Bureaucratic Redundancy Model

Bendor (1985) makes an argument of criticism on redundancy. First, he asserts that it is not efficient. Giving a job which can be done by a single agency to various agencies is wasteful. Second argument is the gaps and overlaps. It is also defined as internal opportunity cost of redundancy. Redundancy can create programmatic gaps. If fixed budget is given and more resources are allocated to one problem, it can be insufficient for another. Problem-solving overlaps. Third argument is pinpointing responsibility. Overlapping jurisdictions may make it difficult to locate responsibility. A non-redundant structure lessens this uncertainty. If there is a failure, it can be difficult to detect who did not perform properly or whose fault was the failure.

2.4. Bureaucratic Redundancy Model in Intelligence Services

Landau (1991) argues that when a unit fails, the redundant unit will cover/backup the failure of the other. It seems that there are two types of failures: intentional and unintentional. When applied to intelligence agencies, the redundant intelligence agency will cover/backup the failure of the other intelligence agency. It has two different meanings in intelligence services: First, it is about intentional failure. When an

intelligence agency does not pursue public interest and benefits (or even commits crime), the redundant intelligence agency will be an alternative to fill the gap, caused by the intelligence agency that abuses its bureaucratic power. Second is about unintentional failure. For instance, when an intelligence agency misses the intelligence about a planned terrorist attack, the other intelligence agency may get the (missed) intelligence of such a possible threat.

Streamlining processes, eliminating duplication, and saving money are the goals of the Classic Public Administration School. However, at this point, the BRT brings a counter argument to the Classic Public Administration School. The BRT assumes that organizations are not perfect. The assumption is that any or all parts of organizations are fallible or prone to error. Both the classic public administration literature and redundancy school accept some level of organizational failure. In that regard, if a unique intelligence agency exists in a country, the implementation of security policies may be in danger because of possible error or failure of this intelligence organization. However, no tolerance for failure or error in intelligence services are accepted or expected. Highly reliable implementation process must be designed to implement security policies in a country. At least, two independent but identical intelligence services should be created for the implementation of security policies in a country. Hence, redundancy may be a tool to reduce the error or failure in intelligence services.

3. Redundant Intelligence Agencies in Turkey

In general, intelligence gathering task is given to three different, independent from each other bureaucratic agencies in Turkey: the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Police Intelligence Organization (PI), and the Military Intelligence Organization (MI). These intelligence agencies are independent intelligence agencies just as defined by the BRT. The MI[1] (through the head general of the Turkish Armed Forces) and the MIT are accountable directly to the Prime Minister. The PI is accountable (through the General Director of the Turkish National Police) to the Minister of Interior. In terms of intelligence gathering, the

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[1] There is also Gendarmerie Forces that is one of the branches of the Turkish Military, responsible of law enforcement in the rural area in the country, and the gendarmerie answers to Ministry of Interior on public order duties, and answers to the head general of Turkish Military Forces on military-related jobs (Law#2803:4).

area of responsibility (AOR) of the MIT is the whole country (all urban and rural areas). The areas of responsibility of the MI and the PI are different. While the area of responsibility of the MI[2] is the rural area, the PI is responsible of gathering intelligence in the urban area. From another criterion, it can be said that the MI collects military intelligence mainly, whereas the PI collects intelligence on all kinds of crime. All of these intelligence agencies are dependent on and responsible to the public prosecutors in terms of judicial affairs.

Sometimes it is difficult to say that there are certain geographic boundaries about intelligence gathering among intelligence agencies because people or criminals may not stay in one place, but move. The target suspects may change their places from each AOR of the MIT, the MI, and/or the PI to the other. Or members of organized crime or terror organizations may live in both urban and rural areas of the country. Such problems can be solved with administrative and/or judicial warrants, allowances, or consents. As mentioned above, these agencies are independent from each other in terms of providing intelligence services. In that regard, it can be said that the MIT, the MI, and the PI are redundant agencies of each other in the same job. On the other hand, only one agency is authorized to collect intelligence outside of the country. The MIT is authorized to collect intelligence not only inside, but also outside the country (Law#2937:4/a).

Those agencies check and balance each other against human failure. One intelligence agency may check another intelligence agency against individual or organizational failure. While gathering intelligence, an intelligence agent may be corrupted. The monitoring possibility of the redundant intelligence agency on the agents of the other intelligence agency may deter the agents to do illegal acts. For instance, while an intelligence agent attempts to commit crime, or attempts not to pursue public interest, he/she may give up and may stay within his/her legal boundaries because of the feeling of being watched and oversight by the other redundant agencies. Those three intelligence agencies in Turkey may also compete and bring the possible best intelligence for the security of the country.

The Turkish Parliament passed a Law in 2010 and created the Public Order and Security Agency to fight terrorism effectively (Law#5952). The goal of this agency is to coordinate the public agencies in Turkey

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[2] Gendarmerie Forces are meant here.

(particularly intelligence agencies) in the war of terror and to develop anti-terror policies and strategies of the Turkish government. This agency has no operational role. The head of the agency is accountable to the ministry of interior. There are about 100 positions in this agency for professionals like academicians, statisticians, psychologists, interpreters, and sociologists. The Law creates the intelligence evaluation center within the Public Order and Security Agency (Law#5952:8). The Law orders the intelligence agencies and the ministry of foreign affairs to share (or give) their intelligence with the Public Order and Security Agency (Law#5952:8). However, it seems that some problems exist with this agency.

First, even though the Public Order and Security Agency is created as an anti-terror policy development center, it looks like the Law#5952 creates a hierarchical principal for the intelligence agencies in Turkey. However, there are not any hierarchical relationships among the intelligence agencies in Turkey which is appropriate according to the BRT. Landau (1991:7) defines hierarchy as "superiors determine the actions of subordinates". Political principals in Turkey implement security policies by using three intelligence agencies. Political principals create security policies and law enforcement agencies (including intelligence agencies) execute (or implement) the security policies. Political principals may not determine the actions of intelligence agencies because they may not know intelligence related issues. Hence, the intelligence agencies should determine their own actions as they are professionals. In addition, while competing with each other, it is expected that each agency does its best to bring the best work to its political principal.

Second, this agency may produce conflict because the MIT and the MI (except the Gendarmerie Forces) are not accountable to the minister of interior, but they are accountable to the prime minister. Their principal is not the minister of interior and also their principal is the highest level political principal. Hence, they may not cooperate and bring intelligence to the intelligence pool because they may have no motivation to cooperate with an agency operates under the ministry of interior. They may not share their intelligence with the Public Order and Security Agency, but they may be willing to use the intelligence submitted to the Public Order and Security Agency by the PI.

Third, the Law#5952 creates an intelligence pool within the agency. If one intelligence agency completely or partially involves in a criminal

activity (which is defined as organizational failure or error), they may find out what the redundant intelligence agencies know about its illegal activities because of the existence of the intelligence pool.

Fourth, interestingly, the Law says that the military personnel can temporarily work for the MIT (Law#2937:11). It means that the MIT hires some officers from the Turkish Military Forces. Even though it is temporary assignment, some military personnel (not the same personnel necessarily) work permanently in the positions of the MIT. It is not appropriate because the military personnel work for the temporary national intelligence job may carry intelligence illegally to or from the MIT. The MIT may not be an independent intelligence agency because of the presence of the military personnel in the organization of the MIT. Hence, it can be said that hiring military personnel by the MIT also violates the "independent" criterion of the BRT.

Conclusion

Redundancy may eliminate goal conflict and information asymmetry between legislators and public administrators. Assigning multiple agencies to a policy problem may lessen or eliminate the goal conflict and information asymmetry. Multiple agency assignment may create competition towards the policy goal. Different agencies may compete and they may not find any opportunity to create problems to legislators. In addition, the redundancy approach may prevent monopoly since the political principals allocate tasks to more than one agency against single agency's failure.

Intelligence is the power and (if it is) unchecked, it may lead to some serious problems. Intelligence agencies compete with one another and they may gather and process the best intelligence. While competing with other intelligence agencies, each intelligence agency may submit its best proposal or its best intelligence information for a security problem defined by the political principal. They may check each other against agency failure. Intelligence agents may use the intelligence for their self-interests (i.e., keeping their positions or promotions). One intelligence agency may check and balance another intelligence agency's power. Even though creating more than one intelligence agency may increase the cost of bureaucracy, political principals can be confident that the security policies will be executed appropriately, efficiently, and effectively as intended by them without any agency or human failure.

In conclusion, based on the BRT, it can be suggested that intelligence sharing or intelligence cooperation seems almost impossible due to several reasons mentioned in this study. Therefore, trying to bring all these independent intelligence agencies together under one umbrella organization is not a solution to get the best, efficient, and effective intelligence. This is not realistic, but just an artificial move. Instead, as the BRT suggests, the best is to let them operate separately, independently and alternatively from each other.

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