

TERRORISM, LIBERAL STATE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Terörizm, Liberal Devlet ve Uluslararası İşbirliği

İdris BAL *

Abstract

This article aims to discuss why liberal states have great difficulty in implementing counter terrorism strategies. To this end, first, some brief information is given about three actors; the state, the terrorists and the public audience. Second, problems of counter-terrorism strategies are discussed. Third, the importance of international co-operation is emphasised. Public opinion is most important actor for a successful counter terrorism campaign. States must act within the law, otherwise states themselves can be regarded as "terrorist".

States' problems in their wars against terrorism are discussed within four categories; deterrence, intelligence and early warning, defense, and retaliation. While discussing these difficulties, some examples are given from different parts of the world, including examples from PKK and US campaign in Afghanistan.

In combating terrorism, the most important need is international co-operation between states. The international community must prevent terrorism from being used as a foreign policy instrument. Otherwise, the world order and international peace can be badly undermined.

Key Words: Terrorism, state, public opinion, media, defence, deterrence, intelligence, retaliation.

Özet

Bu makale neden liberal devletlerin anti terör stratejilerini uygulamada büyük güçlükler çektiğini tartışmaktadır. Bu amaca yönelik olarak, öncelikle devlet, teröristler ve kamuoyu ile ilgili kısa bilgiler verilmiştir. İkinci olarak, anti terör stratejilerinin problemleri tartışılmıştır. Üçüncü olarak, uluslararası işbirliğinin önemi vurgulanmıştır. Kamuoyu başarılı bir mücadele için en önemli aktördür. Devletler hukukun sınırları içinde hareket etmelidirler, aksi takdirde devletlerin kendileri "terörist" konumuna düşerler.

Devletlerin teröre karşı savaşlarında karşı karşıya kaldıkları problemler dört başlık altında ele alındı: caydırıcılık, istihbarat ve erken uyarı, savunma, ve misilleme. Makalede bu zorluklar tartışılırken PKK ve ABD'nin Afganistan operasyonu dahil olmak üzere dünyanın farklı yerlerinden örnekler verilmiştir.

Terörle mücadelede, en önemli ihtiyaç uluslararası işbirliğidir. Uluslararası camia terörizmin dış politika aracı olarak kullanılmasını önlemelidir. Aksi takdirde, dünya düzeni ve uluslararası barış çok büyük yaralar alacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, devlet, kamuoyu, medya, savunma, caydırıcılık, istihbarat, misilleme.

* Assistant Professor Dr. İdris Bal is a lecturer at The Faculty of Security Sciences, Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey.

INTRODUCTION

The term terrorism was first used during the French revolution. As Walter Laquer (1986:88) expressed it, “experts agree that terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy”. It is not an ideology but a strategy that can be used by people of different political convictions. It has also never had a chance in an effective dictatorship, but hardly a major Liberal democratic country has entirely escaped it (Laquer, 1986:88-91).

In order to prevent terrorism, liberal states need effective counter-terrorism strategies. On the one hand, public and media outrage creates pressure for urgent forceful action, on the other, limitations of the law and legal processes severely constrain governments that take seriously their responsibilities under international and domestic law. In the contemporary world, liberal states face an outstanding threat of terrorism. 11 September attacks on USA have underlined the importance of terrorist threat and even the most powerful country of the world is not immune to terrorism. Therefore, in order to safeguard their people, the rule of law and integrity of their country, states are trying to implement counter-terrorism strategies.

In this article, we shall discuss why liberal states have great difficulty in implementing such strategies. To this end, first some brief information is given about three actors; the state, the terrorists and the public audience. Second, problems of counter-terrorism strategies are discussed. Third, the importance of international co-operation is emphasized.

THE STATE, TERRORISTS AND PUBLIC AUDIENCE

Three actors play vital roles in terrorism: the state, the terrorists and the public audience. The state is, essentially, the whole fixed political system, the set-up of authoritative and legitimately powerful roles, by which people are finally controlled, ordered and organized. Thus the police, the army and the civil service are aspects of the state, as are parliament and local authorities (Robertson, 1986:307). Liberal theorists emphasize that any political regime needs some element of popular legitimacy, consents and collaboration if it is to be stable and effective. In liberal discourse, the concept of authority implies generally recognized rights, powers and responsibilities consistently and clearly defined and limited in legal constitutional terms. The whole thrust of classical liberalism was directed at establishing a government of laws in place of arbitrary and despotic power and at establishing social peace. And this movement was swiftly followed and reinforced by the pressure of liberal democracy bringing popular

participation, representation and a far greater degree of public accountability to public demands and expectations than had previously been the case. It is because they are based on popular consent and legitimacy that the very existence of liberal democratic states is so galling to ideologues of terror (Wilkinson, 1977:122-123). It is a simple fact that states must act within the domestic and international law otherwise they can themselves be regarded as "terrorists". Therefore, the primary objectives of a counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and the maintenance of the liberal democracy, rule of law and upholding the state's constitutional authority. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that achieving these primary objectives over-rides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence as such. Even in a most severe crises, therefore, a liberal democracy must seek to remain true to itself, avoiding on the one hand the danger of sliding into repressive dictatorship, and on the other, the evil consequence of inertia, inaction and weakness in upholding its constitutional authority and preserving law and order (Wilkinson, 1977:121-123).

Terrorism can be regarded as a political weapon developed by revolutionaries in the womb of autocracy. Terrorist philosophies and ideologies clearly pose a frontal attack on liberal values, principles and morality. Terrorism is generally employed by small conspiratorial secret groups, organized in crudely paramilitary structures, lacking any mechanism of internal democracy and employing terror to control and discipline their own members. For instance, within the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist organization active since 1984 primarily in the South Eastern Turkey, the leader, Abdullah Öcalan, punished Şemdin Sakık, his second in command, as he feared Sakık could threaten his leadership of the PKK. There are also reports that the PKK executed some of its own members for criticizing the PKK's leadership and methods. Now PKK has changed its name to KADEK.

As Wilkinson (1977:121-123) pointed out, terrorist groups within liberal democracies despise democratic procedures and electoral tests of public support and legitimacy. It is an important, sometimes over-riding terrorist aim to undermine the political will, confidence and morale of liberal governments and citizens so that they are made more vulnerable to political and social collapse. A second major political strategy of terrorists is the attempt to push the liberal state into authoritarianism and hence into denying its constitutionalism, into dropping all humane restraints and checks on power, and ultimately into becoming a paramilitary or police state. Political terrorism is thus a weapon of psychological warfare. Its theorists and skilled proponents hope to achieve a climate of fear, panic, disorientation and capitulation out of all proportion to the actual military strength and numerical support of the terrorist movement. And the terrorists judge their own success or failure primarily in terms of political, psychological

and propaganda impact rather than purely by the traditional military criteria of deaths and damage caused. Terrorists are only too well aware that their really crucial requirement is large and growing public support (Wilkinson, 1977:121-123). In order to achieve this goal, the terrorist group in a liberal democratic setting try to make maximum use of the freedoms of speech and the press. They also benefit from the fact that although state must act within the domestic and international law and morality, there is no such self-restraint on terrorists, who have freedom of action in this regard.

Both the state and the terrorists address the public audience. Therefore, the public audience is the most important actor. While implementing counter-terrorist strategies, the state must act within the law and it should not lose the public support. The British historian E.H. Carr, subdivided the elements of political power into three categories; military, economic and public opinion. A band of terrorists seeking political power cannot hope to field massive forces to compel opponents to accept their will nor can they tap a state's full financial resources to promote their cause. But clearly terrorists can and do exploit public opinion. Where they fail with the might of their guns, they hope to succeed with the forcefulness of their propaganda (Livingston, 1988:120). Therefore, terrorists usually want a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead. If necessary, the more violent tactics have been found in order to have greater prominence as a way of gaining attention. As one expert on terrorism has observed, "If terrorism stops terrorising, if it ceases to have an explosive impact on public opinion, then terrorists have an innate tendency to escalate the violence in order to recapture the headlines" (Jenkins, 1985:511).

PROBLEMS OF RESPONSE

The responses of Liberal states to overcome terrorism may vary from concession to military retaliation. There may be several other forms of response, such as domestic legal actions, high penalties, regular counter-terrorism forces, special courts, visa regulations, identity cards, media restrictions, domestic surveillance, multilateral state co-operation, political measures, economic sanctions, propaganda, large media apparatus, measures against supporting governments, diplomatic relations, improved security, intelligence and surveillance, and so on. The choice for a certain form of response to a given terrorist act may also depend on the characteristics of the terrorist organization. While governments respond to terrorism, they are faced with several problems.

One of the problems facing governments is that there is no coherent and generally accepted philosophy in the name of which force can be organized against the violence of terrorists. States face a dilemma in this respect. The terrorist is attempting to provoke an overreaction and thus to make the

government appear repressive. Yet, if the government is to pursue the terrorist effectively, it may be forced to take strong and sometime an unpopular action. On the other hand, a weak response tends to give an impression of a weak government. In resolution of this dilemma, governments should act through the normal process of the courts without a hasty suspension of civil liberties.

Freedman (1986:19) criticizes two approaches; the police plus non-violent sanctions approach and the military approach. The first approach is widely supported, though with different degrees of conviction as to its adequacy. Even the many that have inclined very strongly to this view do not by any means reject all military action: they may well favor, for example, commando raids to release hostages or to seize hijackers.

The second approach is obviously more controversial for very good reasons. The record of what might be termed cross-border operations or military punitive responses to terrorist actions is not a particularly encouraging one. Difficulty with the military-punitive approach is that both its motive and its consequences are so easily misinterpreted. An action by one state may be intended to be totally defensive in character, but it can only too easily happen that a rival state interprets the same action as an extension of power, a threat or a challenge to its credibility. Also there is a danger that it may lead to a general decline in international standards. For instance, following the US attacks on Afghanistan, Israel began to punish Palestinian side by using same arguments such as destroying terrorist targets and weakening supporters of terrorism. Similarly Russia began to warn Georgia and accuse Chechens for similar reasons as well.

A final problem of the military-punitive approaches is with the choice of targets. It is not easy to select suitable targets for military raids, since relatively few targets are clearly and indisputably associated with terrorism (Freedman, 1986:19-22). It must be noted here that if there are visible targets, obviously the army can be used successfully. For example, after the Gulf war in 1991, control of Iraqi government in Northern Iraq collapsed and a power vacuum emerged. PKK militants seized this opportunity to take control of some areas in the region and started to use them as retreat and training grounds. Although there were, and still are, forces under the local tribal leaders, Mesud Barzani of Democrat Party of Kurdistan and Jalal Talabani of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, in Northern Iraq, they were not powerful enough to control all the region and above all they had fought with each other several times. Under these circumstances, Turkey had no option but to use military option against terrorist targets in Northern Iraq, as a result of which she was successful in weakening the position of terrorists in the region. However, it is very sensitive issue to select a target as it is highly likely that states can harm innocent people while trying to punish terrorists. Harming innocent people is not ethical and can led to loss of public support at home and

abroad. For instance US air forces hit a village in Afghanistan and several innocent people who had gathered for a wedding party were killed. This was criticised in the USA as well as in the world.

Military force is certainly not the answer to every terrorist challenge. Army involvement heightens public tension and leads to a feeling that the situation is getting out of hand. Therefore, military methods are usually unsuitable to handle the terrorist actions; a cat is better at catching mice than an automatic rifle. It is very difficult to know where, when and how terrorists will attack. Accordingly, states should use intelligence and special anti-terrorist units against terrorism rather than the regular armed forces. It must be noted here that these secret counter terrorism units must act within the law. Otherwise, because of their unlawful actions, these units can easily be labeled "terrorists". Liberal states must be careful in using special counter-terrorist groups against terrorism, as it is difficult to control these groups. Furthermore, if states fail to control these groups, this can cause a loss of public support.

While a cat is useful for catching mice, cats obviously are not competent to catch or kill a monster. In this case, a lion is necessary for a success. In the same manner, in Turkey, PKK, supported by states that consider Turkey as an enemy, became much greater than terrorist groups in international standards. In other words, in general, the PKK was bigger than other terrorist groups around the world. The PKK's basic strategy was to form a regular army. It attempted to gain public support in the region and to provoke the public to revolt against the Turkish state. Although weak coalition governments and frequent governmental changes weakened Turkish struggle, Turkish Army, Police and Intelligence continued their cause against terrorism and thus, PKK has failed to achieve its goals at this stage. However, innocent people of the region were negatively affected by the struggle between Turkish army and terrorists and in return Turkey was criticized at home and abroad.

The ability to address the public through the media is vitally important for terrorists. This is mainly because they need ever growing public support in order to survive over the years. However, while dealing with terrorist groups, to restrict the media is not a reliable solution in a liberal state because, experts on terrorism have noted, any attempt to impose media blackouts is likely to force terrorists to escalate the level of violence in order to attract more attention. Indeed, a ban on publicity would break down if terrorists demanded publicity in exchange for the lives of some hostages as was illustrated in February 1977, when Anthony Kiriatsis strapped a gun to the neck of a business executive, Michel Hall, in Indianapolis and threatened to blow off Mr. Hall's head unless he was given television coverage.

Rather than devoting their efforts to media blackouts, public officials could

more productively concentrate on developing closer working relations with the press in order to promote responsible journalism in the coverage of terrorism. The impact of media on terrorism should not be exaggerated. But on the other hand, the sort of coverage given to terrorism influence public opinion. If coverage focuses on the horrible nature of the terrorist acts, not on the proclaimed reasons for the deed, then the unacceptability of terrorism, no matter what its motivation is, emerges clearly. By pointing out a society's abhorrence of terrorism, the media can become important force in the battle against terrorism. Moreover, for example, in times of a hostage-taking crisis, media coverage can provide public officials with vital information since the media often have greater ability than state officials to get up close to the action and to report it quickly. Reporters also have greater access to the terrorists themselves, who often refuse to speak to government officials. Also, ample media coverage is vital for generating awareness of the magnitude of the terrorist threat. The media should not be viewed as potential enemies who would damage the anti-terrorism effort unless kept carefully in check. The media should instead be seen as likely allies who can contribute much towards the elimination of terrorism. By approaching the media as possible friends rather than as likely enemies, government officials can expect the media to be more sympathetic and open to their concerns.¹

To refuse negotiation with terrorists is not always a solution as terrorists holding hostages can force a democratic government to negotiate. If a democratic government then pretends that no negotiation took place, this helps the credibility of the terrorists rather than that of the democratic government. Although a non-negotiation policy is difficult to maintain during a hostage crisis, it can be said that a "no concessions" policy can be useful in the fight against terrorism. It used to be thought that such hostages situations presented the authorities with only two stark alternatives: either capitulation to the kidnappers demands to save lives of hostages or frontal assault on the kidnappers in order to catch or kill the terrorists at the probable cost of the hostages' lives. After 1975, it was realized that there was another option; standing firm breaking down the morale and will of the terrorist and forcing them to surrender peacefully without harm to the hostages. Irish security authorities tested this option in 1975. It was successful. Also, to negotiate with terrorists makes the government appear weak. The state may lose public support; ordinary people naturally begin to wonder who is running the country and what the next concession is going to be (Wilkinson, 1977:131). Terrorists usually use social and economic problems in order to justify their existence and activities. Therefore, instead of concession, governments should concentrate on solving these problems. If these problems are eliminated, terrorists will lose their instruments of justification and there will be no fertile ground for terrorism to flourish.

¹ For the media's role see; Clawson, P. (1987), "We need more but better coverage of Terrorism", *Orbis*, Winter.

It is clear by now that liberal states have great difficulty in implementing counter-terrorism strategies. Arie Ofri points out that the problems facing governments in their wars against terrorism can be divided into four categories; deterrence, intelligence and early warning, defense, and retaliation.²

Holsti (1992:235) explains deterrence thus: "...decision makers in one nation seek to prevent certain actions by potential adversaries by threatening them with military retaliation, [this] can be considered one of the means by which [a] nation attempt[s] to influence others". The concept of deterrence assumes that an enemy can be convinced that the cost of an attack exceeds the benefits. To judge whether this will be effective requires good knowledge of the specific terrorist group. However, it is very difficult to collect information about a specific terrorist group. Such a policy is clearly futile when the enemy has no identifiable assets against which to retaliate. To deter terrorists is a very difficult task as usually there are no visible targets. Therefore, a state that supports terrorists active in another country can be deterred, but not the terrorists themselves. In all cases, attempts to deter terrorists will create a host of legal and political problems. For example, as a response, imprisonment often leads to hostage taking. Imprisonment of captured terrorist as a deterrence alternative for future terrorist acts often leads to hostage taking. When the Swiss ambassador, Giovanni Buches, was kidnapped on 7 December 1970, his release was secured for the ransom of seventy terrorist movement prisoners (Holsti, 1992:130). Deterrence also generates the same problems as nuclear deterrence. Above all, as with nuclear deterrence, it presumes a "rational actor". It is assumed that all players have the "rational analysis" of calculating costs and benefits. However, the argument for deterrence is not so strong as human beings are rather passionate creatures. Miscalculation may emerge and it is rather questionable that the terrorists can have a rational mind in analyzing the situation. By their nature, it is difficult to expect a rational decision from terrorist groups.

From the perspective of intelligence organizations, most terrorist attacks can be regarded as extreme cases of potential surprise attacks. In trying to provide early warning, the intelligence community faces all the problems of a military surprise attack in highly accentuated form. Covert human intelligence is undoubtedly the most useful source of information about terrorism. But it is very difficult to insert an agent into terrorist organizations. The collection task is much more difficult against terrorist organizations than other types of enemies. Because of collection problems, information will be limited in quantity, from a small number of sources and will usually be of dubious reliability.

Intelligence work can be divided into three distinct levels. The collection of information (acquisition), analysis (its evaluation), and decision making. Richard

² See, Ofri, Arie (1984), "Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism", *Orbis*, Spring.

Betts (1978) remarks that in the best known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw materiel, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analysis, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. He further argues that the ultimate causes of error in most cases have been wishful thinking, cavalier, disregard of professional analysts and above all the premises and preconceptions of policy makers. Moreover, the intelligence function is hindered most by the structural characteristics of hierarchy, centralization and specialization. It is very difficult to analyze evidence that is very ambiguous. Uncertainty reflects inadequacy of data, but an excess of data can also aggravate ambiguity. In attack warning, there is the problem of noise and deception. When the problem is an environment that lacks clarity, an overload of conflicting data and lack of time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity abets instinct and allows intuition to drive analysis. Intelligence can fail because data are too permissive for policy judgment. Decision-makers require brief reports while intelligence submits sophisticated reports. Decision-makers are not without prejudice and this affects their assessment of intelligence reports.³

Two types of defense are usually recognized, active and passive. The problems of active defense (preventive or pre-emptive strike) are those of identification and early warning. Passive defense can be regarded as "target hardening" -raising barriers and monitored choke points, making unauthorized access more difficult, so delaying if not preventing hostile attacks. The financial costs, however, of such measures are high. It is also difficult to protect embassies, consulates, missions and residences without substantial interference in their work. One immediate by-product of increased protection, or reported increased protection, is that terrorist attention will focus on unprotected assets, installations, and people. For example, after the arrest of Öcalan, the leader of PKK, in February 1999, while Turkish security forces increased protection of important places, PKK bombed shops, private cars and so on. Then PKK changed its strategy and name and ended these attacks. Since terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime and the government cannot protect everything everywhere all the time, terrorists always retain a certain advantage (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989:417-418). Therefore, one may argue that instead of concentrating on passive defense, terrorists should be stopped before they attack a target by means of active defense. After September 11th attacks, US is trying to follow an active defense strategy. However, in doing this innocent people should not be harmed.

The fundamental problem of cross-border retaliation is political. Retaliation against states controlling, supporting or harboring terrorists is a political decision. Also, before retaliation there must be enough proof that the state in question

³ About intelligence failure see, Betts, Richard K. (1980-1981), "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.95, No.4, Winter; Betts, Richard K. (October 1978), "Analysis War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failure are inevitable", *World Politics*, Vol. 31; Betts R. (1982), *Surprise Attack*, Washington: Brookings Institution.

supports the terrorists, otherwise the political cost of retaliation can be very high.⁴ In most cases, the ties between terrorists and supporting countries are difficult to prove. However, in some cases these ties between terrorists and a supporting state can be very obvious and in this case retaliation can be successful. For instance, because of evident ties between Syria and the PKK, although Syria was not an easy state to punish, Turkey took the risk in 1998 and stated that unless Syria expelled Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey would hit Syria. Turkey's determined policy was very successful and Syria unwillingly expelled Öcalan. This process ended up with the Turkish security forces catching Öcalan. However, it is not certain that this kind of policy would work every time and there is no guarantee against escalation into full-scale warfare with the retaliated country.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Terrorism is an issue of international relations. As Brian Jenkins has suggested,

A combination of unique political circumstances with recent technological developments, allowing mass travel, instant communication and readily usable weaponry, has produced a situation in which complex social systems are more vulnerable to terrorism than in any previous period, and more attention is paid to it because of this vulnerability (Freedman, 1986:3).

According to Freedman (1986:3), trans-national terrorism challenges orderly international relations at least four senses.

First, it violently interrupts, or threatens to, the conduct of ordinary, everyday international life-from lunch at an embassy to a summit meeting. Second, when undertaken by non-state groups, it seems to undermine the rule of international society according to which states enjoy the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Third, when undertaken, or sponsored or encouraged, by states themselves, it seems to threaten the system of reciprocal restraint that underpins their own existence. Diplomatic immunity, the sanctity of agreements, non-interference- the principles which make possible the coexistence of states with different social systems- are not merely at risk from terrorist violence; they may also be the special target of it, as when the diplomats of other states are singled out as symbols of the operation of a corrupt system. Forth, if besides separate terrorist groups pursuing their separate purposes, there is also co-ordination among the groups in some kind of 'terror-international', then the security of the system as a whole might be under threat.

Examination of the likely causes of terrorist activity suggests that terrorism is not perceived by all to be a disease. Although while a state calls some one

⁴ See, Ofri, Arie (1984), "Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism", *Orbis*, Spring.

terrorist, some of other states can call the same person as liberator (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989:418-419). Moreover, as some terrorist groups are state sponsored, it is imperative to regard the sponsor state as terrorist accordingly. States may finance, train, equip and provide sanctuary for terrorists whose activities serve to their foreign policy objectives. They support the terrorist activities of movements espousing philosophies that they embrace or challenge the security of states that they see as enemies. The US for example accused the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya, Iran, N. Korea and Syria among others, for applying state terrorism. In much the same way the US was accused of sponsoring terrorist activities in Vietnam, Chile, and Nicaragua (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989:418-419).

It is usually claimed that PKK has been using Syria and a number of European countries, for instance, Greece, as safe heavens. In Turkey, it is usually believed that Armenian terrorist group, ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), has used France as a safe heaven in the past and carried out several terrorist activities against Turkish diplomats. It is usually claimed that Greece⁵ and Syria (Robins, 1991:49-53) use terrorism as an instrument of their foreign policies against Turkey. Turkey, Iraq and Syria are involved in the water dispute (Rowley, 1993:188).⁶ Iraq and Syria has been opposed to Turkey's South East Anatolian Project (GAP). Hence, it is argued that after the end of the Cold War the major threat to Turkey now comes from the South East, namely from Iraq and Syria and that this shift should be reflected in Turkey's new defense strategy (Kuniholm, 1991:40). In particular, Syria has been an important source of anxiety on the part of Turkey. Sezer (1992:234-235) pointed out that Syria was for a long time perceived as a source of threat due to its military association with the Soviet Union. A treaty of assistance between the two and the flow of sophisticated Soviet weaponry to Syria, together with the presence of the Soviet navy in the eastern Mediterranean, gave rise to a feeling of having been encircled by Soviet power to the north and the south. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, although the Soviet-Syrian connection was broken, there was a proliferation of sophisticated weaponry-ballistic missiles, chemical and nuclear weapons-in Turkey's immediate neighborhood,⁷ thus, Turkey's worries remained to exist. In 2000'sh, Syria has began to change her policy towards Turkey and especially new regime in Syria prefers to cooperate with Turkey rather than

⁵ Some other states can be added to this list, but these states are the most evident and the most important ones.

⁶ *The Economist*, 18 June 1987, pp.52-58. For Turkey's Peace Pipeline Project see, Duna, Cem (1988), "Turkey's peace Pipeline", Joyce R. Starr and C. Stoll, (Eds.), *The Politics of scarcity*, London: Westview Press, pp.119-124.

⁷ Turkish authorities single out three major problems between Turkey and Syria: first, Syrian support for the PKK; second, Syria's dissatisfaction with the amount of water Turkey releases from its dams on the Fırat (Euphrates) river; and third, Syria's claims on the Turkish province of Hatay - (the speech by the Head of the Foreign Policy Institute, Seyfi Taşhan, delivered at the meeting organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on 13-14 January 1992, "Turkey from Marginality to Centrality", *Turkish Review*, Vol.6, No.27, Spring 1992, p.53). See also Suha Bölükbaşı, (1993), "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: The Euphrates Dispute", *Journal of South Asian Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.16, No.4, Summer, pp.9-32; and Kamran Inan, (1989), "South-East Anatolian Project (GAP)", *Turkish Review*, Vol.4, No.20, Summer, p.53.

confront.

Turkey and Greece also have some problems. The disputes over Cyprus, the Aegean islands and the Turkish minority in Western Trace are just some of the major problems between Turkey and Greece. It is usually claimed in Turkey that to bargain with and weaken Turkey, Greece has been trying to use terror as a weapon. Relations between Greek diplomats and Öcalan and Öcalan's presence in Greek Embassy in Kenya just before he was captured were some obvious examples of ties between Greece and PKK. Greece's position as a member of the EU makes Greece's hostility against Turkey very effective because disputes between Turkey and Greece are becoming disputes between Turkey and the EU, and it is clear that Turkey will be under more pressure in the future (Bal, 2001:332-333; Bal, 1996:77).

The Turkish security forces claimed that, apart from Kurdish terrorists, there were Armenian and Syrian agents fighting under the umbrella of the PKK against Turkish security forces and also Greek and Syrian military officials had been training the PKK militants. These additional problems strengthen the terrorist threat against Turkey as combating terrorism turns to be a war against supporting states under the umbrella of terrorism. This trend can severely damage international system and world order.

States, which have been using the PKK as an instrument of their foreign policies, are successful to the extent that more than 30,000 people have lost their lives, Turkish domestic politics was put under the shadow of terrorism, the Turkish economy has been undermined and Turkish foreign policy has been constrained. There is widespread anger in Turkey, and demands from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the public, especially from families who lost their children in fight against PKK, for vigorous action to stop terrorism and protect Turkish citizens. The public is very sensitive about this issue and, therefore, each burial ceremony for a PKK victim turns into an anti-PKK demonstration. The Turkish public is also very sensitive about foreign support for or foreign indulgence of the PKK. For instance, Turkish police were hard pressed to control anti-Italian demonstrations as the public believed that Italy provided Öcalan with a safe heaven as it would neither hand him over to Turkey nor bring him before an Italian court. The public also protested against Italian goods.

Co-operation among states is very important because a state can strengthen its legal procedures for dealing with terrorists, improve its intelligence-gathering capacity and develop its protective and active defense. However, the impact of the best of these measures is limited with each state's border, severely so in a hostile environment. Acting collectively, states can provide better protection to each other, share intelligence, synchronize their laws and understanding and develop common diplomatic approaches to terrorism questions (Borg, 1988:11-

12). However, this co-operation must be serious. Unfortunately, there is an important barrier to this co-operation: competition for power in the world; perceiving and using terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy; a method by which states may pursue to achieve their objectives abroad.

In no aspect of terrorism is international co-operation more central than in dealing with problems arising outside the borders of the national states principally affected. These problems are compounded by the freedom of movement that is encouraged by democratic societies and by modern modes of transport. Thus, the ease with which terrorist based in one country can take refuge or sanctuary in another would decrease with the steps taken towards improved international co-operation. Vagueness of international law, too, serves to terrorism. Three key principles of international law-the right to self-determination, the right of asylum, and the policy of non-interference-have assisted terrorist groups. A terrorist group that is terrorizing a liberal state may find refuge in or even get support from other liberal states. And all these could still be considered acting within international law. Therefore, the key principles of international law must be redefined in order to stop terrorism.

Liberal democratic states, by their nature, are not only open for criticism from domestic groups, but also from the international public. They become more sensitive by the day towards criticism from abroad because of ever-complex international economic and social relations. However, when it comes to effective counter-terrorism strategies, this complex web of inter-dependent relationship becomes a limitation.

CONCLUSION

There are three important actors in terrorism: the state, the terrorists and the public audience. States must act within the domestic and international law otherwise they can themselves be regarded as “terrorists”. The main objectives of a counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and the maintenance of the liberal democracy, rule of law and upholding the state’s constitutional authority. The state must act within the domestic and international law and morality. However, there is no such self-restraint on terrorists, who have freedom of action in this regard. The public audience is the most important actor as both the state and the terrorists address the public audience. While implementing counter-terrorist strategies, the state should act within the law and it should not lose the public support.

Liberal states have great difficulty in implementing counter-terrorism strategies. The problems facing governments in their wars against terrorism can be divided into four categories; deterrence, intelligence and early warning, defense and retaliation. Deterrence presumes a “rational actor”. It is assumed that

all actors have the “rational analysis” of calculating costs and benefits. However, the argument for deterrence is weak, because it is questionable that the terrorists can have a rational mind in analyzing the situation. The concept of deterrence assumes that an enemy can be convinced that the cost of an attack exceeds the benefits. However, such a policy is clearly ineffective when the enemy has no identifiable assets against which to retaliate. Therefore, deterring terrorists is a very difficult task as usually there are no visible targets. Providing early warning is very difficult for the intelligence community. In comparison with other types of enemies, the collection task is much more difficult against terrorist organizations. Covert human intelligence is undoubtedly the most useful source of information about terrorism. But it is very difficult to insert an agent into terrorist organizations and it is also very difficult for an agent to survive within the terrorist organization. Because of collection problems, information will be limited in quantity, from a small number of sources and reliability of information will be open to the criticism. Decision-makers require brief reports while intelligence submits sophisticated reports. Decision-makers are not without bias and this affects their assessment of intelligence reports. Two types of defense usually are recognized: active and passive. The problems of active defense (preventive or pre-emptive strike) are those of identification and early warning. Passive defense can be regarded as “target hardening” and so delaying if not preventing hostile attacks. However, the financial costs of such measures can be very high and these measures can disturb residences. One immediate by-product of increased protection is that terrorist attention will focus on unprotected assets, installations, and people. Terrorists always retain a certain advantage as terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime and the government cannot protect everything everywhere all the time. Therefore, instead of concentrating on passive defense, terrorists should be stopped before they attack a target by means of active defense. Terrorists usually have no assets to be retaliated. But states that support the terrorist can be retaliated. The fundamental problem of retaliation is political. Retaliation against supporting states is a political decision. Before retaliation there must be enough evidences to prove that the state in question supports the terrorists, otherwise the political cost of retaliation can be very high. However, in most cases, the ties between terrorists and supporting countries are difficult to prove.

It is obvious that terrorism is a very difficult problem to solve. International and domestic law, the international system and public pressure, etc. limit liberal states. Also, states have no golden solution. There is no coherent and generally accepted philosophy in the name of which force can be organized against the violence of terrorists. States are in a dilemma. If there are visible targets, obviously the army can be used successfully. Otherwise, military force is

certainly not the answer to every terrorist challenge. Because of army involvement, public can begin to wonder that the situation is getting out of hand. An action defensive in character by one state can easily be interpreted by a rival state as an extension of power, a threat or a challenge to its credibility. There is a danger that it may lead to a general decline in international standards. Another problem is with the choice of targets. It is very difficult to select suitable targets for military raids, since relatively few targets are clearly and indisputably associated with terrorism. Therefore, army methods are usually inappropriate to handle the terrorist actions. It is very difficult to know where, when and how terrorists will attack. Therefore, states should use intelligence and special anti-terrorist units against terrorism rather than the army. It must be remembered that every terrorist struggle has unique elements. Therefore, there must be special counter-terrorism strategies for each group. It must be noted here that liberal states must be careful in using special counter-terrorist groups against terrorism, as it is difficult to control these groups. These secret counter terrorism units must act within the law. Otherwise, because of their illegal actions, these units can easily be labeled "terrorists". Furthermore, unless special counter-terrorist groups are properly controlled by states, these groups can cause a loss of public support.

The role of the media is important in terrorism. The media should be seen as likely allies who can contribute much towards the elimination of terrorism. If government officials approach the media as possible friends rather than as likely enemies, they can expect the media to be more sympathetic and open to their concerns. The sort of coverage given to terrorism can influence public. If coverage focuses on the horrible nature of the terrorist acts, not on the proclaimed reasons for the deed, then the unacceptability of terrorism, no matter what its motivation, emerges clearly. By focusing on society's abhorrence of terrorism, the media can become important instrument in the fight against terrorism.

"No concessions" policy can be useful in the fight against terrorism. This policy can be helpful to break down the moral and will of the terrorists. Negotiating with terrorists makes the government appear weak and the state may lose public support. Terrorists usually use social and economic problems in order to justify themselves. Therefore, instead of concession, governments should concentrate on solving these problems. If these problems are eliminated, terrorists will lose their instruments of justification and there will be no suitable base for terrorism to flourish.

International co-operation between states is very important for counter-terrorism strategies. Because of developments in technology, transportation and telecommunication, the importance of national borders has declined. Co-operation among states is very important because a state can strengthen its legal procedures for dealing with terrorists, improve its intelligence-gathering capacity

and develop its protective and active defense. However, the impact of the best of these measures is limited with each state's border, severely so in a hostile environment. Acting bilaterally, states can provide better protection to each other, share intelligence, synchronize their laws and understanding and develop common diplomatic approaches to terrorism questions. However, there are problems in international arena as well. For example, terrorism may be seen as an instrument of foreign policy or a method states directly pursue to achieve their objectives abroad. The international community must prevent terrorism from being used as a foreign policy instrument. Otherwise, the World order and international peace can be badly undermined.

In brief, the reasons that can cause terrorism must be found and states must try to eliminate these reasons. Unless the reasons (social, economic, political, etc.) that cause terrorism are eliminated and an international co-operation between states are emerged, terrorism will persist.

References

- Bal, İdris. (1996), "European Union, Turkic Republics and Turkish Dilemma", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol.49, No.1, January, pp.77.
- Bal, İdris. (2001), "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası İçin Türk Cumhuriyetleri'nin Önemi", İdris Bal, (Ed.), *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, ss.332-333.
- Betts R. (1982), *Surprise Attack*, Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Betts, Richard K. (1980-1981), "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.95, No.4, Winter.
- Betts, Richard K. (October 1978), "Analysis War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failure are inevitable", *World Politics*, Vol.31.
- Borg, P.W. (1988), "The Evolution of U.S. Anti-Terrorism Policy", C.N Livingstone and T. E. Arnold (Ed.), *Beyond the Iran Contra Crisis*, Lexington: Lexington Books, pp.11-12.
- Bölükbaşı, Süha. (1993), "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: The Euphrates Dispute", *Journal of South Asian Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.16, No.4, Summer, pp.9-32.
- Clawson, P. (1987), "We need more but better coverage of Terrorism", *Orbis*, Winter.
- Duna, Cem. (1988), "Turkey's peace Pipeline", Joyce R. Starr and C. Stoll (Ed.), *The Politics of scarcity*, London: Westview Press, pp.119-124.
- Freedman, Lawrence. (1986), *Terrorism and International Order*, New York: Routledge Kegan Paul Ltd., pp.19.
- Holsti, K.J. (1992), *International Politics*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, Inc., pp.235.
- İnan, Kamran. (1989), "South-East Anatolian Project (GAP)", *Turkish Review*, Vol.4, No.20, Summer, pp.53.
- Jenkins, Brian M. (1985), "Will Terrorists go Nuclear", *Orbis*, Fall, p.511.
- Kegley, Charles W. And Wittkopf, Eugene R. (1989), *World Politics*, New York: St. Martins Press, pp.416.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. (1991), "Turkey and the West", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No.2, Spring, pp.40.
- Laquer, Walter. (1986), "Reflections on Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs*, No:65, pp.88.
- Livingston, C. N. (1988), "New Media Strategies for Addressing Terrorism", C. N. Livingston and T. E. Arnold (Ed.), *Beyond the Iran Contra Crises*, Lexington: Lexington Books, pp.120.
- Ofri, Arie. (1984), "Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism", *Orbis*, Spring.
- Robertson, D. (1986), *Dictionary of Politics*, London: Penguin Books, pp.307.

- Robins, P. (1991), *Turkey and Middle East*, London: Pinter Publishers, pp.49-53.
- Rowley, Gwyn. (1993), "Multinational and National Competition for Water in the Middle East: Towards the Deepening Crisis", *Journal of Environmental Management*, Vol.39, No.3, November, pp.188.
- Seyfi Taşhan, Head of the Foreign Policy Institute, the speech delivered at the meeting organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs on 13-14 January 1992, "Turkey from Marginality to Centrality", *Turkish Review*, Vol.6, No.27, Spring 1992, pp.53).
- Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. (1992), "Threat Perceptions in Southern Europe: The Case of Turkey", Laszlo Valki (Ed.), *Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp.234-235.
- The Economist*, 18 June 1987, pp.52-58.
- Wilkinson, P. (1977), *Terrorism and Liberal State*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., pp.122-123.