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CYPRUS AS THE LAST PHASE OF HISTORICAL TURCO-GREEK CONFLICT

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Abstract

Greeks revolted against Ottoman rule in the 19th century and won their independence with actual support of the European industrialized great powers. Since the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece, this small state -again under the auspices of the Great Powers- constantly extended against Ottoman State for almost a century. Through the 1923 Population Exchange Convention between the two countries, new Turkey achieved to completely turkicize its regions where once Greeks were also inhabitants and Greece achieved to completely grecize the regions within its current boundaries except Western Thrace where there is still Turkish population. Turco-Greek relations were on friendly terms for a quarter century thereafter. However, Cyprus, -as an island under the domination of Britain- where Greek and Turkish communities used to live together, remained forgotten and untouched during the population exchange

between Turkey and Greece. When Enosis policy (unification of Cyprus with Greece) based on violence against Turkish Cypriots started to be implemented, Turkey and Greece once again encountered from mid 1950s. The island is 600 miles away from the Greek mainland while the distance between the island and the Turkish coasts is just 45 miles. The most important turning point in the Cyprus issue, which did not remain as a conflict between two parties and internationalized, was the Lancaster House Summit in 1955 as the basis of Zurich and London Treaties. Finally Turkey made a military intervention as a guarantor state in 1974 in terms of its right arising from Zurich and London Treaties. No violence or clash of arms has occurred on the island since then. The most basic result of Turkey's intervention is that it brought bizonality to the island. In 2004, as an another historical turning point in Cyprus, the plan of Kofi Annan which aimed to end the political division of the island was taken to referendum in both Greek and Turkish regions. The rate of Turkish Cypriot support appeared to be 64.90% while Greek Cypriot support was 24.17%.

Key Words: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Enosis, Johnson's Letter, Annan Plan Referendum.

Öz

19. Yüzyılda Yunanlılar Osmanlı yönetimine karşı ayaklandılar ve dönemin büyük güçlerinin fiili desteğiyle bağımsızlıklarını kazandılar. Küçük Yunan Krallığı kuruluşundan itibaren yaklaşık yüzyıl boyunca Osmanlı Devleti aleyhine olarak -yine Batılı devletlerin himayesinde- büyüdü. İki ülke arasında yapılan nüfus mübadelesi antlaşmasıyla yeni Türkiye bir zamanlar Rumların da nüfusun bir parçası olduğu bölgelerini tümüyle Türkleştirmeyi, Yunanistan ise Batı Trakya hariç olmakla bugünkü sınırlarını tümüyle Yunanlaştırmayı başardı. Bundan sonra yaklaşık çeyrek yüzyıl süresince Türk-Yunan ilişkileri dostane bir seyir takip etti. Bununla birlikte nüfus mübadelesi sırasında İngiltere egemenliğinde bulunduğu el değmemiş olarak kalan ve iki halkın birlikte yaşadığı bir bölge olan Kıbrıs adasının Yunanistan'la birleştirilmesine dönük şiddete dayalı politika (Enosis) iki ülkeyi 1950'li yıllardan itibaren yeniden karşı karşıya getirdi. Ada Yunan anakarasına 600 mil, Türk kıyılarına ise 45 mil mesafede bulunuyordu. Yalnızca bir Türk-Yunan sorunu olarak kalmayıp uluslararasılaşan Kıbrıs sorununda en önemli dönüm noktası Londra ve Zurich Antlaşmalarına temel teşkil edecek olan 1955 tarihli Lancaster House toplantısıdır. Sonuçta Türkiye Londra ve Zurich Antlaşmalarından doğan garantör devlet sıfatıyla 1974 yılında adaya askeri müdahalede bulunmuştur. O günden bu yana adada bir çatışma veya şiddet olayı yaşanmamıştır. Kıbrıs için Türk müdahalesinin getirdiği en temel sonuç iki kesimli bir ada profilinin ortaya çıkmasıdır. 2004'de ise bir diğer tarihi dönüm noktası olarak Kofi Annan'ın adadaki siyasi bölünmüşlüğü sona erdirmeye dönük planı Türk ve Rum kesimlerinde referanduma götürüldü. Plana Kıbrıslı Türkler %64.90 oranında destek verirken Rumların desteği %24.17 oranında kaldı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Türkiye, Yunanistan, Enosis, Johnson Mektubu, Annan Planı Referandumu.

Introduction: Historical Background of Turco-Greek Relations

Turco-Greek relations date much back in history. Non-Muslim nomad or semi nomad Turkic tribes like Pechenegs or Bulgarians had close relations with the Eastern Roman Empire. However, the neighborhood era of the Orthodox Greeks with the Muslim Turks opened in the 11th century when the Seljukis entered into Anatolia from the east by defeating the Eastern Roman Empire. Four centuries after the first encounter, Greeks, with some exceptions, almost as a whole people came under the domination of the Ottoman State in the 15th century. It was the role of the Ottoman rule which did not adopt the policy of assimilation besides the positive value imputed to the Greek language and civilization in the preservation of the Greek language and civilization for a period of nearly four hundred years without a political presence. La Gorce, who served as the French Envoy in Athens between 1855-1857, stated in his book "Les Grecs A Toutes Les Epoques" which broke the routine that prosperity was brought into Greece under Ottoman rule, and the Greeks were never able to find as tolerant rulers as Turks even among themselves.¹ Especially the Latin invasion in the 13th century left so negative effects on the people of "Constantinople" which would last for generations that, for instance Lucas Notaras, who was one of the most powerful statesmen during the conquest of Byzantium made his preference with his saying " *It is better to see in the city the power of the Turkish turban than that of the Latin tiara*", reported by a famous Byzantine historian Michael Ducas having an important place in the Byzantine Palace in the 15th century.²

The so-called Hellens in the 19th century were in fact a mixed breed of Albanian, Slavonic, and Latin origin, with but a slight tincture of Greek blood.³ They used to live together with Turks as neighbors for centuries. Turks constituted the majority of the population -where especially there was urban settlement- in the large geography from Peloponnese to Crete within today's Greece borders, as in most part of the Balkans. However, non-Muslim elements were densely populated taking place in the countryside throughout the Balkans. Nevertheless, it should be noted as a remarkable demographic change that the rate of Turkish population started decreasing among general population of the Balkans when military defeats of Ottoman State started against the European forces. The reliability of this information which is attributed to Western voyagers and observers travelled and lived in Ottoman State by today's Western resources may be questioned, however, it seems logical considering the increasing mortality due to the extending wars and that militant

¹ La Gorce, **Çağlar Boyu Yunanlılar (Les Grecs A Toutes Les Epoques)**, çev. Doğu Araştırma Merkezi, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1986, p. 397.

² Alexander Alexandrovich Vasiliev, **History Of The Byzantine Empire**, University Of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1952, p. 647.

³ Phillips, W. Alison, **The War Of Greek Independence**, Elder Smith & CO., London, 1897, p. 3.

forces were predominantly Muslim-Turkish originated. Therefore mainly extending wars are indicated as a reason for the decrease in the Turkish population. Moreover, as again an appropriate finding, it should be underlined that feeding of Ottoman State in terms of Turkish population through immigration of central Asian Turkic tribes was hindered because of Safavid Iran.⁴ Similarly, in the context of some Balkan peoples including Greeks appeared with political demands which became effective in the 19th century, the first two factors coming to minds are that they found strong actors that would support them against Ottoman rule and the powerful motivation of the nationalism idea. -As a third factor that shall not be escaped from the attention- the demographic situation change in their favor mentioned above could be considered as an important background for the rising self-confidence of non-Muslim elements.

Even before the modern capitulations that were believed to make Christians in Ottoman State have their rights, there was freedom for the non-Muslims to exercise their religions, to have education in any type, and to save money. In so much that they not only had the right to promote in their church hierarchy without any government involvement, but also had opportunities to take charge in the Ottoman governance and have promotion. In Ottoman State, peasantry had better conditions than those living in most part of Europe had. When serfdom was still available almost universally for Christendom, it was not a matter for those under Turkish domination, and cultivators including Christians enjoyed the welfare that other peasantry -in the communities considered more civilized- were out of touch. Therefore, it is not true to think that Greeks revolted due to "Turkish despotism." Quite the contrary, diminishing control of Turkish governance and gradually increasing welfare of Greek community made the Greek revolt possible and even unavoidable.⁵ Greeks were so free that they both got richer through trade activities and established churches and enhanced their religious organizations at their will, and they opened their own schools not only in Peloponnese and Epirus but also in Western Anatolia and Black Sea coasts. As different from the development of Slavic peoples in the Balkans, Greek people -by getting richer through trade activities- formed a diaspora in Europe. They settled in some coastal towns in Europe and Russia and established foundations and made their children have education in Europe. It is not a coincidence that Philike Hetairia was established in Odessa seven years before the rebellion, a town in the Black Sea coast of Russian Empire. To realize how favorable conditions Ottoman Greeks had, comparing their situation -for instance- with the situation of Ionian Greeks who stayed out of the Ottoman rule is enough. When Britain took the control of Ionian Islands located along the Western coast of Greek mainland from France, it was seen that the moral condition of the Greeks on these islands was much worse than the moral condition their agnates under Ottoman rule in the mainland. Ionian

⁴ Peter F. Sugar, **Southeastern Europe Under Ottoman Rule**, University Of Washington Press, 1977, Printed in the USA, p. 222.

⁵ Phillips, W. Alison, **ibid**, p. 8.

Greeks, together with their social institutions formed by first Venice and then French governance, were quite far away from having autonomy so as to rule their own social institutions. Public order on the islands was very bad. When France invaded the islands after removing Venice, murder was the most common crime and every day of the year a murder case was experienced.⁶

Greek Rebellion, the Emergence of Independent Greece and Greek Expansion

“The Turks of Greece left few traces. They disappeared suddenly and finally in the spring of 1821 unmourned and unnoticed by the rest of the world. Years later, when travellers asked about the heaps of stones, the old man would explain, ‘There stood the tower of Ali Aga, and there we slew him, his harem and his slaves.’ It was hard to believe then that Greece had once contained a large population of Turkish descent, living in small communities all over the country, prosperous farmers, merchants, and officials, whose families had known no other home for hundreds of years. As the Greeks said, the moon devoured them.”⁷

The Greek independence resulted in that Turks, having lived in Peloponnese for centuries where the modern Greece was established, went out of existence: *“The orgy of genocide exhausted itself in the Peloponnese only when there were no more Turks to kill.”⁸* However, since this independence was the result of Russian-British-French coalition rather than being the result of Greek revolt, Greeks became independent against Ottoman State by gaining their independence, but they were so bound to Russia, Britain and France that no Greek person could be the king of the newborn Greek Kingdom. Catholic Otto, the Prince of Bavaria was imported as the King to rule Greece, on whom Russian-British-French coalition agreed.

A small Greek Kingdom was established in 1832, however, majority of the Greek people was left under the Ottoman domination. The motivation to collect all the Greeks under Greek flag is so irresistible that –from the view of the Greeks– neither the cease of international support after the War of Independence, nor the power inequality arising from the superiority of Ottoman State and smallness of Greece would lead intimidation. Young Greek Kingdom had established offices dealing with the territories of Ottoman State, where Greek population settled since its foundation.⁹ This powerful motivation in Greece would be formulated and converted into a national ideal. Ideologist of Megali Idea (Great Idea) was Ioannis Kolettis.

⁶ George Finlay, **The History Of Greece Under Othoman And Venetian Domination**, William Blackwood And Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1856, p. 340.

⁷ William St. Clair, **That Greece Might Still Be Free, The Philhellenes In The War Of Independence**, Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, 2008, p. 1.

⁸ William St. Clair, **ibid**, p. 12.

⁹ Psomiades, Harry, J., **The Eastern Question The Last Phase**, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1968, pp. 18-19.

Prime Minister Kolettis, who gave a speech to National Assembly in January 1844, formulated "Megali Idea" as follows: *"The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece. It constitutes only one part, the smallest and the poorest. A Greek is not only a man who lives within this kingdom but also one who lives in Jannina, in Selonica, in Serres, in Adrianople, in Constantinople, in Smyrna, in Trebizond, in Crete, in Samos, and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race... There are two main centres of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Greek kingdom, and 'The City' (Constantinople), the dream and hope of all Greeks."*¹⁰

In spite of power inequality between both countries, surprisingly, Greece constantly extended against Turkey until 1922. Greece gained the first land acquisition against Turkey in 1881 without war. When European lands of Ottoman State were being shared after the Turkish defeat in 1877-1878 Turco-Russian War, the Great Powers left Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. In spite of the precise defeat of Greece in Turco-Greek War in 1897 (known as Thirty Day War), Greek Prince George (in Turkish=Yorgi) was appointed as governor to Crete by Ottoman State under pressure from Great Powers. Thus Greece took Crete not formally but practically and Ottoman State went down in history as a country which won the war but lost land as a result. Greece, by allying with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro against Ottoman State in 1912-1913 Balkan War I, almost doubled its lands. Eventually, while Ottoman State -as one of the defeated multi-national empires of the World War I- was entirely being purged and dismembered, Greece started Anatolian venture under the aegis of Britain. Although it had captured Western Anatolia and Eastern Thrace since 1919, it was severely beaten in 1922 and forced to fall back to Greek mainland.

Turco-Greek Relations In The Post-Ottoman Period

Undoubtedly the fact that the dominating power Turks, within a century after the Greek Rebellion, fell into a situation which they were obliged to fight for saving Anatolia from a Greek invasion cannot be explained with Greek magic. This process - which developed as a Greece centered issue against Ottoman State- was joint in a more comprehensive process, which was the Eastern Question; and Greece was just one of the instruments to resolve the Eastern Question which was exceeding its national/political objectives.¹¹ With the collapse of Ottoman State, this historical problem was resolved, process of the Eastern Question ended. With an additional protocol (January 30th 1923) to the Treaty of Lausanne which is the international legal document of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Greek minority population in Turkey except Greeks settled (établi) in boundaries of İstanbul before October 30th 1918 and except Western Thracian Turks in Greece would be subjected to a compulsory mutual migration (population exchange). Process of population exchange

¹⁰ Elaine Thomopoulos, **The History of Greece**, Greenwood, California, 2012, p. 81.

¹¹ "...one ever-recurring question is sure to turn up : the eternal " Eastern Question." ...up starts again the everlasting topic, the never-failing difficulty : "What shall we do with Turkev?" Karl Marx, **The Eastern Question**, Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling, Swan Sonnenschein &CO. Lim., London, 1897, p. 2.

which started in 1923 was very problematic and humanistically dramatic. Of course, from a humanistic point of view it was a tragedy to take millions of people out of the lands where they were born and where were considered as their homeland for generations. However, this population exchange was in favor of political interests of both sides. Turkish and Greek parties in the Population Exchange Commission had a severe conflict arising from the interpretation difference in the subject of "Établi" that means "the ones settled". Greece was trying to leave Greeks as many as possible in İstanbul. Still they had an idea of making İstanbul one day again Constantinople in their minds. The issue became such important that Greece applied to Nations League, and then the issue was brought to Permanent Court of International Justice. However, no binding result came out here. The situation was so delicate, thus, Turkish Government did not hesitate to expel the Orthodox Patriarch after Constantine Araboğlu (Terkos Metropolitan, born in Bursa) was selected as the Patriarch. Greece also started dispossing Western Thracian Turks' properties. In response to this, Greeks in İstanbul started to be dispossessed as well. Tension increased and risk of war appeared. Eventually, the party stepping back was Greece. Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece noticed that the party that would suffer the consequences more would be Greece if the problem became severe, and preferred to break the ice. Venizelos' this attitude was positively responded by Ankara and an agreement was signed to solve the exchange problems in June 10th 1930. However, the approval of all the Greeks (including the ones born out of İstanbul and settled in İstanbul after October 30th, 1918) in İstanbul as "établi" in the agreement gives the impression that Greek argument gained importance. Justification of Patriarch Constantine Araboğlu's deportation in 1925 seemed to disappear through this agreement for the Turkish side. Venizelos made a historical visit to Turkey in October 1930. In Ankara, three agreements were signed between the two states. Constant hostility prevailing for a century seemed to take a break. Actually, both countries had no reason to fight any more. Both parties were satisfied with the situation reached. Turkey achieved to turkicize Anatolia through population exchange, and Greece achieved to grecize Turkish lands that it captured since 1881 except Western Thrace. Moreover, both Turkey and Greece were among the anti-revisionist countries at the beginning of 1930. That is to say, they supported the balance emerged after World War I. Turkey was in war almost constantly between the years of 1911-1922 and all its sources particularly human were exhausted, and it needed an absolute peace as a country ruined thoroughly. It had an area which could be considered as large in comparison with its minor population. It was already too glad to content with what it had. Greece was already a hormonal state that grew more than its capacity and was trying to protect what it had. It can be said that it realized Megali Idea not wholly but partially. Moreover, Greece was the addressee of territorial claims of its revisionist neighbors Bulgaria and Albania. This time, international balances pushed Turkey and Greece

not to be against each other, but to be together. Turkish Prime Minister İnönü returned the visit of Venizelos in 1931. The first of the series of Balkan conferences was held in Athens in 1930. The second, third and fourth conferences were held in İstanbul in 1931, Bucharest in 1932 and Thessaloniki in 1933 respectively. Finally, the fruit of the series of Balkan conferences started being picked and the Balkan Entente was signed by Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in February 9th 1934.

Cyprus As A Present Day Turco-Greek Problem Field

Turkey and Greece had spent an unproblematic period from the 1930s for almost a quarter century. The conditions prevailing before and after the World War II pushed both neighbors to be unproblematic, even friendly and allied. Such that after the World War II, they, together, received support of the United States under Truman Doctrine. This support for Turkey had rather the meaning that Turkey would never be left alone against Soviet Union, but for Greece it was a savior, and Greece got rid of the communists who came into power during the civil war by means of this support. Two neighbors as the addressee of the support by means of Truman Doctrine later started receiving American support named "Marshall Support". Greece received a support amounting 366 million dollars and Turkey 137 million dollars, respectively between the years of 1948-1951.¹² Both countries together became the members of NATO in 1952. As noticed, world conjuncture pushed Turkey and Greece to be allied, however, when Megali Idea, the ever-present sickness of Greece, recurred after the World War II, problematic fields started emerging one by one. It is possible to classify these extant problem fields in two categories: Territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf, flight information region, armament of the eastern Aegean islands as the Aegean Sea oriented problems and Cyprus conflict.

When Ottoman State as a global power of its era directed towards Cyprus that had strategic importance in the Western Mediterranean, it did not find a Greek political existence, but Venice against itself, and took possession of Cyprus from Venice. Cyprus was conquered by Ottomans in 1571 and turned to be a new Turkish homeland through classic Ottoman settlement policy. 307 Years after the conquest, the island was temporarily leased to Britain in turn of its political support at the end of 1877-1878 Turco-Russian War. However, Britain declared annexation as a response when Ottoman State entered the World War I on the side of Germany. This de facto situation became de jure through the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923:

"Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914." Article 20.

Greece raised the Cyprus issue after the World War II. Communists in the leadership of General Marcos in guerrilla war against Greek central government were supported by Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Parallel to Greek civil

¹² Roy Gardner, **The Marshall Plan Fifty Years Later**, The Marshall Plan, Edited by Martin A. Schain, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p. 120.

war, communist Greeks on the island became involved in Enosis attempt (annexation, unification with Greece). In terms of the worldwide political balances going far beyond the internal affairs of Greece, the goal of attempt to realize "Enosis" of Cyprus to a probable communist Greece was to remove Britain from Cyprus and was to create a communist base in the Mediterranean. At the beginning of 1950s Turkish press analyzed the development on the island correctly and in the first page news it was said "a powerful communist minority try to make this strategic island of Britain, of great importance in the Mediterranean, a Greek Self-Government" under the title of "Cyprus Communists Getting Ready For Revolution On The Island"¹³ and informed the Turkish public opinion. Realization of this goal would be a great gain for Soviet Union. As an ever present Russian dream, it would go down to warm seas this time through Cyprus that may be regarded as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Thus, it would gain a very advantageous ground to have an access to Middle East. Enosis of Cyprus dream of Greek communists also appealed to conservative/nationalist Greeks from their own point of view. Therefore, a Cyprus agenda had emerged in Greece after the World War II. Particularly when Dodecanese Islands were left to Greece after the retreat of Italy as one of the defeated countries of World War II from Aegean Sea in 1947, Greek irredentism (Megali Idea) resurrected. Greek Government and public opinion laid their eyes on Cyprus. Even in this early stage of the Cyprus issue, American diplomats realized its potential of destabilizing Greek relations with Britain and Turkey.¹⁴

Due to the geostrategic location of the island and since there existed approximately 120 thousands Turkish Cypriots, it could not be expected that Turkey would stay irrelevant to the Greek demands which started being raised. However, Turkish governments appeared to be avoidant to deal with the Cyprus issue from 1947 up to 1955. It was because of the fact that actual agenda of the governments was to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country against Soviet danger until 1952, and until 1954, an agenda of maintaining the friendly relationship with Greece in order not to endanger the Balkan alliance to be formed. During this period, not the Turkish governments but the Turkish public opinion and press were the ones who kept the issue in the agenda. In Turkish public opinion, it was asserted that if Britain would move from the island, the island should have been given to Turkey being the former and real owner of the island.¹⁵ Besides, it attracts the attention as a development regarding to Cyprus in 1949 that 12 fighter aircraft of Turkish Air Forces Command visited the island upon the invitation of Britain. Cyprus flight of the Turkish fleet was declared in the newspaper namely "Halkın Sesi" as "We embrace

¹³ *Milliyet*, 05.05.1950, p. 1.

¹⁴ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*, Hurst&Company, London, 1999, p. 176.

¹⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Cilt I, 10. Baskı, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara, 1994, pp. 529-530, 533.

Turkish Pilots. Long live Turkish Eagles. Welcome Turkish Air Force Fleet." The Greek party considered this event, which was performed peacefully upon an invitation, as a rehearsal of annexation of the island to Turkey and even some Greek Cypriots abandoned the island with this fear. It was not forgotten that France left Hatay to Turkey in 1939, and same thing might happen for Cyprus and this time Britain might leave Cyprus to Turkey with a bilateral agreement.¹⁶ On the other hand Greece applied to Britain and demanded the island in 1951 but did not receive a positive response. If Britain left Cyprus to Greece through a bilateral agreement as Italy did by leaving Dodecanese Islands to Greece, Turkey would not have so much to say. However, Britain did not have any desire to move away from Cyprus and Britain itself lured Turkey into Anglo-Greek conflict because Greece applied to the United Nations in 1954 and demanded the right of self-determination in the island. In such condition Britain was seen as a rude invader who historically had no right to lay a claim on the island due to the fact that there were no British people residing on the island. Britain played an intelligent diplomacy game by inviting Turkey to the stage, which had ethnically a relative community on the island as Greece had.

Britain invited Turkey together with Greece to Cyprus Conference in 1955. In London, British Greek and Turkish parties convened and started negotiating the situation. However, Britain, who tried to restrain the Greek claims, disappointed with Turkey's policy of demanding nothing and taking the part of maintenance of existent status quo (Cyprus being dependent to Britain). Determination of Semih Günver from the Turkish Committee visiting London in August 1955 about the intention and concerns of Britain are remarkable: *"British Government expected an advantage by putting us against Greece regarding Cyprus problem. However, it did not desire the issue to come to a point that might create a risk of war between two members of NATO. Since, in that case, it would lose the initiative, and this event would cause the intervention of NATO, or rather of America."*¹⁷ Probably, Britain should have expected Turkey not blindly supporting the status quo but claims of Turkey with a high level that would conflict with those of Greece. Thus, Britain could justify its existence with an arbiter role to be prevailed against the claims of both parties to protect the balances. When the things went opposite way, Britain became flexible in favor of Greek thesis and accepted to grant autonomy to the island. EOKA (the paramilitary force of Enosis idea in Cyprus) terrorism, which officially began in April 1st 1955, was supported by Greece and intensified from the beginning of 1956. Terrorist attacks started saking the British rule on the island. Britain sent a special representative to determine the constitution of an autonomous government to be founded on the island. Special Representative Lord Radcliffe prepared a report after having performed investigations on the island and submitted it to British Ministry of Colonies. The fact that two different communities were living on the island was stated in this report. British Minister of Colonies, in his

¹⁶ Hulusi Kaymaklı, **Havacılık Tarihinde Türkler 4**, Hava Basım ve Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 2005, pp. 63-65.

¹⁷ Semih Günver, **Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü**, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 1985, p. 64.

speech that he performed in the House of Commons, indicated the division of the island among two communities as one of the solution alternatives. British authorities' this attitude was a milestone for Cyprus. From that date, Turkish government started supporting "partition" thesis. After 1957, Turkish government both attempted to adapt its public opinion to this idea and intensified its efforts in this way at Britain and Greece. In the session of Grand National Assembly of Turkey dated on 28th December 1956, where heated debates occurred, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes explained Cyprus policy of Turkey by stating that:

"My dear friends, Turkey and Turkish people have inalienable rights on the island. ...Cyprus is located 600 miles away from Greece, and 45 miles away from Turkish coasts. Since our most important harbors are Mediterranean harbors, they would have the control. That is to say, we would give the control of our harbors to strangers and would hand over the reins. ...We support the division of the island. We do not only stand for the division. No other solution can be implemented which is more unfavorable than this. Nobody can even think to force Turkey to another solution than division of the island. ...In the issue of division of the island, we cannot consign our population of 120 thousand people to foreigners. We consider it compulsory that our patrol, our outstation should absolutely be present on this land protecting the security of 25 million people.¹⁸ Indeed only one voice was coming out of Turkish public opinion, which had been adapted to partition thesis, in the beginning of 1958: "Either partition or death!"¹⁹

Upon complete deterioration of the situation on the island, Turco-Greek and Anglo-Greek relations got tensed up, and it even started affecting adversely Anglo-Turkish relations as well. The risk of weakening the southeastern wing of NATO because of its three allied members' becoming problematic as part of such a problem triggered The United States. Firstly, Turkish and Greek parties convened in Zurich on 5-11th February 1959, and as a result of negotiations at the level of Prime Minister, it was decided to found an independent Cyprus Republic. According to the agreement, an arrangement taking also Turkish Cypriots' existence under protection was made; therefore Turkish Cypriots gained a political identity at international level. Turco-Greek agreement in Zurich was certified as "Treaty of London" on 19th February 1959, after being signed by Britain, Turkey and Greece, as well as the representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London. Zurich and London Treaties were quite successful agreements in favor of Turkey, and they are in fact a triumph of diplomacy. Thus, while Turkey was a state without any expectation other than sustaining the status quo from Lausanne until a short while ago (1955), from 1959 rights arising from international law and agreements connected Turkey with the fate of Cyprus. According to this, Turkey, just like Britain and Greece, was establishing an organic

¹⁸ **TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi**, Devre:X, Cilt:15, İçtima:3, İnikat: 22, Celse:2, 28.12.1956, pp. 352-353.

¹⁹ Armaoğlu, **ibid**, p. 532-533.

link with independent Cyprus Republic and gained the status of being one of the three guarantor states of the constitutional order on the island appeared through Zurich and London Treaties. Eventually, Turkey became entitled to deploy a military force of 650 soldiers as its right generating from the said treaties (Greece was entitled to deploy 950 soldiers). The symbolic meaning of that Turkish army returned after 90 years to the island which actually stayed under sovereignty of Ottoman State for more than three hundred years (1571-1878) and was legally separated from Turkey in Lausanne (1923), is of great importance. Cyprus adventure would continue without any meaningful development from 1959 until 1963.

Britain is seen to have overcome the process of Cyprus issue developed after the World War II by protecting its benefits. It both preserved its strategical benefit on Cyprus and evaded the burden of virtually governing the problematic island. As a diplomacy mastery, Britain brought the justifiable demands of Turkey forefront against those of Greece, and thus it turned the problem focused on its inexplicable presence on the island to be a Turco-Greek conflict. In this process, the real loser was Greece. While it desired Enosis of Cyprus, Zurich and London Agreements made this goal of Greece impossible.

Towards The Cyprus Peace Operation

The Constitution of Cyprus Republic developed by means of London and Zurich Treaties stipulated Turkish and Greek sides to establish Public Assemblies (Communal Chambers) for the issues concerning with their own; and for the common issues, the execution of a structure based on presidential system. The President, who is the head of executive power would be Greek, and vice-president would be Turkish. A cabinet would be constituted by 10 people, 3 of whom would be Turkish; 30% of House of Representatives with fifty members would be Turkish as well, and mixed courts would be established to hear the cases of both Turks and Greeks. It was resolved that security would be commonly maintained by both parties. 60% of the army and 70% of the police and gendarmerie would be formed from Greek Cypriots, the rest of the security forces would be formed from Turkish Cypriots.²⁰ However, it was seen in a short while that the agreement that was reached in the covenant did not fulfill the actual expectations. As mentioned above, the constitution of Cyprus Republic developed on basis of London and Zurich Treaties turned to be a powerful obstacle for Enosis and Greeks needed to get rid of such "bottleneck". It is understood from the developments that Greeks adopted a method of using violence to make constitutional order inoperative.²¹ Although both communities are required to have separate municipalities in five big cities of Cyprus according to the constitution, Greeks attempted to establish only one municipality through a fait accompli.²²

²⁰ **Cyprus**, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1960, pp. 91, 110, 118, 141, 150.

²¹ Mehmet Gönlübol vd., **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara, 1996, pp. 365-371.

²² **Cyprus Constitution (1960). Article 173:** " *Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of the Republic, that is to say, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos by the Turkish inhabitants thereof:*

Makarios had applied for 13 constitutional amendments accepted by neither Turkish Cypriots nor Turkey. Then, Greeks put Akritas Plan into implementation in 1963 with the belief that they would be able to solve the(ir) problem through an effective suppression and intimidation action. Akritas is the alias of Polikarpos Yorgacis, who was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. According to a news of a Greek journal named *Patris*, Minister of Internal Affairs Yorgacis was the one standing behind the bloody assaults performed against Turkish Cypriots.²³

*“Archbishop Makarios, in December 1963, proposed amendments to the Constitution including abrogation of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. Not surprisingly, these proposals were regarded by the minority community as an attack on their safeguards. Their rejection of the amendments was followed almost immediately by large-scale intercommunal violence in which up to 500 people were killed. The majority of the casualties were Turkish Cypriots. Also, 103 Turkish Cypriot villages were attacked and 30000 Turkish Cypriots made refugees.”*²⁴

Upon this wave of violence directed to Turkish Cypriots in Christmas 1963 (the Bloody Christmas)²⁵, Turkish Air Force flied over Cyprus to show the determination of Turkey. However, after a short while of astonishment arising from the fear from Turkey, Greek Cypriot fanatics attempted to finish their intention which they left unfinished in Christmas 1963, and continued the terrorist campaign against the Turkish Cypriot minority in the beginning of 1964 as well. Greece refused the offer made by Turkey for reinforcing Turkish and Greek military units to ensure the security on the island. Instead, it let EOKA Militias make their meetings in Athens. Britain and the United States were involved and suggested to deploy a NATO force to the island. This offer was conditionally accepted by Turkey but firmly refused by the Greek side. Actually, Makarios was getting out of his depth. He, as the President of Cyprus Republic, preferred to form a close relationship with Soviet Union to the NATO force to be deployed on the island. When bomb attacks were organized to the US Embassy and Averof Hotel where the personnel in charge in the US Embassy

Provided that the President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall within four years of the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution examine the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the aforesaid towns shall continue.

2. The council of the Greek municipality in any such town shall be elected by the Greek electors of the town and the council of the Turkish municipality in such town shall be elected by the Turkish electors of the town.” **Cyprus**, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1960.

²³ **Milliyet**, 13.04.1966, p. 1.

²⁴ John Terence O’Neill and Nicholas Rees, **United Nations Peacekeeping in The Post-Cold War Era**, MPG Books Ltd., Great Britain, 2005.

²⁵ *“On Christmas Eve many Turkish Cypriot people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes, including the wife and children of the Turkish Cypriot head of army medical services - allegedly by a group of forty men, many in army boots and greatcoats.”*

The Guardian, December 31th 1963.

settled, on February 4th, 1964, the United States started evacuating its citizens on the island. EOKA militia attacks constantly went on, and Turkish press published photos displaying killed Turks. The issue became a situation that could not be tolerated by Turkish Government without doing anything. On February 15th and March 14th, journals in Turkey appeared with the headlines stating that Turkish troops on the landing ships and navy were ready. The United Nations Security Council intervened in the issue and decided to deploy Peace Force to Cyprus.

Makarios kept the real surprise for April. He declared that he cancelled the Alliance Agreement included in the agreement packages in London and Zurich Treaties on behalf of Cyprus Republic in April 4th. Makarios and Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou who came together after 10 day of this event, declared that they agreed on self-determination issue. Papandreou declared that he would “plump for” rightful matter of Greek Cypriots.²⁶ Therefore, Greece turned the issue to be a Turco-Greek conflict going beyond the island through supporting the terrorist attacks addressed to Turkish Cypriots which had been considered as an action of fanatic Greek Cypriots thus far.

It can be said that Cyprus issue completely captured the foreign policy of Turkey as from 1964. Ankara took the final decision to intervene in Cyprus under a circumstance where international law and treaties were disregarded, and constitution was not recognized, and terrorist attacks were going on against Turkish Cypriots, where the photos of killed Turkish Cypriots appeared on the press, and where it became impossible to stand by without doing anything. The date of intervention was decided to be June 7th 1964.²⁷ However, decision of intervention was abandoned as a result of a warning letter by the US President Johnson and of the contacts performed by NATO Chief Commander General Lemnitzer through his immediate visit to Ankara. In his letter dated on June 5th, 1964, US President Johnson reminded particularly that responsibility of consultation with the United States had to be accepted fully, regarded Turkey’s making preparations for an intervention as a disappointment and made an implicit threat emphasizing that the United States might not have had any opportunity to negotiate about that if they had an obligation to protect Turkey in case of a potential Soviet aggression. Explicit statement of that the arms which Turkey took from America would not be used in Cyprus was undoubtedly the most annoying part of the letter by Johnson. In the letter, it was stated that these arms were provided to be used against any attacks addressing to independency of Turkey and that it was mentioned number of times that this condition was explicitly known by Turkish authorities.²⁸ Letter of President Johnson made a deep wound in Turco-American relations having developed based on exact trust since days of Truman Doctrine and it caused a deep confidence crisis. Cyprus

²⁶ *Milliyet*, 14. 04. 1964, p. 1.

²⁷ Nihat Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık, Ankara, t.y., p. 300.

²⁸ <http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html> (original letter of President Johnson)

issue started to poison the Turco-American relations. Although there was generally no anti-Americanism existing in Turkish public opinion except radical left wing groups thus far, this situation would turn to be an infinite fuel for radical left wing groups to be used in anti-Americanism propaganda.²⁹

In the summer of 1964, Turkey became aware that it was alone in terms of Cyprus issue. Prime Minister İnönü, who went to the United States to discuss with Johnson about the issue, was faced with American barrier against a potential Turkish intervention. İnönü was responded in the similar way in London and Paris that he visited. Three Western capitals had an attitude against a potential Turkish intervention. However, Greece increased the number of its soldiers on the island to ten thousands. On the same days, there appeared news that Greece Prime Minister would visit the island. The problem went beyond the island, it was obviously seen that Greece embarked on an actual operation. Interesting solution alternatives were attributed to the United States and Britain, such as an island in the Aegean Sea or Western Thrace would be granted to Turkey in return for that it backed down from Cyprus. Another alternative appeared on the press was granting Karpass peninsula of the island to Turkey as hush money. Kostopulas, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, stated that his government would not think to give even one inch of land and that the conflict became so severe because the principle of that a country could be governed not by the minority but the majority, was ignored.³⁰ That is to say he considered Turkish community on the island as a simple minority and disregarded the Zurich and London Treaties which he concluded. It is very uncommon to observe such an obvious backing down within a very short while.

Attempts to find a solution to Cyprus issue began again in July 1964 in Geneva through mediation of American former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. During the negotiations between Turkey, Greece and Britain, Acheson Plan was brought to the agenda. According to this, Karpass Peninsula was offered to Turkey and it was suggested to found autonomous Turkish administrations in some regions where Turkish Cypriots were the majority. However, Greek attacks did not cease while the negotiations were going on in Geneva. Upon genocide attempt in Erenköy (Kokkina Exclave) and Mansura regions towards Turkish Cypriots, Turkey executed restrained air operations over the island on August 8th and August 9th, 1964. During the operation one Turkish fighter aircraft crashed. Although Cengiz Topel, the pilot of the fighter aircraft rescued from the crash, he was captured by Greek militants and was killed through torture.³¹ The importance of this bombardment was that Turkey at least

²⁹ Savaş Açikkaya, **Solun Türk Devrimiyle İmtihani, Paraf yay.**, İstanbul, 2011, p. 64.

³⁰ **Milliyet**, 14.06.1964, p. 1; 01.07.1964, p. 1.

³¹ Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Genel Sekreterlik Tarihçe Şube Müdürlüğü, **Cengiz Topel Dosyası, Raporlar**, Ankara, 2007.

partially realized the actual intervention which it had been planning since December 1963. Thus, Turkish intervention ceased Greek attacks by force for a short while. This situation revealed that the manner which fanatic Greeks understood was to use force. As for Acheson Plan, it could not be expected from Greeks, who even refused the political system of Cyprus stipulated by the 1960 Constitution and were in pursuit of Enosis, might accept an arrangement leaving the control of 25-30% of the island to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.³²

The situation appeared in Cyprus in 1964 remained the same until 1967. Decisive attitude of Turkey ceased Makarios and Greeks supporting Enosis to some extent. Meanwhile, diplomatic solution attempts went on either through mediation of the United Nations or bilateral discussions between Turkey and Greece but no result could be obtained. By the way, it should be noted that Makarios did not support negotiations between Turkey and Greece at all and desired to bring the issue to the United Nations because The Republic of Cyprus, where Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the governance was a member of Non-Aligned Movement. General Assembly of the United Nations, where Non- Aligned countries constituted the majority, might not be expected to have a decision in favor of Turkey. While Cyprus appeared to be like a patient having constantly 40°C temperature, a development arising from the internal policy of Greece occurred in 1967. A group of colonel took power by a coup in Greece on April 21st, 1967. Greece was ruled by governments based on "Colonels Junta" until 1974. Greek foreign policy positioned on a falcon orbit by the nature of junta regime. The amazing part of the situation was that while the junta which took power from elected Papandreou government was supported by the United States, Turkey awakened from dream of feeling secure through the traumatic effect of Johnson's letter and started discovering that the world was not made up of solely the United States. In this context, the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to Soviet Union in 1967 is very meaningful. Soviet Union promised to support the establishment of some essential industrial facilities and comprehensive treaties were concluded between (the) two countries. Moreover, as for Cyprus issue, Soviets Union developed an approach satisfying Turkey. When Greek militants who mobilized on November 15th 1967 initiated a planned attack towards Turkish Cypriots living in Geçitkale (Lefkoniko) and Boğaziçi (Aytotoro) regions, it was stated on the Soviet newspaper Pravda; "*it is obvious that Greek dictators take orders from American imperialists.*"³³ Response by Turkey was quite sharp. Turkey stipulated that Greek General Grivas ruling Greek Cypriot National Guards and army troops of Greece which became an important force through military build up since 1964 would abandon the island, otherwise it threatened with declaration of war. On November 25th, it was "*five to twelve*" and everybody was on the alert.³⁴ Whether the war was going to break out or not would depend on the response of Greece to the ultimatum.

³² Armaoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 792.

³³ Murat Sarıca vd., **Kıbrıs Sorunu**, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, İstanbul, 1975, p. 145.

³⁴ **Milliyet**, 25.11.1967, p. 1.

Finally, Greece realized that Turkey did not bluff and accepted the conditions set by Turkey. According to this, Greece would withdraw its soldiers and General Grivas from the island. However, Makarios had an objection to the conditions that Greece accepted in November 1967. Actually Makarios and Colonels Junta were on bad terms. Athens realized that it could not go on with Makarios and tried to find out a way to get rid of Makarios. Therefore, it initiated an expansive anti-Makarios campaign among Greek Cypriots. This campaign caused act of violence towards Turkish Cypriots again for Enosis which appeared to lose its effectiveness. Violence once more returned to Cyprus when Grivas secretly returned to the island and started organizing EOKA-B in 1971, after he was obliged to leave the island according to the agreement in 1967 but could not be successful in his political games he performed in Greece. However, this time, the terrorist attacks did not target only Turkish Cypriots, but also Makarios' supporters. Ioannidis junta which overthrew Papadopoulos -the ex-junta leader- in November 1973 was definitely against to the method of realizing Enosis through gradual constitutional amendments and preferred explicit military struggle directly addressing the goal.³⁵ However, in 1968, a period started where the representatives of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots convened and made negotiations for the solution of the problems under supervision and through mediation of the United Nations, as a method having sustained until today. Moreover, Greek Cypriots had a proper addressee in international negotiations, because Turkish Cypriots founded a Temporary Turkish Governance on December 28th, 1967, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was elected as the President and Rauf Denktaş as the Vice President. By going a step further, "the five-sided negotiations system" was formed for the solution of problems prevailing on the island. According to this, the fifth party of the negotiations, where representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as Turkey and Greece were present, was the United Nations. Newspapers were publishing the negotiations commenced in Nicosia under the presidency of the United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on June 9th, 1972.³⁶ However, attempt to find solution to the issue through international negotiations within conditions of 1973-1974 became non-sense. Nikos Sampson, the EOKA fighter took power from Makarios by a coup on July 15th, 1974. Of course, Ioannidis Junta in Athens supported this operation. Makarios gave the following speech in United Nations on July 19th, 1974:

"As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks. The United Nations has a peace-keeping force stationed in Cyprus. It is not possible for

³⁵ Nathalie Tocci, **EU Accession Dynamics And Conflict Resolution**, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, 2004, p. 52.

³⁶ **Milliyet**, 09.06.1972, p. 1.

the role of that peace-keeping force to be effective under conditions of a military coup. The Security Council should call upon the military regime of Greece to withdraw from Cyprus the Greek officers serving in the National Guard, and put an end to its invasion of Cyprus."³⁷

As it is seen, even Makarios assessed military coup dated on July 15th as a Greek invasion addressing Cyprus. Under these circumstances, Enosis was seemed to be realized by fait accompli. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit fled to London and submitted Harold Wilson, his British counterpart, an offer including a common military intervention in Cyprus, on July 17th, but he did not receive a positive response. By mediation of American Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, the United States "came into play" and submitted an offer of sending more moderate figure instead of Sampson even if not Makarios, to Athens, but this time it was the United States who was refused after the refusal of Turkey by London.³⁸ Apparently, junta regime in Greece was playing the game of "all or none". However, Turkey had not had the final word yet. On July 20th, 1974, BBC broadcasted the following news:

"Thousands of Turkish troops have invaded northern Cyprus after last-minute talks in the Greek capital, Athens, failed to reach a solution. Tension has been running high in the Mediterranean island since a military coup five days ago in which President Archbishop Makarios, a Greek Cypriot, was deposed.

*The coup led to fears among the Turkish Cypriot community that the Greek-backed military rulers would ignore their rights and press for unification for Cyprus with Greece or enosis."*³⁹

Turkey initiated military landing to Cyprus by common operation of air, land, sea elements on July 20th, 1974, in the morning. Both the Greek junta in Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration on the island, based on their experiences in 1963 and 1967, might have thought that Turkey could not initiate a military operation, therefore took an uncompromising stance in this last crisis. Greek junta in Athens made a big miscalculating by refusing the offer of the United States on July 19th. If they had not taken such an uncompromising stance, Turkey would have had an alternative except military operation and could not have found an opportunity to go beyond the diplomatic area. Meanwhile, Turkey blocked the Greek air and sea forces attempting to transport aids to the island and a close combat was experienced between Turkish and Greek military units. In Athens, Ioannidis wanted to attack Turkey on all fronts but others in the junta, many of whom outranked him, declared this impossible.⁴⁰ Parties agreed the resolution numbered 353 taken by Security Council of the United Nations on July 22th and ceasefire was ensured. Turkish military operation created

³⁷ <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/makarios-speech.html> (Recording of the speech by Makarios delivered before the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974 is also available on the website)

³⁸ **Milliyet**, 20.07.1974, "Atina'ya Sisco'nun Getirdiği Teklifler Reddedildi", p. 1, 10.

³⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866000/3866521.stm

⁴⁰ Keith Kyle, **Cyprus: In Search Of Peace**, Minority Rights Group International, published in UK, 1997, p. 18.

such a big trauma in the Greek side that Sampson in Cyprus and Junta in Athens became obliged to withdraw from power.

Guarantor states Turkey, Greece and England gave start to negotiations for solution of the existing situation in Geneva on 25th of July. Turkey took part in the negotiation table powerfully in the first Geneva Conference lasting until 30th of July where resolutions were announced with a declaration and left from the conference by getting what it desired. For instance based on the consequences, armed Greek Cypriot forces and Greek Army in Cyprus would remove the blockade in Turkish Cypriot regions, and these regions would be taken under the protection of UN Peace Force.⁴¹ The Second Geneva Conference was held between the dates of 8-14th of August. The roles seemed to be changed. In the conference where Rauf Denktaş, the leader of Turkish Cypriots and Glafkos Clerides, the leader of Greek Cypriots also attended, Clerides demanded full implementation of 1960 Constitution, however, this time the Turkish party was no longer speaking that language. Conditions were changed for Turkish party. Since the fact that Enosis had never died and it gained power whenever it found the chance, it became the Turkish side's thesis that protection of the existence of Turkish Cypriots should have been dependent on a new status. Accordingly, a bizonal federation where 34% of the island would be constituted by Turkish side was proposed.⁴² Greek side firmly refused this proposal. Moreover, Greek side insisted on not removing the blockade in Turkish Cypriot regions under siege. Since the Greek blockade had not been removed and due to the risky position of Turkish troops landed, Turkish Army initiated the second operation on August 14th, 1974. On the same date, Greece left NATO's military wing in anger at NATO's failure to discipline Turkey for its intervention in Cyprus.⁴³ Greek anger caused by the defeat, disappointment of not being supported, and finally aggression arising from fanaticism turned towards to the American targets in Cyprus and American Embassy in Nicosia was attacked, Ambassador Rodger Davies was assassinated. When the "Cyprus Peace Operation" (Turkish: Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı) ceased, 38% of the island was taken under Turkish control. In the first operation which began on 20th of June, international community showed tolerance to Turkey by regarding it as a country using its right arising from the convention. However, they evaluated the second operation as an invasion in general. In a sense, Junta regime in Greece was treated as "deserved" by the international community, but civil government, established instead of overthrown junta, was protected. In fact, throughout the history playing the victim instead of the party they victimized became something that the Greek side used to do well. Harry Scott Gibbons, who lived in Cyprus as a British journalist in 1960s,

⁴¹ Armaoğlu, *ibid*, p. 805.

⁴² Keith Kyle, *ibid*, p. 18.

⁴³ Richard N. Haass, "How To Keep Greece And Turkey Apart", *New York Times*, 13.04.1987.

portrayed the state of peace on the island he observed after the Peace Operation: *"When I lived in Cyprus in 1960s, unmarried women were seldom seen by outsiders. Now, perhaps because of having their own country where they are safe, they have blossomed into real beauties. And there is almost no crime."*⁴⁴ According to an analysis which has been valid since the Peace Operation, Turkish Cypriots may make some territorial concessions for an agreement, however, they should not be expected to give up its sovereignty gains.⁴⁵

Conclusion

Greek policy put into effect in Cyprus was not something unfamiliar for the Turkish side. After gaining its independence by separating from Ottoman State through full support of Britain, France, and Russia, Greece deterritorialized Turks by following the same method for almost a century. It is difficult to show an ideology that mobilizes its supporters as much as Megali Idea formulated by Ioannis Kolletis. Megali Idea is expansionist by its nature and Enosis is an implementation form of Megali Idea in practice. As noted before, Kolletis directly targeted and referred to Turkey and Turks in 1844. Actually its relationship with Turkey seems to be an exact success story for Greece as of the last century of Ottoman era. Even Megali Idea was not totally implemented, it was significantly put in effect. The view of past seen from the Turkish side is depressing and exemplary. Turks, the founding element of Ottoman State, was kicked out of Europe, and political existence of Turks retreated to Asia Minor where the Turkish population constituted the majority. Greece became only an instrument in this process, which was the East policy of the industrialized great powers, in other words "the Eastern Question."

In an era when traditional multi-national empires went out of existence and nation-state became a raising value as a political model, Ottoman State collapsed and Republic of Turkey was founded as its successor. This new Turkey considered that having as much homogeneous demographic structure as possible was the key for being strong in political terms and having social peace, therefore agreed with Greece for Population Exchange. According to this, -with some exceptions- Greeks within the boundaries of Turkey were subjected to compulsory migration to Greece, and Turks within the boundaries of Greece to Turkey. Even some disruptions and tension were experienced in the Population Exchange process, both parties were satisfied with the result politically, because Turkey achieved to turkicize Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, and Greece achieved to considerably grecize the lands within today's boundary of Greece (except Western Thrace). Indeed, in the age of nation-states, expansionist ambitions were substantially hindered by not having people from the same nation on the other side of the border. Cyprus which was under the supremacy of Britain within

⁴⁴ Harry Scott Gibbons, **The Genocide Files**, Charles Bravos Publishers, London, 1997, p. 492.

⁴⁵ Soyalp Tamçelik, **Kıbrıs İçin Düşünülen Federal Anayasanın Özellikleri**, Zirve Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, Gaziantep, 2010, p. 31.

that period was the region forgotten and stayed out of this absolute sharing which was not conscientious but logical.

Initially, Cyprus issue did not develop as an issue related to Turkey. The origin of the issue was undoubtedly the ideology of Megali Idea and its implementation named Enosis. Nevertheless, Britain as the sovereign power in the island was the addressee of Greek demands. Main problem was stemming from that Greece as a state was affected by people having motivation to get the lands where people of Greek origin live under their own domination one way or another. It was such a powerful motivation that as it is in the examples of Turco-Greek or Anglo-Greek relations, power inequality could not cause demoralization. Turkish public opinion woke up to the subject of Cyprus before the Turkish Government. Actually the one awakening the Turkish Government was Britain. Since a British community did not use to exist in Cyprus, the fact that the island was under British domination caused an unpleasant view reminding the colonialism era. Therefore, to inhibit Greek demands, Britain brought forward the Turkish party in the island. In that way, Britain became successful to make the Cyprus issue internationalized rather than being an Anglo-Greek conflict where Britain was weak in terms of political ethic. As a result, after important diplomatic disputes, Zurich and London Treaties were executed, which constituted a base for the foundation of the Cyprus Republic. Greek Cypriots and Greece should have regretted most in terms of their own interests and goals because of signing London and Zurich Treaties. In this way Britain guaranteed its own interests in the island, and what's worse for the Greek side was that Turkey got involved in the issue in accordance with international law. In fact, Enosis became impossible even in 1960, but the Greek side did not understand this.

Cyprus issue remained not as a solely Turco-Greek conflict and took over internal and external policies of both parties. Due to the letter by President Johnson in 1963, Turkey was traumatized against The United States that was the ally which Turkey trusted most. Anti-Americanism began to muster up support in Turkish public opinion hereafter. Moreover, Turco-American relations completely deteriorated depending on American arms embargo that Turkey suffered after its military intervention to Cyprus in 1974. As for Greece, even its conversion to democracy from junta regime ironically became possible depending on Cyprus issue. Moreover, Greece left NATO's military wing after military intervention of Turkey to Cyprus. Turkey's military intervention to the island as a guarantor state in 1974 has an historical meaning beyond the apparent situation. The country, which stayed in defense for centuries, went out of its borders and used force to protect its national interests. This time, international conjuncture was different from the period when Greece was expanding its lands against Turkey under the auspices of industrialized great powers without even firing a bullet. This time, Turkey was a member of

Western alliance system and Greece lacked of western protectors that would be mobilized against Turkey. This time Greece stayed alone against Turkey. The historical mistake of both Greece and Greek Cypriot leadership before Turkey's intervention was the assumption that the United States would stop Turkey as it did in 1963 and 1967. Indeed, the United States got involved in the issue by means of active diplomacy just before the intervention. However, the junta in Athens dug its own grave by refusing the American proposal. It made Turkey have no other choice. Despite all valid ground from its own side, the mistake of Turkey was the second military operation it initiated. This operation led Turkey to be perceived as an occupying state. In fact the second operation was a necessity for Turkey; but if it had been possible and the objectives which were reached in the second operation had been reached at the end of the first operation, this perception would not be developed since the first operation was regarded as the right of Turkey stemming from international law. For Cyprus, the most basic result of Turkey's military intervention is that it brought bizonality to the island. No violence or clash of arms has occurred for 38 years (1974-2012) on the island. Turkish Army provided security for Turkish Cypriots which could not have been provided by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Besides this state of peace, inter-communal negotiations have been still going on by means of the United Nations since then. Turkish thesis in the inter-communal talks is based on de facto state and adopts federative model with bizonality having equal political rights of both parties. In fact, it is more logical for the communities to live as neighbors in two separate zones rather than experiencing unrest when they live nested. In a sense, practically a population exchange happened. Turkish Cypriots living in the south migrated to Turkish side in the north, and Greek Cypriots living in the north migrated to Greek side of today in the south. It may humanistically be a tragedy as experienced in the population exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1920s that people leave their homeland, however, bizonality -as a result of population exchange- is a tested and logical way of ensuring state of peace between Turkish and Greek parties.

The most important two developments emerged in Cyprus issue since 1974 have been the declaration of independence of Turkish Cypriots on November 15th, 1983, and the referendum which was held in both zones in 2004. Turkish Cypriots, who had declared "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, declared their own independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983 when Greek side refused the "federation" thesis. From the Turkish point of view, the essential problem is that the Greek side cannot stand to see a Turkish political existence having equal political rights with them on the island and its tendency to consider Turkish Cypriots as a minority who should have less political rights. The most important problem of Turkish Cypriots is accreditation. There exists no state recognizing Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus except Turkey. However, Greek Cypriot administration is the member of European Union as if it represents the entire island. Referendum for the plan of Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General, to end the political

separation in the island was held in both Turkish and Greek sides in 2004. While the plan, which was flexing the thesis of both sides and aiming to bring them together in a common point, was supported by Turkish Cypriots with the rate of 69.90%, Greek Cypriots voted it at the rate of 24.17% and said "No" to it in conclusion. 2004 Referendum may have been the last chance for living on the island together as one state with two communities having equal rights. Time elapses against the political union of the island. New generations who have already become inured to the current political situation have grown up. In the Turkish region of the island as well, national will and accordingly parliamentary democracy with all institutions and organizations such as political parties, free elections etc. are available. It is illogical to expect Turkish Cypriots to abandon their actual acquirements and join in a common state with minority rights. Sufficient time has elapsed to understand that producing a policy supporting the idea that "Greek population constitutes the majority on the island, therefore Turks shall have some rights either, but the essential element is the Greek" by underestimating the de facto situation prevailing does not serve the objective of "political union" of the island. Since it is impossible to impose the Greek interests on Turkey with a 19th century model international campaign, it is obvious that Greek side needs changing its point of view whether political union of Cyprus is really desired.

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