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Davidson'un Düzensiz Tekçilik Kuramı ve Sosyal Bilimsel Yasaların Varlığı

Journal Name:

  • Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2003

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Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The question whether there exists strict social scientific laws has long been debated in the philosophy of the social sciences. In spite of its widespread acceptance, Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, which holds that there are no strict psychological laws, has been the target of a variety of distinct criticism. In this paper, my aim is to a) discuss the central tenets of anomalous monism; b) examine whether it is committed to epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism; c) develop an argument that refutes the criticism raised by Lee McIntyre against anomalous monism
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Kesin sosyal bilimsel yasaların olup olamayacağı sorusu sosyal bilimler felsefesinde uzun süredir tartışılmakta olan bir konudur. Yaygın kabul görmesine karşın, Donald David-son'un, kesin psikolojik yasaların olmadığını ileri süren düzensiz tekçilik kuramı bir çok farklı eleştiriye hedef olmuştur. Bu makalede amacım, a) düzensiz tekçiliğin temel ilkelerini tartışmak; b) bu kuramın gölge-olguculuk ve yadsıyıcı maddeciliği içerip içermediğini incelemek; c) Lee McIntyre'ın düzensiz tekçilik kuramına yönelik ileri sürdüğü eleştiriye karşı bir argüman geliştirmektir.
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  • 2
157-169
  • Turkish

REFERENCES

References: 

Davidson, Donald. (1980a). "Psychology as Philosophy", Essays on Actions and Events içinde (229-39), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, Donald. (1980b). "Mental Events", Essays on Actions and Events içinde (207-27), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davidson, Donald. (1980c). "The Individuation of Events", Essays on Actions and Events içinde (161-86), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Donald Davidson. (1995). "Thinking Causes", Mental Causation içinde (3-17), derleyenler: J. Heil ve A. Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kim, Jeagwon. (1989). "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 63:31-47.
Kim, Jaegwon. (1995). "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strick Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" Mental Causation içinde (19-26), derleyenler: J. Heil ve A. Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Sedat YAZICI
McLaughlin Brain P. (1995). "On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism", Mental Causation içinde (27-40), derleyenler: J. Heil ve A. Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1980). "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" From a Logical Point of View içinde (20-46), Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Smart, J. J. C. "Davidson's Minimal Materialism", Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events içinde (173-82), derleyenler: B. Vermazen ve M. B. Hintikka, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McIntyre, Lee. (1998). "Davidson and Social Scientific Laws", Synthese 120:
375-94.
Searle, John. (19849. Minds, Brains and Science, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Searle, John. (1991). "Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences", Phi¬losophy of the Social Sciences 21(3): 332-344.
Sosa, Ernest. (1984). "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation" Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: 271-81.
Weber, Max. (1968). "Objectivity in Social Science" Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Science içinde (85-97), derleyen: May Brodbeck, New York : The Macmillan Company.
Yalowitz, Steven. (1998). "Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism", Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 28 (2): 183-226.

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