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Desentralizasyon Kamu Sektöründeki Hantallaşmayı Önler Mi? Bir OECD Panel Verileri Regresyon Analizi

Does The Decentralisation Prevent The Excessiveness In Public Sector? An OECD Panel Data Regression Analysis

Journal Name:

  • Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2007

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
Public sector viewed as important with its numerous functions for a long time has recently become the locus of criticisms by many due to its unproductive and excessive size. One of the most emphasized factors which downsizes the public sector and makes it more efficient is the decentralization, moving more weight of this sector towards local administrations. There in fact, exists some predictions of how decentralization, leaving more of the public services and revenue sources to finance them, to sub-national government provides discipline in public sector. In this study, the disciplinary effects of decentralization on the public sector is tested using panel corrected standard errors procedure and the from OECD countries. The results show that decentralized public services and taxes up to some degree, limits the growth of public sector.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Uzun süredir yüklendiği bir çok fonksiyonla ekonomide ağırlığını hissettiren kamu sektörü son yıllarda verimsizliği ve hantallığıyla basta ekonomistler olmak üzere bir çok kesimce elestiri odağı haline gelmistir. Kamu sektörünü içinde bulunduğu hantal yapısından kurtarmak ve daha etkin hale getirmek üzere yapılan çalısmaların üzerinde en çok durulanlardan birisi de bu sektörün ağırlığını yerel yönetimlere doğru kaydırarak yeniden yapılandırmak, yani desentralizasyondur. Desentralizasyon yoluyla merkezi yönetim hizmetlerinin ve bunları finanse edecek mali kaynakların bir çoğunu yerel yönetimlere devretmenin kamuda disiplini sağlayacağı yönünde literatürde bir takım öngörüler bulunmaktadır. Bu çalısma da desentralizasyonun kamu sektörünü disipline edici etkileri OECD ülkelerine ait panel verileri ve standart hataları düzeltilmis panel verileri (PCSE) tahmin prosedürü ile test edilmektedir. Ortaya çıkan tahmin sonuçları özellikle kamu harcamalarının ve belli bir ölçüde de vergilerin merkezi yönetimden yerel yönetimlere kaydırılmasının kamu sektörünün büyüme hızını sınırladığını göstermektedir.
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  • Turkish

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