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Sezginin Arı Formu ya da Formel Sezgi Olarak Kant’ta Zaman: Heidegger’i Marburg Okulu’ndan Ayıran Yitimsellik Paradoksu

Time as Pure Form of Intuition or Formal Intuition in Kant: The Paradox of Finitude Which Differentiate Heidegger from Marburg School

Journal Name:

  • Kaygı: Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2011

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
This article critically examines Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, regarding his controversial thesis that, for Kant, intuition and thought has a “single root” as imagination. That is, for Heidegger, Kant’s theory of imagination, uncovers the idea that all thought have a relation to intuition as a “synthesis speciosa”. This means that our all cognitive powers are primordially finite on the basis of the finitude of human being as Dasein and Being as such. As Heidegger puts it, “man is never absolute and infinite in the creativeness of being itself, but only in so far he is engaged in comprehending it”. As opposed to Heidegger, Marburg School Neo-Kantians claim that infinity of the ontological is essentially tied to the experience of the ontic for Kant. Then Neo-Kantians maintain that such an understanding allows a finite creature such as man attains to knowledge, reason, or truth. According to them, Kant’s problem is precisely this: “how, given this human finitude, could there ever be truths which are both necessary and universal? , “How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?” This study also articulate difference between the “pure forms of intuition” and the “formal intuition” to pinpoint Heidegger-Marburg School disputation.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu çalışma, Kant için, sezgi ve düşüncenin “ortak kökü”nün imgelem olduğunu savlayan tartışmalı görüşü doğrultusunda Heidegger’in Kant yorumunu ayrıntılı bir biçimde açımlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Heidegger için, Kant’ın imgelem anlayışı, düşüncenin tamamen “synthesis speciosa” (ya da “figüratif sentez”) olarak sezgi ile ilişkili olduğu düşüncesini gerekçelendirmektedir. Bu açıkça, bizim tüm bilişsel yetilerimizin, insan varlığı olarak Dasein ve Varlık’ın kendisinin yitimselliği temelinde, kökensel olarak yitimli olduğunu söylemektir. Heidegger’in belirttiği gibi, “insan asla, varlığın kendisini açığa çıkarmak bakımından mutlak ve yitimsiz değildir; ancak yalnızca gücü yettiği kadar onu anlama çabasındadır”. Heidegger’e karşıt olarak, Marburg Okulu Yeni-Kantçıları, Kant için, varlıkbilimsel olanın yitimsizliğinin en genel anlamda ‘olan’ın deneyimi ile ilişkili olduğunu irdeler. Bu nedenle, Yeni-Kantçılar, yalnızca bu türden bir anlayışın, insan gibi yitimli bir varlığın bilgi, us ya da hakikate ulaşabilirliğini açıklayabileceğini savunur. Yeni-Kantçılar’a göre, Kant’ın sorunu tam da şudur: “İnsan yitimselliği hem zorunlu hem de evrensel hakikatlerin olanaklılığını nasıl sağlayabilir?” “Sentetik apriori yargılar nasıl olanaklıdır?”. Bu çalışma, ayrıca “sezginin arı formları” ve “formel sezgi” arasındaki ayrımın, Heidegger-Marburg Okulu arasındaki tartışmaların asıl nedeni olduğunu açıklığa kavuşturmaktadır.
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  • 17
11-27
  • Turkish

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