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Güvenlik Hizmetlerinde Devlet-Özel Sektör İşbirliği: Metodoloji ve Kriterler

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Abstract (2. Language): 
Public security services are directly provided by public organizations in Turkey. Private security services, as described in the law, are a complementary component of public security. Developed western countries widely utilize private sector in provision of public security services. If carefully planned, several advantages of private sector including high performance and low cost can increase efficiency and quality of public security services. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have shown the possible cost of incorrect private security provision. Several factors such as service features, private sector characteristics, competitive market situation, and risk assessment should be evaluated before deciding to privatize security services. A security privatization methodology supported by theory can be useful for decision makers. This article aims to develop such a methodology with privatization criteria to help decision makers arrive at effective decisions. The principleagent theory, also known as contract theory, was used in specifying privatization criteria. The theory was applied to United States aviation security system that was provided by private sector before 9/11 terrorist attacks. The methodology developed in this article was exemplified through several public security services. As a conclusion, the methodology and criteria developed can guide decision makers on the privatization of public security services.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Türkiye’de kamu güvenliği hizmetleri bizzat devlet kurumları eliyle sağlanır. Özel güvenlik hizmetleri, kanunda belirtildiği şekliyle, kamu güvenliğini tamamlayıcı mahiyettedir. Özel sektörün güvenlik hizmetlerinde kullanımı, gelişmiş batı ülkelerinde çok daha yaygındır. Dikkatli bir şekilde planlandığı takdirde, yüksek verim, düşük maliyet gibi özel sektörün öne çıkan özellikleri, güvenlik hizmetlerinin verimini ve kalitesini artırıp, maliyetleri düşürebilir. 11 Eylül terörist saldırılarında görüldüğü gibi, güvenlik hizmetlerini yanlış bir şekilde özelleştirmek, olumsuz sonuçlar doğurabilir. Güvenlik hizmetinin özellikleri, özel sektörün karakteristikleri, piyasanın rekabet durumu, risk durumu gibi birçok faktör bir arada değerlendirilerek özelleştirmeye karar verilmelidir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, bir özelleştirme metodolojisi geliştirerek, özel sektörden güvenlik hizmeti alımının belirlenen kriterler ışığında yapılması için altyapı oluşturmaktır. Teorik altyapısıyla geliştirilecek güvenlik hizmetleri özelleştirme metodolojisi, hizmetin bizzat devlet tarafından verilmesi veya özel sektörden satın alınması noktasında karar vericiler için kullanışlı olabilir. Bu kriterlerin belirlenmesinde, Sözleşme Teorisi olarak da bilinen “Principal-Agent” teorisi kullanılmıştır. Teori, örnek olay olarak seçilen 11 Eylül saldırıları öncesi özel sektörce işletilen Amerika Birleşik Devletleri sivil havacılık güvenliği sistemine uygulanmıştır. Geliştirilen metodolojinin kullanımı, belirlenen kriterlerin değişik kamu güvenliği hizmetlerine uygulanması ile örneklenmiştir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışmanın geliştirdiği metodoloji ve kriterler güvenlik hizmetlerinin özelleştirilmesinde karar vericiler için yol gösterici olması amaçlanmıştır.
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