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Thomas Nagel’ın 'Fizikalizm' ve 'Yarasa Olmak Nasıl Bir Şeydir' Makalelerinin Bilince Nesnel Bir Açıklama Verme Arayışı Açısından Kıyaslanması

The Comparison of 'Physicalism' and 'What is It Like to be a Bat?' of Thomas Nagel in the Context of the Search for Giving an Objective Ac-count of Consciousness

Journal Name:

  • Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy

Publication Year:

  • 2017

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Abstract (2. Language): 
“What is it Like to be a Bat” (1974) and “The View from Nowhere” (1986) of Thomas Nagel are two extremely cited pieces of analytic philosophy in the last century. The arguments presented in those works have been frequently cited as either problems of giving an objective-scientific account of consciousness or an outright denial of the possibility of a physicalist characterization of it. After summariz-ing all of them, I turn to show why they are mistaken. By this, I hope I will be able to show that all these mistakes are originated from either blatantly ignoring his objective phenomenology project or misunder-standing it. The reasons that I use to explain these misperceptions would also suggest that Nagel’s objective phenomenology project is some sort of constructing a theoretical and conceptual ground to have an objective account of the subjective aspect of experience.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Thomas Nagel’ın “Yarasa Olmak Nasıl bir Şeydir” makalesi (1974) ve “Hiçbir Yerden Bakış” (1986) adlı kitabı aşırı derecede alıntılanmış iki eserdir. Buradaki argümanlar sıklıkla (i) bilincin öz-nel boyutunun nesnel-bilimsel bir açıklamasının tümüyle yapılabil-mesinin mümkün olmadığını gösteren, veya (ii) fizikalizmin sıkıntı-larını dile getiren, veya (iii) düpedüz fizikalizmin bir reddi olarak algılanmış veya kullanılmışlardır. Bu çalışmamda her üç algının da, değişen oranlarda, hatalı olduğunu savunuyorum. Tezimi savuna-bilmek için, söylediğim üç ana yorumun, her birini özetliyor ve bunların her birinin neden yanlış olduğunu gösteriyorum. Böylelik-le Nagel’ın ana projesi olan nesnel fenomenoloji önerisini öne çıka-rarak tüm bu hataların bu projenin genelde pek incelenmemesi ve-ya incelendiğinde yanlış algılanmasına dayandığını ortaya koyuyo-rum. Bunları ikna edici şekilde yapmak için gösterdiğim gerekçeler nihayetinde Nagel’ın nesnel fenomenoloji projesi aracılığıyla “bilin-cin öznel karakterini nesnel bir şekilde açıklamaya çalıştığı” şeklin-deki ikinci tezimi destekleyecektir.
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