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Anayasanın Yorumlanmasında Felsefi Yaklaşım: Ronald Dworkin'e Göre Anayasanın Ahlaksal Okunuşu

Philosophical Approach In The Interpretation Of The Constitution: The Moral Reading Of The Consititon According To Norald Dworkin

Journal Name:

  • Çankaya University Journal of Law

Publication Year:

  • 2012

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
In this article, first I state that the provisions of constitutions are very important and for that reason the importance of well-written constitutions cannot be denied; but interpretation of the provisions of the constitution is also incontrovertible. I tried to explain Ronald Dworkin's view concerning the moral reading of the Constitution. Dworkin alleged that while abiding by the provisions of the constitution, it is possible to catch the changes in the society. Dworkin makes this possible by making a distinction between "conception" and "concept". According to Dworkin abstract provisions of the United States Constitution cannot be treated as specific "conceptions". For this reason, the abstract provisions of the Constitution of the United States cannot be interpreted as if they are the conceptions of the constitution-makers. The moral reading proposes that we all interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency and justice. The moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law. This means that ethical philosophy and constitutional law must fuse. After examining the criticisms of the Dworkin's philosophical approach to interpretation, I tried to appraise this approach from the viewpoint of Turkey. As a conclusion, I arrived to the view that in order to realize the moral reading, consti¬tutions must be short and have abstract moral principles like the United States Constitution.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu yazıda ilk olarak anayasalarda yer alan kuralların çok önemli olduğu ve bu nedenle iyi yazılmış bir anayasaya sahip olmanın gerekliğinin inkar edilemeyeceği; ama anayasalarda yer alan kuralların yo-rumlanışlarının öneminin de yadsınamayacağı belirtilmiştir. Bu makalede Ronald Dworkin'in anayasaların ahlaksal okunuşuyla ilgili görüşleri açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Dworkin anayasal metne sadık kalırken, metnin yorumlanması yoluyla toplumdaki değişikliklerin yakalanabileceğini ileri sürmüştür. Bunu yazar "kavram" ve "anlayış" arasındaki farklılıkla gerçekleştirmektedir. Yazara göre Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Anayasasında yer alan soyut hükümler belirli "anlayışları" değil belirli bir "kavramları" göstermektedir. Bu nedenle bu soyut hükümler kurucuların o hükümlerle ilgili anlayışlarına göre yorumlanmamalıdır. Ah¬laksal okuma bizlerin bu soyut hükümleri adalet ve siyasal ahlak konusunda çağırışımda bulunduğu ahlak¬sal ilkeler anlayışı temelinde yorumlayıp uygulamamızı önermektedir. Ahlaksal okuma siyasal ahlakı ana¬yasa hukukunun kalbine yerleştirmektedir. Bu ise ahlak felsefesiyle anayasa hukukun birleşmesini gerek¬tirmektedir. Dworkin'in felsefi yaklaşımına yöneltilen eleştiriler incelendikten sonra, bu yazıda bu yakla¬şımın ülkemiz açısından değerlendirilmesine çalışılmıştır. Yazıda anayasaların ahlaksal okunuşlarının sağ¬lıklı bir biçimde gerçekleşebilmesi için Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Anayasası gibi kısa, ayrıntılara girme¬yen ve soyut ahlaksal ilkelerden oluşan bir anayasanın varolması gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır.
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ANAYASANIN YORUMLANMASINDA FELSEFİ YAKLAŞIM: RONALD DWORKİN'E GÖRE ANAYASANIN AHLAKSAL OKUNUŞU
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