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KYOTO PROTOKOLÜ UYGULAMA MEKANİZMALARI: KUSURLU MU YOKSA UMUT VERİCİ KAVRAMLAR MI?

Journal Name:

  • İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Publication Year:

  • 2010

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of AuthorFaculty of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
The Kyoto Protocol is praised by some scholars and criticized by others. This paper evaluates the enforcement mechanisms comprising monitoring and noncompliance procedures based on an informal game theoretic analysis. It is argued that the monitoring system has achieved an unprecedented level of sophistication. It also appears that the non-compliance procedures have achieved a remarkable quality (in particular when judged in view of past international environmental treaties) in terms of their deterrence potential and credibility, though there is room for improvement. Possibilities for improvement are outlined and possible supplemental non-compliance procedures are proposed.
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Abstract (Original Language): 
Kyoto Protokolü bazı aydınlar tarafından övgüyle karsılanırken bazıları tarafından da elestirilmektedir. Bu makale, formel olmayan bir oyun teorisi analizi üzerine kurulan kontrol ve uyumsuzluk prosedürlerini içinde barındıran uygulama mekanizmalarını ele almaktadır. Kontrol sisteminin daha önce görülmemis düzeyde bir kapsamlılık gösterdiği öne sürülmektedir. Ayrıca uyumsuzluk prosedürleri de caydırıcılık potansiyeli ve güvenilirliği bakımından -hala gelistirilmesi gereken noktalar olsa bile- dikkate değer bir kalite düzeyine ulasmıs görünmektedir (Özellikle çevreyle ilgili geçmisteki uluslararası anlasmalarla karsılastırıldığında). Yapılabilecek iyilestirmeler ana hatlarıyla belirtilmis ve eklenebilecek uyumsuzluk prosedürleri önerilmistir.
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  • 2
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  • Turkish

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